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i 
ABSTRACT 
This study examines the emergence of risk governance arrangements in US 
bank holding companies (BHCs) and tests for their impact upon performance 
and risk profiles. Following the financial crisis, regulators introduced several 
new risk governance processes, including the adoption of Risk Appetite 
arrangements and the establishment of Risk Committees, both board level 
features. In this study, a research gap is unearthed with respect to risk 
governance practices and their impact upon BHC performance and risk 
measures. The motivation of this research is to validate the adoption of these 
board-level practices in an evidence-based framework.     
The empirical research method relies on the collection of a unique data set. The 
sample covers a significant dollar-weighted portion of the US banking system. 
Multivariate analysis facilitates the testing of risk governance mechanisms to 
outcome variables, while controlling for firm-specific and standard corporate 
governance variables.   
The practical implication of this study with respect to Risk Appetite is clear. 
BHCs that practice Risk Appetite arrangements exhibit improved performance 
and lower realised loan losses. In contrast, while some limited evidence is 
presented that the marketplace may reward BHCs for certain composition 
aspects of the Risk Committee, the overall results suggest that the requirement 
for a Risk Committee has little impact to BHC’s operating performance and risk 
measures.  
In terms of academic contribution, this study examines two major risk 
governance mechanisms within a common framework, presenting evidence of a 
significant and positive impact of the board level articulation of Risk Appetite 
arrangements to a suite of BHC performance measures and a negative 
association to loan losses. As the first known empirical research study of Risk 
Appetite, it confirms that this board level mechanism should be included as an 
explanatory variable in bank or risk governance related empirical research 
studies. 
These findings provide industry practitioners (including BHC chief executive 
officers and board members) convincing arguments for the immediate adoption 
of Risk Appetite arrangements. US Regulators, who introduced Risk Appetite 
requirements in 2014 for larger BHCs, are presented with validation by this 
study for wider adoption of this risk governance mechanism, even if such 
practices are voluntarily adopted by BHCs.  
As signs begin to emerge in the United States of the possible relaxation of the 
regulatory requirements of certain aspects of the Dodd-Frank Act, this study 
contributes to this debate in a timely fashion by testing the veracity of two key 
supervisory-driven risk governance practices aimed at the boardroom in an 
evidence-based evaluation. 
 
Keywords: Risk Governance, Corporate Governance, BHCs, Risk Appetite, 
and Risk Committee 
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1 FOUNDATION 
1.1 Introduction 
Ineffective monitoring and risk oversight contributed to the financial crisis, which 
plagued the global economy from 2007 to 2009. Excessive risk-taking has been 
specifically identified as a leading cause of the financial crisis (Bolton, 2009; 
Gao, Liao and Wang, 2013), resulting in both significant financial and societal 
costs. Since the financial crisis, global debt levels have increased by $57 trillion 
to $199 trillion, including government borrowings to fund bailouts (McKinsey, 
2015a). Luttrell, Atkinson and Rosenblum (2013) estimate a base case output 
loss of $50,000 to $120,000 for every US household. Beyond these financial 
costs, the social costs of financial crises can be significant, including a reduction 
in life expectancy, a decline in the availability of education, and increased global 
poverty (van Dijk, 2013). The financial crisis was the most severe economic 
event in the US since the Great Depression (Bolton, 2009). 
Corporate governance failures in financial institutions has also been linked to 
the severity of the financial crisis (Walker, 2009; Kirkpatrick, 2009; United 
Nations, 2010; The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, 2011). These failures 
occurred simultaneously with changes to the business model of banking, which 
placed greater reliance on risk-taking (Blundell-Wingnall, Atkinson and Lee, 
2008). Bank corporate governance was often ineffective, as directors failed to 
act as an effective challenge to management (RiskMinds, 2009). 
Since the financial crisis, US bank boards have begun to face an increase of 
their risk oversight responsibilities and duties (Macey and O’Hara, 2016). A 
battery of regulations has been introduced to mitigate systemic risk, such as 
increasing bank capital levels and extending liquidity profiles (Claessens and 
Kodres, 2014; Ellis, Haldane and Moshirian, 2014; Admati, 2016). Beyond these 
structural reforms, heightened risk governance practices have been specified in 
the Dodd-Frank Act (2010)1 and later enshrined in the Federal Register (2014a).   
Two risk governance mechanisms are examined in this study, Risk Appetite 
arrangements and the role of the Risk Committee.2 Risk Appetite statements 
are defined as the written articulation of the aggregate level and types of risks 
that a BHC is willing to accept or avoid in order to pursue its objectives (Basel, 
2015a, p. 2). While empirical research studies have examined Risk Committees 
before the crisis period, few studies have probed the period of regulatory 
intervention that followed the crisis, and no study appears to have empirically 
examined the role of Risk Appetite arrangements. Given the impact of systemic 
risk and the important role of banks as credit intermediaries, this study 
addresses a significant research gap relating to these risk governance 
practices. 
                                            
1 The Dodd-Frank Act (2010) makes a total of six references to Risk Committees, including the requirement for a Risk 
Committee, the requirement for a number of independent members including at least one risk management expert. 
Dodd-Frank (2010) makes no explicit reference to Risk Appetite, which was reflected in the Federal Register (2014a).  
2 Risk Appetite arrangements are the board level processes relating to the approval of the risk appetite statement, 
including qualitative and qualitative measures expressed relative to earnings, capital, risk, and liquidity (FSB, 2013a, p. 
2). The Risk Committee is the board level sub-committee delegated with risk oversight and monitoring. 
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The results of this study can be summarised as follows: Board-level approved 
Risk Appetite arrangements exhibit a cogent relation to a suite of BHC 
performance measures (and at least one key risk measure) across a variety of 
empirical settings, as well as time and size-varied sub-samples. Upon 
examination of the phenomenon of Risk Appetite arrangements through the 
lens of agency theory, this evidence suggests that the practice is a key aspect 
of internal board monitoring. Risk Committees, on the other hand, fail to exhibit 
compelling evidence of being significantly related to BHC accounting measures, 
although certain aspects of this board sub committee may be recognized and 
rewarded by the equity markets.   
The study makes several contributions to the understanding of bank corporate 
governance. First, from an industry perspective, it presents evidence regarding 
the relationship and impact of Risk Appetite arrangements with bank accounting 
outcome measures, which will be of interest to bank directors and senior 
management. For regulators, this research provides a compelling argument to 
include Risk Appetite arrangements in their oversight and consider the 
publication of selected Risk Appetite data in regulatory call reports. Supervisors 
may also wish to consider the use of Risk Appetite content when evaluating 
economic capital requirements and system-wide stress tests, given that this 
practice has been subject to criticism as currently designed (Dowd, 2016).3   
From an academic perspective, this study probes the literature on bank 
corporate governance and monitoring, and identifies a gap relating to empirical 
research of Risk Appetite and bank outcome measures. It also provides early 
evidence of a significant association between the adoption of Risk Appetite 
arrangements and an array of bank accounting variables. These explanatory 
variables have hitherto received limited empirical attention.4 Risk Appetite 
arrangements in particular should be considered as a potential explanatory 
variable in selected future empirical research of the banking sector. 
This thesis is structured as follows. Following this introduction, the remainder of 
Chapter 1 reports on the regulatory intervention, presenting the research 
question and explaining the background of the project and the research 
methods employed. Chapter 2 presents a literature review and develops 
hypotheses for testing for the two risk governance mechanisms. Chapter 3 
explains the sample construction and data collection processes, and Chapters 4 
and 5 examine relationships between risk governance mechanisms and a suite 
of headline outcome measures. Chapter 6 presents a further analysis of board-
level Risk Committees and Risk Appetite arrangements for robustness, 
including the role of CEO Power in performance and risk-taking, and probing for 
underlying channels of impact. Chapter 7 presents conclusions and limitations 
of the research and presents recommendations for further study. 
                                            
3 One overarching criticism of the bank stress-testing regime is its reliance on a single adverse and unacceptably low 
stress scenario. Supervisory examination of Risk Appetite arrangements may assist in the identification of even more 
relevant and realistic risk types and boundaries for the bank stress testing in the future. 
4 There appears to have been little or no previous empirical research on Risk Appetite arrangements and performance 
or risk-taking measures in commercial banks. However, conceptual research in this domain is emerging, as discussed 
by Sabato (2009), Wymeersch (2012), Yoost (2014), Stulz (2015), Gontarek (2016) and others. 
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1.2 Regulatory Intervention 
Bank boards failed to exercise adequate risk oversight in the run-up to the 
financial crisis. Weaknesses identified by global policy makers include the 
failure of board directors to adhere to acceptable risk appetite profiles (SSG, 
2009, 2010). The de Larosière Report (2009) adds that ineffective corporate 
governance arrangements and independent risk monitoring contributed to the 
crisis, suggesting that poor risk assessment and a failure to aggregate 
exposures made it difficult to comprehend risk profiles. Ellis, Haldane and 
Moshirian (2014) posit that, while supervisory reforms have been under way, 
less attention has been paid to the role of corporate governance. They argue 
that the financial crisis unveiled bank governance failures at multiple levels, 
including poor internal monitoring and ineffective market discipline. 
Heightened bank regulation followed the financial crisis, and Dodd-Frank (2010) 
was the primary early response in the US (Gao, Liao and Wang, 2013). A key 
underlying objective of this reform is to improve the safety and soundness of the 
banking system, given the systemic risks associated with large and complex 
banks (Skeel, 2011; Federal Register, 2014a). Immediately following the 
financial crisis, the G30 (2012) proposed the adoption of Risk Appetite 
arrangements and board-level Risk Committees, amongst other measures. In 
the following year, the Financial Stability Board (FSB, 2013b) recommended the 
adoption of risk governance arrangements, while bank supervisors in other 
nations announced new board-level requirements for Risk Appetite (OSFI, 
2013; MAS, 2013). However, 2014 was a watershed year for regulation, with 
the issuance of new risk governance guidelines by the Basel Committee (Basel, 
2014), the OECD (2014), and other regulatory authorities. Figure 1 below 
illustrates the recent acceleration in risk governance.  
This study adopts the FSB’s definition of risk governance: “a framework through 
which the board and management establish the firm’s strategy, articulate and 
monitor adherence to Risk Appetite and risk limits, and identify, measure and 
manage risks” (FSB, 2013b, p. iii).5 
Also in 2014, significant aspects of Dodd-Frank as well as other new standards 
were enshrined into law, including the adoption of Risk Appetite arrangements 
(Federal Register, 2014a) and board-level Risk Committees (Federal Register, 
2014b). Other less prominent measures were also introduced along with these 
arrangements, such as director talent management programs, minimum 
requirements for independent directors, and director training (Federal Register 
2014a). Adoption of the risk governance measures is occurring over time for 
covered banks (Grant Thornton, 2014), however banks not covered by the new 
regulations (i.e. those with assets below $50 billion) have also been encouraged 
to adopt the guidelines on a best practice basis, and some have done so 
(Deloitte, 2014b).  
                                            
5 Few alternative definitions are available for risk governance. The FSB’s definition is used here, given its role as an 
international body that monitors the global financial system, comprising the G20 as well as the European Commission, 
the Bank for International Settlements, the ECB, the IMF and the OECD. It is also cited in Gontarek (2016). Battaglia 
and Gallo (2015) and the Center for Financial Inclusion (2013) provide similar definitions.  
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Figure 1. Accelerating public policy attention to risk governance 
Source: Author’s own analysis 
In the period leading up to the financial crisis, some market observers were 
already questioning US banks’ corporate governance activities. For example, 
concerns were raised about the composition of bank boards, including board 
size, insufficient levels of banking experience on boards, the high number of 
customer-related directors on bank boards which might reduce their 
independence, and the influence of merger and acquisition activity in naming 
new directors (Moody’s, 2005). These reports also note that the quality of risk 
management was inadequate in certain cases. 
Of course, bank board members traditionally provided oversight before the 
financial crisis. Charkham (2003) explains the duties of non-executive bank 
directors as supporting management in advancing the institution’s aims, 
agreeing long-term strategy, and dealing with mergers and acquisitions. With 
respect to risk management, he describes the board’s tasks to include 
considering strategic risks, ensuring risk accountability by others, and validate 
credit monitoring. Since this period, bank supervisors have extended 
heightened risk governance activities. To illustrate this emerging trend, Table 1 
presents a citation count for two-risk governance concepts highlighted in this 
study, as found in the Basel (2015a) corporate governance-related guidelines. 
Table 1. Growing focus on risk governance: Historical Basel citation count 
Year Risk Appetite arrangements Board Risk Committee 
2006 0 0 
2010 15 4 
2015 46 16 
Source: Gontarek, 2016 
2012	
• G30: Board-level 
risk commi7ee, 
CRO, Risk 
Appe>te
2013	
• FSB - Risk  Governance 
Review
• FSB: Principles for an 
eﬀec>ve Risk Appe>te
• Canada's OSFI: risk 
commi7ee, CRO, Risk 
Appe>te
• Singapore's MAS: risk 
commi7ee, CRO and Risk 
Appe>te
2014	
• EC-CRD IV: risk commi7ee, risk Appe>te
• Basel - Risk commi7ee, CRO, Risk Appe>te
• OECD: board risk overisght, risk commi7ee
• IMF: risk commi7ee, CRO
• BOE: senior management arrangements
• US OCC: Risk governance framework including  
risk oversight, CRO, Risk appe>te
• US OCC: Enforcement ac>ons (FDIC rule 39) for 
non-compliance of risk governance 
• US Fed: risk commi7ee charired by 
independent and one member withsignﬁcant 
experience, stress tes>ng, approval of risk 
tolerances/appe>te, experienced CROs  
• US Fed, Tarullo - risk exper>se for board 
members, Risk Appe>te, Federal Register 
(2014a and 2014b)
• Central Bank of Ireland - Risk Appe>te Paper
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Policy makers began to intervene by emphasizing direct board responsibility for 
heightened risk oversight (OECD, 2009a; United Nations, 2010; EBA, 2011). 
Walker (2009) called for better risk governance, including articulation of Risk 
Appetite and establishment of board-level Risk Committees (G30, 2012).  
Following the crisis, regulators responded promptly by making bank risk 
governance arrangements more obtrusive in order to address the shortcomings 
noted above. This development is not surprising, as supervisors tend to focus 
more closely on corporate governance standards after financial crisis periods 
(Himaj, 2014). 
The risk governance framework, proposed by policy-makers, includes the 
articulation of board-approved risk appetite statements and board Risk 
Committees (FSB, 2013a; Basel, 2015a; G30, 2015; BOE 2015a). The 
regulatory authorities followed policy makers in establishing a battery of risk 
governance standards aimed at boards (Basel, 2015a; OCC, 2014; BOE, 
2015a). Experts observe that attention has shifted from capital and liquidity 
metrics to governance arrangements (Ernst & Young, 2015a), and that Risk 
Appetite is at the forefront of practitioner risk governance developments (Ernst 
& Young, 2014a, 2015a).  
The Federal Reserve finalised its legal interpretation relating to the 
implementation of enhanced prudential standards mandated by Section 165 of 
Dodd-Frank, codifying these new laws in the Federal Register in late 2014 
(2014a, 2014b). 
These standards impose new direct duties upon BHC boards of directors. The 
new standards for improved risk governance consider organisational 
arrangements for oversight of risk-taking were specifically considered. In order 
to address risk management weaknesses observed during the crisis, US BHCs 
with assets of more than $50 billion must now establish Risk Appetite 
arrangements at the board level (Federal Register, 2014a). The law also 
requires BHCs of this size (as well as publicly-traded BHCs with assets of more 
than $10 billion), to establish and maintain standalone BHC Risk Committees to 
oversee risk management (Federal Register, 2014b). 
Fischer (2015) observes that BHCs have faced a regulatory shift from moral 
suasion to enforcement actions, greater public disclosure, and closer 
supervisory focus on the boardroom. These heightened standards come at a 
time when banks are facing other challenges to their business models, including 
greater regulatory burdens and compliance costs, and a flattening yield curve, 
which negatively impact on their net income margin (NIM), a key underlying 
indicator of profitability (Trepp, 2011). 
In the remainder of this chapter, the research question and positioning of the 
study and the stance of the researcher are explained, and the contributions of 
this study are articulated. 
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1.3 Statement of Purpose 
Since the financial crisis, calls have continued for further analysis of risk 
management and governance practices (Conyon, Judge and Useem, 2011). 
The importance of examining bank risk management structures has been 
underscored by pressure placed upon governance actors by regulators (Lim et 
al., 2016). However, empirical studies do not always support the regulatory 
measures actually undertaken (Enriques and Zetzche, 2014). There is growing 
evidence that some of the regulatory overhauls may have been misguided 
(Morrison, 2012; Levine, 2012). An underlying motivation for this study is the 
realisation that conducting corporate governance research in a context of policy 
change too often results in little opportunity to ground the policy debate with 
evidence (Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro, 2011). McNulty, Zattoni and Douglas 
(2013) suggest that the challenge of corporate governance researchers is to 
illuminate the efficacy of the impact of policy change. 
The purpose of this research is to empirically investigate the gap identified in 
this study relating to risk governance to BHC outcome measures, specifically 
Risk Appetite arrangements and the role of the Risk Committee in the post 
crisis period. Better knowledge of corporate governance practice is crucial in 
order to validate the recent intervention by regulators; however, scholarly 
research can be diverse and scattered (de Haan and Vlahu, 2015). Bohren and 
Odegaard (2005) observe that corporate governance is an immature field with 
data and methodological challenges. The available literature on bank risk 
governance tends to focus specifically on the financial crisis period (Beltratti and 
Stulz, 2012; Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013), so this 
empirical examination of the subsequent period marked by great regulatory 
change seeks to make a significant contribution to the current literature field. 
Financial market practices remain under-investigated (van der Stede, 2011). 
Claessens and Yurtoglu (2012) call for further research relating to financial 
institutional governance, as the crisis revealed oversight failures by major 
financial institutions. Laeven and Levine (2009) suggest that researchers have 
not yet fully appreciated how corporate governance mechanisms interact with 
national regulations in shaping institutions’ risk-taking activities.  
Periods of intervention provide a rich laboratory for researchers to test the 
efficacy of new regulations (Black and Kim, 2012; Dewatripont and Rochet, 
2010). New regulations can remain in place for a long time (Iselin, 2016), 
underscoring the need to validate their efficacy. This study seeks to determine 
whether these risk governance requirements, and their internal friction costs, 
are justified by their benefits within an evidence-based approach. 
These measures are just one part of a broader increase in regulation facing 
banks today. The full span of regulatory-driven changes includes not only risk 
governance directed at the board, but also bank culture and conduct (McNulty 
and Akhighbe, 2015), stress testing (Federal Register, 2014b), capital-based 
rules (Admati, 2014), liquidity provisions (Imbierowicz and Rauch, 2014), ring-
fencing and living wills (Freixas, 2010), and resolution (Ellis, Haldane and 
Moshirian, 2014). 
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Probing for measurable signs of impact upon BHC performance and risk profiles 
is justified, given the systemic risk considerations present in banking. New 
regulations can change the nature of the relationship between board structures 
and performance (Booth, Cornett and Tehranian, 2002; Adams and Mehran, 
2012). Writing before the crisis, Barth, Caprio and Levine (2006) posit that new 
regulations should encourage greater disclosure and provide incentives for 
effective monitoring and market discipline. They argue that the greatest danger 
in bank supervision is continuing to follow a model despite evidence that it may 
be unworkable.   
Moreover, enhanced internal monitoring activities are costly and may be 
ineffective (IMF, 2014). The regulatory environment of banks has become both 
more difficult and costlier, draining BHC profitability (Trepp, 2011). US BHCs 
with assets greater than $50 billion, which are subject to the full set of Dodd-
Frank-related regulatory requirements, are subject to direct costs of at least $2 
billion per year, resulting in lending reductions of between $14 billion and $20 
billion (Federal Financial Analytics, 2015). Heightened risk governance 
arrangements for certain banks (for example, smaller BHCs) may be unsuitable 
unless otherwise justified with evidence, since the costs may outweigh the 
benefits (Zagorchev and Gao, 2015). Thus investigating the costs and benefits 
for these smaller BHC is both timely and justified.  
1.4 Research Question 
As noted above, the goal of this research is to test the efficacy of the recently 
introduced risk governance practices for US BHCs, since they represent 
substantial changes to historical board-level oversight practices. The over-
arching research question is: 
What is the impact of Risk Appetite arrangements and the Risk Committee 
upon US BHC performance and risk? 
This research extends the current field of empirical study with respect to the 
impact of regulatory-driven Risk Committee characteristics on BHCs. 
Importantly, it appears also to be one of the first empirical studies to 
acknowledge the role of Risk Appetite and test its impact upon both 
performance and risk-taking. 
 
1.5 Stance of the Researcher 
In answering the research question, the philosophical stance of the researcher 
must be first considered in order to facilitate the choice of the most appropriate 
research method. Does the ontological position adopt labels and artificial names 
or hard, tangible and realistic facts? Does curiosity about boardroom processes 
stem from an anti-positivist, subjective and relativistic perspective, learning what 
is going on from the inside, or is it based on observing what are believed to be 
tangible facts scientifically to answer the research question?  
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This section describes the ontological and epistemological stance undertaken in 
the context of this research and the theoretical lens employed. Burrell and 
Morgan (1979) provide a useful guide to philosophical positioning, explaining 
that one must first ask whether the phenomenon being studied is external to the 
researcher or a by-product of the researcher’s cognition. For example, 
positivism seeks generalisable theory, gleaned from a clear separation of the 
researcher and the observation (Zattoni, Douglas and Judge, 2013). 
Epistemological assumptions must also be considered, which concern how the 
world is understood and how knowledge is communicated, and whether human 
nature is deterministic (i.e. conditioned by experience) or based on free will. 
Such assumptions have methodological consequences for the research stance. 
Burrell and Morgan’s (1979) approach (see Figure 2 for elements of this 
framework) has been used in previous corporate governance research. 
Alghamdi (2012) employs it in an empirical study of audit and governance, and 
Crow and Lockhart (2012) also cite this framework in their corporate 
governance research. 
 
 
Figure 2: Assumptions regarding the nature of the social sciences (excerpts)  
Source: Burrell and Morgan (1979) 
Given the motivation of the so-called black box of corporate governance 
research (McNulty, Florackis and Ormrod, 2013), one valid approach is to use 
qualitative methods to seek knowledge subjectively. Approaches underpinned 
by subjectivist ontology are driven by a desire to ask why things happen, and 
are often inductive, theory building exercises rather than theory testing 
exercises. A key theme is thus the social dynamics of business, leading to 
theory building. One advantage of this approach is an ability to understand 
complex social processes and appreciate the contextual dynamics of 
governance. Drawbacks of this approach are its potentially time-consuming 
nature and the possibility that clear data patterns may be difficult to identify, 
hindering generalisability and replication of the research process. 
On the other hand, Ryan, Scapens and Theobold (2002) explain that a 
dominant methodology has emerged in the field of financial research, which is 
empiricist in nature, employing models as abstract, theoretical versions of 
reality. Key themes include deducing testable hypotheses, developing 
measures and samples, conducting operational processes, and examining 
outcomes and modifying theory as necessary (Robson, 2002). 
 
Nominalism! Ontology! Realism!
An01posi0vism! Epistemology! Posi0vism!
Subjec0vist;Approach! Objec0vist;Approach!
 9 
Given the availability of data on the boardroom features and outcome variables 
identified and collected later in this study, the research question of this study fits 
well with a positivist approach. A positivist approach enables large amounts of 
data to be harnessed, and is focused and reproducible. However, its drawbacks 
include lack of flexibility, and failure to generate a sense of social processes. 
Positivism is applied in a top-down, deductive setting, testing theories and 
linking premises to the conclusions of the research process. 
Key papers in the relevant research domain are recognised as empirical, 
including Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014), Aebi, Sabato and Schmid 
(2012), and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), and all employ an objective, positivist 
approach to risk governance research. On balance, given the research question 
and data availability, the chosen methodology is an ontological stance based on 
realism and a positivist epistemological approach. 
1.6 Significance of this Study 
There are three distinct parts to this thesis: a literature review, an empirical 
analysis, and lastly a description of its impact and contribution to practice. The 
impact of the study has been honed in discussions with both academics and 
practitioner experts from leading boards, bank senior management and 
supervisory authorities. Its contribution is described in the next sub-sections 
from both practical and academic perspectives. 
1.6.1 Contribution to practice 
The severity of the financial crisis discussed earlier underscores the need to 
gain a better understanding of risk oversight processes. Specifically, for board 
members, Risk Committee members and senior management, this research not 
only validates the emerging use of Risk Appetite arrangements but also 
validates its economic impact when banks are otherwise plagued with 
profitability concerns and greater levels of regulatory related expenses (Trepp, 
2011; Federal Financial Analytics, 2015). Risk Appetite arrangements exhibit a 
significant and economically impactful relation to the suite of BHC outcome 
measures, as presented later in Chapters 4 through 6.  
The findings of this study are also pertinent to bank regulators. Bank 
supervisory officials might consider publishing further selected information in 
their regulatory call reports (BHC Y9 reports) on the use of Risk Appetite 
arrangements by BHCs, in order to further illuminate this practice for bank 
investors, counterparties and bank customers. This level of transparency would 
be consistent with global efforts to increase banks’ financial transparency, as 
noted in Basel Pillar 3 (Basel, 2015c), and would thus facilitate a greater degree 
of informed decision making and even encourage greater market discipline. 
It is difficult to validate whether Risk Appetite data is available to supervisory 
field staff. However, over time, Risk Appetite arrangements may increasingly 
assist bank regulators in shaping economic capital requirements and stress 
testing, given their potential to establish boundaries for banks’ risk-taking. 
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This research also reveals that regulatory-driven characteristics for board-level 
Risk Committees are not highly related to measurable performance or risk 
profile improvements. This may be either because not all risk governance 
mechanisms have had an equal impact, or because more time is required for 
these governance practices to yield discernable results. These developments 
will be followed by the researcher over time, and will continue to be 
communicated through social media and through practitioner and academic 
dissemination. 
1.6.2 Contribution to academia 
This study makes several contributions to academia. Consistent with seminal 
literature, it explicitly recognizes the primacy of risk governance in financial 
institutions vis-à-vis standard corporate governance mechanisms (Aebi, Sabato 
and Schmid, 2012, p. 3215). It makes a unique contribution to the emerging 
literature domain of risk governance and contributes to the scrutiny of the risk 
management oversight function of boards (Ellul and Yeramilli, 2013; Stulz, 
2015).  
Firstly, the references cited within this study support a unique literature review 
of risk governance, which is presented later in Chapter 2. In doing so, it 
identifies a material literature gap, which underscores the need for an empirical 
study of board-level Risk Appetite arrangements. This risk governance 
mechanism, as part of the suite of regulatory risk oversight requirements, has 
received scant attention in conceptual research and little if any previous 
empirical examination vis-à-vis performance and risk thus far.  
This study introduces this mechanism and addresses a fundamental research 
gap, providing new and impactful knowledge to this literature domain. Future 
risk governance research may consider the use of Risk Appetite arrangements 
as an explanatory variable in empirical studies. This research also searches for 
but fails to find compelling evidence for the Risk Committee and BHC outcome 
measures in the post crisis period. It significantly extends existing studies of 
bank corporate governance that adopt a single, one-dimensional outcome 
measure (Klomp and de Haan, 2012; Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012) to a 
broad suite of outcomes variables.  
1.7 Summary 
This chapter has highlighted the relevance of intervention by bank supervisors 
in corporate governance practice, notably given the series of risk oversight 
shortfalls observed following the credit crisis. While public policy and initial 
regulatory changes began to take root just after the financial crisis, formal 
intervention by global authorities only gathered force by 2014. A simple citation 
count reveals a dramatic increase in phrases relating to board-articulated Risk 
Appetite arrangements and Risk Committees, as noted in the Basel corporate 
governance guidelines for banks (Gontarek, 2016). Scholarly studies enable the 
effectiveness of new regulations to be tested empirically, and contribute to 
current debates in the practical and academic literature.  
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This study seeks to provide a better understanding of the risk governance 
practices and their impact upon US BHC performance and risk profiles of the 
risk governance practices that have been codified into law. It makes a 
contribution to both practice and academic research as a previously under 
researched corporate governance practice. 
Evidence of a significant impact of Risk Appetite arrangements adopted by bank 
boards is presented to the industry for the first time herein, providing validation 
of this industry practice and an indication of economic impact to the bottom line 
of BHCs.  
This research makes a modest but unambiguous claim to contributing to 
knowledge relating to the impact of Risk Appetite arrangements upon BHC 
outcome measures. The research community may consider employing Risk 
Appetite arrangements as an explanatory variable in future research, given their 
relationship with the performance and risk measures observed in the literature. 
Lastly, this study provides an early analysis of risk governance practices 
targeted at the post-financial crisis period that may be reviewed for relaxation 
given recent political changes underway in the US. 
The theoretical framework and development of the hypotheses now follow. 
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2 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
2.1 Introduction 
Corporate governance of banking firms differs from that of non-financial firms. 
Becht, Bolton and Röell (2011) explain that banks are multi-constituency 
organisations with a broad spectrum of actors, including investors, management 
and the board, but also depositors and bondholders (who provide the majority of 
bank capital).  
Banking supervisors and society at large, which ultimately underwrites systemic 
risk, also are unique actors in this setting (Adams and Mehran, 2003). These 
authors argue that bank CEOs may have different incentives from those in non-
financial institutions. Internal monitoring in banks is further challenged by higher 
business complexity and the ability to ramp up risk-taking quickly given access 
to capital markets. 
Banks are subject to a broad variety of risks, including credit, market, 
operational, liquidity, capital and reputational risks (Fiordelisi and Molyneux, 
2010). However, the choice of risk related dependent variables in this study 
underscore the role of credit risk. Credit risk is present at the heart of most 
banking organisations. When not effectively adjudicated, credit risk may have 
devastating effects on the statue of BHCs. Historically, poor lending policies, 
over-lending, weak credit standards, credit concentration and excessive credit 
exceptions, have been identified with US bank failures (OCC, 1988). 
The remainder of this chapter presents the theoretical framework of this study, 
beginning with a literature review and development of hypotheses. This 
provides a lens through which to consider risk governance, positioning it within 
internal monitoring and thus comfortably relating to agency theory. An empirical 
research gap is identified in the literature relating to bank Risk Appetite 
arrangements and its impact upon bank performance and risk measures. 
Three standard corporate governance mechanisms are examined later in this 
chapter,6 namely internal monitoring, board structure and incentives. After 
probing this literature domain, this review later narrows its purview to develop its 
hypotheses on board-level risk appetite statements and Risk Committees as 
key internal monitoring activities and risk governance practices. 
2.2 Literature Review 
This review of the literature considers standard theories of corporate 
governance. While grounded in agency theory, it is acknowledged that other 
approaches may be relevant in this context. 
 
                                            
6 Shleifer and Vishny (1997) offer a perspective on corporate governance mechanisms, defining them as “economic and 
legal institutions that can be altered through political process”. Himaj (2014) argues that corporate governance 
mechanisms can be treated as practical traits, viewed from multiple theoretical positions, which may be interrelated or at 
times counteract each other. 
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2.2.1 Corporate governance definition and theories 
Before reviewing the risk governance literature and developing hypotheses for 
testing, this sub-section probes existing corporate governance theories. Many 
definitions of corporate governance can be found within the literature; however, 
the following definition relates particularly well to the financial institution sector, 
given its acknowledgement of the role of multiple constituencies: 
“Corporate governance is the complex set of constraints that determine the 
quasi-rents (profits) generated by the firm in the course of relationships with 
stakeholders and shape the post bargaining over them (Claessens and 
Yurtoglu, 2012, p.4).” 
Corporate governance in the banking sector relates to how banks are governed, 
including corporate objective setting and risk profiles, aligning corporate 
activities and behaviours with the expectation that management will operate in a 
safe and sound manner, running day-to-day operations within an established 
risk profile, and protecting the interests of depositors and stakeholders 
(Greuning and Bratanovic, 2003, p.8). Certain relevant corporate governance 
theories include agency, institutional, stakeholder, stewardship, resource-
based, and managerial hegemony theories. 
2.2.2 Agency theory 
Corporate governance considers the nature of relationships and motivations 
between key actors in a corporation. Agency problems arise from the separation 
of management and the owners (Berle and Means, 1932). 
Agency theory is the most prevalent theory addressed in the literature (Van der 
Elst, 2015). It states that principals may delegate decisions to agents who act 
on their behalf, mainly for practical purposes; however, moral hazard and other 
factors may result in conflicts of interest. Agency theory embraces the concept 
that agents primarily consider their own interests. Thus, rents (or residual 
losses) are incurred with active monitoring; and actions (or inactions) by 
management can reduce the wealth of owners (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
Incentives can be employed to balance agency–principal interests, but these 
may be ineffective or counter-productive. Incentive structures initially evolved 
from owners’ concerns that agents might not take a sufficient degree of 
business risk (Tao and Hutchinson, 2013; IMF, 2014), which is ironic in light of 
the arguments that bankers’ incentive schemes may have contributed to the 
financial crisis (Acharya, Litov and Sepe, 2013).  
Agency theory has been used to better appreciate corporate governance in a 
banking context (Demsetz, Saidenberg and Strahan, 1997). Agency conflicts 
are particularly acute in banking activities (Berger and di Patti, 2003; IMF, 
2014), and may be intensified by information asymmetries. Agency problems in 
banks are also exacerbated by certain structural features, including the 
existence of deposit insurance, which further underscore the risks of moral 
hazard in this sector (Merton, 1977; Laeven, 2002; and de Haan and Vlahu, 
2015).  
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Deposit insurance was introduced to mitigate the risk of bank runs, but may also 
induce risk-taking behaviours that are not in the best interests of depositors, 
bondholders or the financial system overall. However, excessive risk-taking 
behaviours can be moderated by other corporate governance mechanisms, 
including well-structured incentives (Dionne, 2013) or effective internal 
monitoring. Agency costs represent a loss of value arising from managers 
maximising their own utility rather than the value of the firm (Berger and di Patti, 
2003). These authors offer an example of how high leverage levels may 
increase firm valuation by encouraging managers with shares to act in the best 
interests of shareholders, but high leverage may also bring more risk to bank 
bondholders and depositors.7  
Government guarantees, deposit insurance, leverage and complexity may 
encourage risk-taking behaviours, and since the costs associated with bank 
failure are externalised, the impact of agency issues upon society are 
pronounced if risk-taking is excessive (de Haan and Vlahu, 2015). Agency 
issues can also materialise conversely if risk-taking is low. Fortin, Goldberg and 
Roth (2010) find that banks under greater managerial control (as opposed to 
board-influenced) tend to take less risk. These findings are consistent with 
Pathan (2009), who finds that powerful CEOs exhibit risk-moderating behaviour 
in their entrenched roles. This suggests a balanced set of incentives and 
controls is required for increased firm valuation (Diamond and Rajan, 2009). 
The board can play a critical role in resolving agency conflicts (Jensen, 1993). 
Bank boards provide internal monitoring (the focus of this paper), but large 
shareholders, the marketplace, and regulators provide external monitoring 
(Hopt, 2013a). Greater disclosure by banks (for example, following the Basel 
Pillar 3 guidelines) may play a role in improving market discipline. As noted 
above, agency conflicts may be amplified by opaque risk profiles (Greenspan, 
1996; Levine, 2004; Grove and Cook, 2013; Zagorchev and Gao, 2015), 
leading to ineffective internal monitoring.  
However, competent and effective risk oversight by the board of directors is 
critical to a bank’s performance and balancing agency conflicts (O’Sullivan and 
Kinsella, 2011; Stulz, 2015). Boards require effective tools and processes to 
carry out their responsibility of internal monitoring, underscoring the potential of 
the two chosen risk governance mechanisms featured in this study.  
As noted by Maati and Maati-Sauvez (2012a), there are at least two divergent 
dynamics at work in bank corporate governance, complying with macro-
prudential risk objectives (to mitigate systemic risks) and satisfying shareholder-
centric objectives (to maximise shareholder returns). Agency based tensions 
may erupt as bank management and boards seek to balance these divergent 
objectives in the context of risk management and board-level practices. 
 
 
                                            
7 See Admati (2016) for arguments that policy should consider broad-based social, rather than private, costs and 
benefits of greater bank leverage, and that loss absorption can only come from a dramatic increase in equity levels. 
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2.2.3 Institutional theory 
The institutional theory of governance (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Scott, 1987) 
argues that environmental forces, including public opinion, law, common 
practice and regulation, may influence organisational decision-making. 
Institutional theory is useful when the adoption of new governance processes is 
motivated by a desire to appear to be following industry best practice 
ritualistically, rather than to exercise vigilant risk oversight and monitoring 
(Beasley et al., 2009). 
Therefore, while agency theory may provide an appreciation of risk governance 
activities designed to monitor management’s role in day-to-day risk oversight, 
institutional theory facilitates understanding of why bank boards may introduce 
ceremonial activities to satisfy regulatory requirements or industry best practice 
standards. This issue is considered further in Chapter 6, which examines both 
mandatory and voluntary adoption of risk governance arrangements by BHCs, 
possibly portraying motivations for adoption.   
2.2.4 Other theories 
Two tasks dominate the practical business of board directors, namely 
monitoring and advising (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Board monitoring, which 
sits comfortably with agency theory, ensures oversight of the firm and is a key 
aspect of this paper dealing with Risk Appetite setting by the board and Risk 
Committee expertise. On the other hand, advising rests with resource 
dependency theory, emphasising the role of directors in contributing to strategy 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hillman, Withers and Collins, 2009). Here, 
management is viewed as a partner rather than a monitor (Beasley et al. 2009). 
Managerial hegemony theory observes that CEOs recruit docile associates as 
board members, who depend on management for their information (Cohen, 
Krishamoorthy and Wright, 2007). Some boards appear to superficially monitor 
with little independent decision making (Beasley et al., 2009). In hindsight, the 
reported risk governance shortfalls at Lehman Brothers and Royal Bank of 
Scotland might have been averted if passive and disengaged boards had faced 
up to powerful bank CEOs. Considering the potential impact of powerful CEOs 
is specifically catered for in this study in Chapter 6.  
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1979, 1984; Freeman and Reed, 1983) is based 
on the underlying premise that business is accountable to a wide array of 
stakeholders. In banking, stakeholders include depositors, borrowers, regulators 
and society at large (Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro, 2011; Mullineux, 2011; 
Leung, Song and Chen, 2016). 
Stewardship theory provides yet another lens through which to consider 
corporate governance. Exercising thoughtful authority motivates agents in this 
construct, suggesting the occurrence of no conflicts of interest with principals 
(Donaldson and Davis, 1991). Thus, managers act as stewards in the best 
interest of the owners, having no self-opportunistic motives, and naturally 
identify with organisational values. 
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Risk governance, the topic of interest in this study, sits well with the internal 
monitoring activities of boards (Stulz, 2015; Basel, 2015a; Iqbal, Strobl and 
Vähämaa, 2015; Gontarek, 2016). Effective risk governance mechanisms are 
closely related to the monitoring function, and can be readily viewed from an 
agency theory perspective. The current research thus focuses primarily on 
employing an agency theory lens to examine monitoring and risk oversight. 
2.2.5 Corporate governance mechanisms 
In this sub-section, three overarching mechanisms are considered: internal 
monitoring, board structure and incentives. However, other governance 
mechanisms are well noted within the literature, such as ownership (type and 
structure) and external monitoring (market discipline). These mechanisms and 
monitoring are later positioned in a field map, which identifies a gap for 
examination by this empirical study. The explanatory variables described in 
Chapter 3 dovetails with internal monitoring, board structure and incentives. 
Various features make banks difficult to monitor effectively as noted earlier 
(Macey and O’Hara, 2003, 2016). Leverage levels and opacity exacerbate 
conflict (Mülbert, 2010; Laeven, 2013). The regulatory, leverage, complexity and 
multiple constituency features of commercial banks underscore these 
challenges (Fama, 1980; Adams and Mehran, 2003, Levine, 2004; Becht, 
Bolton and Roëll, 2011; Sarra, 2012; Hopt, 2013a).  
Moreover, there is some evidence indicating a bank’s history may affect its 
performance or risk-taking, and suggesting that bank-specific shocks previously 
experienced (and survived) may affect its risk-taking and capital levels 
(Bouwman and Malmendier, 2015; Fahlenbrach, Prilmeier and Stulz, 2012). 
This later evidence may play a role in the design of risk governance studies and 
its research design, as described later. 
Board-level decision-making has a major influence on bank performance 
(Spong and Sullivan, 2007). The unique nature of banking firms necessitates 
robust governance mechanisms to deal with potential conflicts between various 
governance actors. However, these mechanisms may be ineffective or fail to 
perform (Becht, Bolton and Röell, 2011). These challenges also complicate the 
role of the bank board, dictating a heightened duty of care in making reasonable 
and informed decisions (Macey and O’Hara, 2016). 
2.2.6 Internal monitoring 
Banks are subject to external and internal monitoring. One example of external 
monitoring (and related agency costs) includes risk-based pricing of bank 
capital, which is a market-based solution to agency problems as investors 
adjust their risk premiums depending on the outcome of their monitoring 
observations (Forssbæck, 2009; Nguyen, 2013).  However, internal monitoring, 
a standard corporate governance mechanism, is directly relevant to risk 
governance, given the board’s responsibility for risk oversight. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) and Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggest that monitoring costs 
are incurred as a means of mitigating agency rents as discussed previously.  
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A primary board-level responsibility is to provide an effective internal monitoring 
function (Fleischer, Hazard and Klipper, 1988). Risk oversight arrangements 
seek to mitigate structural features that hinder external stakeholders’ ability to 
monitor banks effectively, given the complexity and opaqueness of their 
activities (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008).  
Nguyen, Hagendorff and Eshraghi (2015a) posit that banks’ boards of directors 
play a major role in overseeing risk controls to mitigate misconduct in financial 
institutions. Specifically, they report reduced bank misconduct levels when 
monitoring quality is high. Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2009) note, prior to 
the crisis, that bank boards appear to have reduced their internal monitoring 
activities at precisely the wrong time in the financial and business cycle: Board 
meetings were less frequent, CEO duality continued, nominating committees 
remained CEO-friendly and golden parachutes increased in number. 
Corporate governance researchers measure the resources dedicated to internal 
board monitoring, including board meetings (Vafeas, 1999). Monitoring has 
been measured by the frequency of board of directors’ meetings (Hahn and 
Lasfer, 2016), the level of attendance at these meetings, the proportion of 
outsiders and the demographical or other features (Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 
2012; Battaglia and Gallo, 2015; de Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Grove and 
Cook, 2013; Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013, Minton, Taillard and Williamson, 2014). 
Risk governance is consistent with the aims of enterprise risk management 
(Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012; de Wild, 2013).8 Nocco and Stulz (2006) 
define enterprise risk management (ERM) as a practice in which risk is viewed 
holistically within a strategic framework. ERM promises the benefit of 
decentralising risk management, facilitating a firm-wide view of total risk, and 
thus allowing management to protect the firm’s ability to execute its business 
plans (COSO, 2004). ERM requires boards to understand the firm’s philosophy 
of risk-taking, monitor management’s oversight of risk and consider Risk 
Appetite in the portfolio of risk profiles.  
The literature also examines potential links between ERM adoption and 
performance. Eckles, Hoyt and Miller (2014) find that risk-adjusted performance 
improves following ERM adoption. These results are consistent with the results 
observed within other ERM related studies with firm value in both the corporate 
and insurance sectors by Gordon, Loeb and Tseng (2009), McShane, Nair and 
Rustambekov (2011) and Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011). For example, the latter 
authors’ analysis of US insurance companies reveals that ERM adoption is 
associated with a material rise in Tobin’s Q. 
Researchers select proxies for oversight mechanisms in order to facilitate 
measurement needs. For example, Pagach and Warr’s (2011) examination of 
ERM practices faced the challenge of a lack of data on formal ERM adoption, 
since direct observation of a firm’s decision to adopt ERM is virtually impossible. 
Thus, they used the firm’s announcement of a plan to hire a CRO as a proxy for 
ERM adoption.  
                                            
8 ERM is positioned within monitoring and agency based frameworks in certain ERM studies, such as McShane, Nair 
and Rustambekov (2011) and Hoyt and Liebenberg (2011) respectively.  
 19 
CEO duality, where the CEO is also the chairman, may play an internal 
monitoring role, especially in the context of banking. Viewed through the lens of 
agency theory, duality may promote CEO entrenchment rents (Finkelstein and 
D’Aveni, 1994). In a banking context, Byrd et al. (2012) note that financial 
institutions with CEO duality have weathered financial crisis conditions with 
better results than other firms. 
In summary, the best evidence is that monitoring appears to demonstrate a 
strong relation with bank performance and risk-taking (Becher, Campbell and 
Frye, 2003, de Andres and Vallelado, 2008; Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012, 
Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013). Regulatory-led risk oversight standards can play a 
role at the industry level (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008), while Risk Appetite 
arrangements and board-level Risk Committees, the focus of this paper, are 
deployed by bank boards in carrying out their internal monitoring roles.   
2.2.7 Board structure 
Bank board structure has a complex relationship with performance and risk-
taking. This mechanism can be further decomposed into board size, 
shareholder-friendly features, non-insider or external directors, financial 
expertise levels, heterogeneity factors relating to directors’ age and job tenure, 
and directors’ busyness (de Haan and Vlahu, 2015). 
Starting with board size, conceptual literature argues that larger boards face the 
challenges of effective communication, co-ordination and control, thus 
strengthening the hand of management (Jensen, 1993). Some studies have 
observed a complex U-shaped relationship between board size and 
performance, suggesting the superior efficacy of very small and very large 
boards (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008; de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). 
However, larger boards have been associated with both improved performance 
(Adams and Mehran, 2005) and greater bank risk-taking (IMF, 2014; Battaglia, 
Curcio and Gallo, 2014).  
Consistent with other earlier research (Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Peni and 
Vähämaa, 2012), Iqbal, Strobl and Vähämaa’s (2015) examination of a sample 
of financial institutions reveals that firms with shareholder-focused boards are 
associated with greater levels of systemic risk or lower returns.  As stated within 
seminal research about BHC directors, “… independent financial experts, with a 
fiduciary duty to shareholders, understand the nature of the equity claims and 
will generally favour more risk-taking” (Minton, Taillard and Williamson, 2014, p. 
377). 
Another aspect of board structure is the proportion of external directors on the 
board and their potential to participate in or mitigate agency conflicts. Fama and 
Jensen (1983) argue that external directors have reputational motivations, and 
thus exercise diligent monitoring. Some studies find that non-insider board 
member representation is largely unrelated to risk-taking (IMF, 2014), while 
others find that it can be detrimental to bank performance (Adams and Mehran, 
2008). Erkens, Hung and Matos (2012), Switzer and Wang (2013) and Beltratti 
and Stulz (2012) find that banks with greater board independence experienced 
worse returns, or greater risk profiles, during the crisis. 
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The expertise of bank board directors may be an obvious pre-condition for 
improved BHC performance and lower risk-taking. In fact, evidence has been 
presented indicating that the level of independent directors’ expertise is 
positively related to risk measures, possibly because they fully appreciate the 
potential residual value accruing to shareholders from risk-taking (Minton, 
Taillard and Williamson, 2014). On the one hand, outside directors have fewer 
conflicts of interest, which is a positive factor in carrying out their monitoring 
roles (de Andres and Vallelado, 2008). On the other hand, non-inside directors 
may have reduced access to firm-specific information (Carrillo, 2012; Wang, Lu 
and Lin, 2012), so the process of establishing risk types and boundaries that 
accompanies Risk Appetite mitigates these governance shortcomings.  
Adams’ (2012) research on bank board independence, board size and number 
of non-executive directorships reveals a positive relationship with receipt of 
bailout funds. However, in the UK insurance industry, Adams and Jiang (2015) 
find that outside directors’ expertise levels are positively related to performance 
measures, including ROA, ROE and solvency measures. 
Demographical features of executives and board members are also measured 
in governance studies. Citing upper echelons theory, Hambrick and Mason 
(1984) argue that executive characteristics make a difference to strategic 
decision making, and thus may be associated with firm performance levels. 
Regarding age, Mikels and Reed (2009) study the role played by age in 
monetary decision-making and establish a greater risk-taking capacity in 
younger adults, whereas mature adults have more experience in complex 
decision-making (Worthy et al., 2011). Nguyen, Hagendorff and Eshraghi 
(2015b) consider executive age in their study of US banks, and find that market 
returns are higher for older bank executives, amongst other characteristics. 
They conclude that younger executives may have greater incentives to engage 
in riskier and value-destroying activities and may incur a greater level of 
agency-related rents.  
The role of busy BHC board members remains ambiguous. Initial evidence 
suggests that busy directors (holding three or more directorships) produce lower 
market-to-book ratios and weaker profitability measures (Fich and Shivdasani, 
2006). Other research validates the association between busyness and greater 
levels of total and idiosyncratic BHC risk (Cooper and Uzun, 2012). However, 
more recent literature presents evidence of improved performance measures 
(ROE, Tobin’s Q and EBIT) and lower risk measures (idiosyncratic, credit and 
default risks) associated with busy BHC directors (Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015). 
2.2.8 Incentives 
Incentives are a third standard mechanism of corporate governance. Consistent 
with agency theory, the aim of a well-designed executive pay package is to 
attract and align executives. Jensen and Meckling (1976) state that principals 
limit negative outcomes by establishing appropriate alignment between owners 
and management. This mechanism motivates agents to act in the best interests 
of the principals (Ross, 1973). 
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Problems may arise from poorly designed incentives in the banking context 
(Alexander, 2006). One view is that management has non-diversifiable wealth 
associated with ownership stakes, which may lead to self-serving and risk-
mitigating behaviours (Switzer and Wang, 2013). An alternative view is that 
management ownership should be considered with care, as managers are 
incentivised to maximise the value of their call options with ever-increasing 
levels of short-term risk-taking (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Acrey, McCumber 
and Nguyen, 2011).  
The link between incentives and performance is not always clear. Some studies 
establish a positive link between incentives and performance in a banking 
context (Adams, 2012; Bhagat and Bolton, 2014; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; 
DeYoung, Peng and Yan, 2013). Houston and James (1995) find no evidence 
that equity structures encourage excessive risk-taking. Spong and Sullivan 
(2007) find that ownership stakes for hired managers relate to improved 
performance and alignment of interests with shareholders, thus potentially 
reducing the agent–principal conflict identified under agency theory.  
Other research suggests that incentive pay may be associated with short-term 
positive performance but poorer loan quality over longer tenures (Grove et al., 
2011). Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) argue that poor performance occurred 
during the crisis when bank CEO compensation was linked to shareholder 
value. Becht, Bolton and Roëll (2011) argue that excessive alignment 
contributed to under-performance during the crisis years. There is also a strong 
association between short-term executive compensation and bank hedging 
activities, as noted by Becht, Bolton and Roëll (2011). On balance, the literature 
argues that the incentive and performance relation can be complex and 
ambiguous, but may ultimately have played some role in excessive risk-taking 
during the crisis (IMF, 2014). 
2.3 Hypothesis Development 
Poorly executed risk management practices and governance-based shortfalls 
have historically contributed to bank failures more than deteriorating economic 
conditions (OCC, 1988). Recent scholarly analysis concludes that the current 
model of bank risk management remains deeply flawed, as existing regulation 
and stylised risk management practices fail to restrain excessive risk-taking 
(Lim et al., 2016). 
Regulatory-driven change has also been considered before in the literature. In 
1999, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act provided for the deregulation of the US 
financial services industry, with a relaxation of regulatory monitoring 
(Greenspan, 1996). Studies have found that the impact of this act has been to 
promote diversification of exposure and revenue opportunities, while containing 
excessive risk-taking (Mamun, Hassan and Maroney, 2005; Carrillo, 2012). 
Akhighbe and Martin (2007) examine the impact of SOX legislation on the US 
financial services industry and find a short-term initial increase in risk measures 
as non-public information is transmitted to the markets, followed by positive 
wealth effects in the longer term as firms become more transparent (Akhighbe 
and Martin, 2007; Carrillo, 2012). 
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Figure 3: Conceptual map of the research design 
Source: Author’s own construct 
The next sub-sections develop hypotheses on two key aspects of risk 
governance and the BHC boardroom: Risk Appetite arrangements and board-
level Risk Committees. A conceptual plan of the research design is presented in 
Figure 3 above, mapping the key predictor, outcome, and standard corporate 
governance and risk governance variables. This plan applies the same 
conceptual framework to different hypotheses and the same suite of 
explanatory and outcome variables throughout this study. 
2.3.1 Hypothesis development: Risk Appetite   
Identifying, measuring and monitoring complex risk profiles are challenging for 
bank directors even in the most gentle market environment and best-intended 
circumstances. Specialist advisory firms that focus on financial institutional 
governance identify the need for more robust risk governance, and specifically 
greater rigour in setting and deliberating risk appetite levels (Nestor, 2009a, 
2010). Both boards of directors and management need to understand the risks 
run by firms and the steps taken to manage risk profiles (Simkins and Ramirez, 
2008).  
However, many financial institutions lack internal risk controls or accurate risk 
reporting (Lang and Jagtiani, 2010). Also, banks have failed to establish control 
mechanisms to ensure effective monitoring of Risk Appetite (United Nations, 
2010; Singh, 2013). As noted earlier, a risk appetite statement is a written 
articulation of the aggregate level and types of risk that a firm will accept or 
avoid in order to achieve its business objectives (Basel, 2015a, p.2).  
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According to the Senior Supervisors Group (SSG, 2008), banks that felt most 
confident in their risk identification practices during the crisis avoided material 
unexpected losses, and managers of those firms held a continuous dialogue 
between business areas and risk management areas on whether the firm was 
balancing its Risk Appetite and controls structure appropriately. However, Risk 
Appetite arrangements at that time were relatively new: many banks indicated 
that they had been in effect for one year or less (SSG, 2010). 
Although US bank boards have not always viewed the oversight of risk 
management and setting of Risk Appetite as a core responsibility (Nestor, 
2009a; Prager, 2013), this is now beginning to change. The OCC now requires 
Risk Appetite arrangements to be specifically articulated and monitored by the 
boards of covered US BHCs as of the end of 2014. Moreover, the board of 
directors of a covered BHC9 must actively oversee its risk-taking activities and 
hold management accountable for adhering to the risk appetite framework. It 
must challenge, or when necessary, oppose management decisions that might 
cause excessive Risk Appetite in accordance with regulatory requirements.  
Banks are placing increasing emphasis on risk governance processes as a 
means of preventing the build-up of excessive risk profiles (Jackson, 2014), and 
Risk Appetite arrangements are at the centre of this shift in bank behaviour 
(Ernst & Young, 2015c). Risk Appetite is taking a more prominent place in the 
suite of risk governance mechanisms of financial institutions (Gontarek, 2016). 
Global policy makers are increasingly focusing on the potential benefits of 
board-level articulated Risk Appetite arrangements. Bank supervisors have 
been unequivocal in their demand for better accountability of the board for 
setting the firm’s Risk Appetite. Financial institutional distress may be 
characterised by an accumulation of risk profiles that have not been fully 
recognised (FSB, 2013b, 2013b; Ernst & Young, 2015c). The board must 
consider all relevant risks and consider a balanced approach to the bank’s 
return targets and risk profile (CEBS, 2010). 
Bank supervisors have made direct calls for collective oversight of the board 
and the need for board-level articulation of Risk Appetite (Basel, 2015a). 
Observers (Walker, 2009; SSG, 2010; United Nations, 2010; EBA, 2011; IIF, 
2011a; G30, 2012; FSB, 2013a) have underscored the important role of Risk 
Appetite in improving risk-taking in Canada (OSFI, 2013), Singapore (MAS, 
2013), the USA (OCC, 2014; Federal Register, 2014a and 2014b), Ireland 
(Central Bank of Ireland, 2014) and the UK (BOE, 2015a). 
Conceptual research relating to Risk Appetite in the context of banking has only 
recently begun to emerge. Fortunately, practitioner literature publication bolsters 
the limited scholarly work published in this domain. Practitioner experts now 
issue practical advice to assist with board implementation of risk appetite 
frameworks in global banking and financial institutions. 
 
                                            
9 A covered BHC is a firm covered by the new regulations, which requires Risk Appetite arrangements at the board level 
and typically has assets of $50 billion or more, as specified in the Federal Register (2014a, 2014b). 
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Practitioner literature reports that establishing and monitoring Risk Appetite 
requires governance actors to think about risk and its boundaries in a 
systematic fashion, ensuring a coherent and holistic framework (Nestor, 2010). 
Risk Appetite arrangements provide transparency for a firm’s risk position and 
facilitate boundary setting from the top of the firm down to the business unit 
(Smith, 2014). 
Banks take risks of several forms, including credit, market and operational risk 
amongst others. For a sample statement of the principal risks facing major 
banks, see Appendix 4. Risk governance principles encourage a culture of risk 
management rather than pure risk aversion, and inhibit risk decisions that may 
not be aligned with firm-wide objectives (Willis, 2015). Risk Appetite 
arrangements help firms articulate and distinguish risk categories that are 
acceptable or aligned with strategy from those that are not acceptable to the 
board of directors (Protiviti, 2012).    
Beyond board interactions, a key aim of risk appetite statements is to formalise 
and communicate a greater level of transparency to employees and 
stakeholders (PWC, 2014b). The role of the board of directors in articulating an 
overarching Risk Appetite and cascading it down the firm is an important aspect 
of risk governance. Failure to do so may result in shortcomings in risk oversight. 
For a sample risk appetite statement, see Appendix 5. 
Bank boards suffered from a lack of consensus on Risk Appetite arrangements 
as quantifiable boundaries during the financial crisis (Nestor, 2010). The failure 
of HBOS Plc is a case in point. According to the Bank of England, the HBOS 
board failed to implement an effective risk appetite framework (BOE, 2015c). 
Each HBOS division was responsible for setting its own Risk Appetite, but no 
group-wide Risk Appetite was established until 2007, with the board having little 
or no formal guidance on divisional Risk Appetite arrangements and a limited 
role in risk oversight. Furthermore, the board gave insufficient priority to risk 
management, failed to develop and embed Risk Appetite arrangements with 
quantitative risk targets across different types of risk, and failed to articulate 
responsibility for setting and monitoring Risk Appetite in its Board Control 
Manual (BOE, 2015c).  
Aggregating Risk Appetite data at the most senior levels facilitates reporting 
and monitoring needs of the board. HBOS failed to monitor risk-taking actively 
through a single group-wide committee (it met once in January 2005), and 
apparently failed to aggregate, consolidate, and monitor firm-wide Risk 
Appetite. Remarkably, the BOE (2015c) report identifies that HBOS’s corporate 
loan division was carrying around £9 billion of credit exposure essentially 
outside its Risk Appetite, as certain credits were moved to a hold-for-future-sale 
category.  
All of this evidence points to a weak risk governance environment at HBOS. 
With the benefit of hindsight, the implementation of the HBOS group-wide risk 
appetite statement during the 2010–2014 business planning process was “too 
little and, it proved, much too late” (McConnell, 2016, p.152). 
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Practitioner publications confirm that a significant shift in Risk Appetite practices 
at banks is now under way. Bank Director (2015) reports that 58 per cent of 
participants in its survey of banks have a risk appetite statement, and an 
additional 27 per cent plan to implement one within 12 months. Deloitte’s 
(2013c) survey of global financial institutions reveals that 79 per cent of 
participants define Risk Appetite both quantitatively and qualitatively. According 
to this survey, acceptable loss levels (76 per cent), risk limits (71 per cent), 
economic capital (69 per cent) and regulatory capital (69 per cent) are common 
triggers for monitoring Risk Appetite. 
Risk Appetite arrangements are now emerging as a key risk governance 
practice in banking. Advisory firms have published practical how-to frameworks 
for risk appetite (McKinsey, 2014). PWC (2014) reports that Risk Appetite 
statements formalise, communicate and create risk profile transparency for 
employees and external stakeholders. In its study of 161 independent US 
directors, chairmen, CROs, CEOs and other senior management executives of 
US banking firms, Bank Director (2016) provides a glimpse into the current use 
of Risk Appetite. According to this report, 94 per cent of firms with assets 
greater than $10 billion confirm that establishing Risk Appetite is a key 
responsibility of the Risk Committee or equivalent.  
Another survey indicates that firms are increasingly establishing an early-
warning system to track, monitor and report different risk types, including so-
called traffic light systems which facilitate improved Risk Appetite reporting 
(Central Bank of Ireland, 2014). 
More comprehensive risk appetite frameworks are increasingly being 
implemented by BHCs. PNC, a $350 billion BHC, regards its risk appetite 
statement as a core element of its enterprise risk management framework, 
along with risk organisation and governance, risk monitoring and risk culture. 
This BHC’s risk appetite framework includes a risk appetite statement, risk 
metrics and limits (including key risk indicators, or KRIs), processes for 
identifying and quantifying risks, and processes for aggregating and monitoring 
risk reporting by the lines of business.  
The process of articulating Risk Appetite may take time to conclude. PNC 
redesigned its enterprise risk appetite statement in 2013, which involved its Risk 
Committee of the board, the CEO, the CRO and others and took six months to 
complete. PNC (Koncz, 2015) also indicates that the statement’s adoption was 
evolutionary; it included peer comparisons and back and forth discussions 
before final board approval over time, and determining the number of 
components that should be included in the framework was challenging. 
A firm’s Risk Appetite is enshrined in its risk appetite statement, which is 
reviewed, approved and monitored by the board (Jackson, 2014). For a sample 
risk appetite statement, see Appendix 5. An example of a firm-wide dashboard 
is provided at Appendix 6. In the case of PNC, the cascading of metrics 
includes the distribution of metrics from the board-approved risk appetite 
statement to the lines of business, corporate functions and risk oversight areas, 
with breaches reported upwards as required (Koncz, 2015). 
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Risk appetite processes interact with other corporate governance and strategic 
initiatives. For example, the board-level Risk Committee should review the 
firm’s executive compensation structure to ensure that it is appropriate to the 
bank’s Risk Appetite and creates proper incentives (Lipton et al., 2012). 
Moody’s (2015) argues for an alignment of Risk Appetite with strategic decision 
making for financial firms, as a means of pursuing profitable businesses while 
remaining compliant with regulatory requirements, suggesting that this may be a 
performance enabler. The board must consider a firm’s Risk Appetite as well as 
risk capacity, and actively examine stress-testing outcomes to determine 
whether the buffer between the two metrics is sufficient (Ernst & Young, 2015c).  
McConnell (2013b) argues that firms should develop Risk Appetite approaches 
that create boundaries for strategic decision-making. Risk Appetite must be 
strongly linked to strategy and longer-term planning (Shang and Chen, 2012; 
Girling, 2013). 
Conceptual academic literature on Risk Appetite is now emerging. This study is 
one of the first to examine empirically the impact of Risk Appetite upon 
performance and risk measures. Governance shortcomings in banks result in 
part from not being fully informed about firm-level risk-taking (INSEAD, 2012). 
Post-crisis, banks must embrace their role, define Risk Appetite at senior levels 
and communicate it across the firm (Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro, 2011). 
Aven (2013) focuses conceptually on definitions, helpfully untangling related 
concepts such as risk acceptability and risk aversion. 
Mülbert (2010) conceptually examines legal means of curtailing banks’ Risk 
Appetite through corporate law mechanisms aimed at the board to protect 
depositor interests. Wymeersch (2012) argues that the entire board plays a role 
in overseeing and monitoring Risk Appetite, while Mollah and Liljeblom (2016) 
suggest that banks’ Risk Appetite should be reflected in their asset quality, and 
ultimately in their performance.  
Banks are re-designing their risk management practices to enable them to 
identify risk events and mitigate unforeseen impacts on their performance 
(Caldarelli et al., 2015). A bank’s Risk Appetite is an assessment by top 
management (with input from the CRO) of the expected effect of the bank’s risk-
taking and the value of undertaking riskier investments and activities (Stulz, 
2015). Mülbert (2010) and Wymeersch (2012) independently argue that boards 
(or their Risk Committees) should be composed of board-level directors with 
appropriate expertise, capable of judging Risk Appetite. Bugalla et al. (2012) 
emphasise the collective role of the board in setting Risk Appetite and its 
potentially symbiotic relationship.   
Wymeersch (2012) posits that establishing Risk Appetite is a complex process 
requiring development by senior risk management staff prior to board review 
and approval. Yoost (2014) provides a useful practical guide on risk appetite 
statements for bank directors, including best practice and director 
responsibilities to ensure that an appropriate risk appetite framework is 
implemented. If the language of Risk Appetite is used by management but not 
fully disclosed to the board of directors, the potential benefits of this board-level 
process go unrealised (McConnell, 2012a). 
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Board-level Risk Appetite arrangements that cascade down the organisation 
facilitate the process of boundary setting and allocation of the bank’s scarce 
resources, and may be closely linked with building a robust risk culture (Alix, 
2014). Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) suggest that the structure of the risk 
management function is likely to be important in determining how risk-based 
information is disseminated within the firm.  
A lack of risk oversight discipline may impair the performance of financial 
institutions. For example, a lack of clarity on Risk Appetite contributed to the 
challenges faced by Northern Rock, Wachovia and Lehman Brothers during the 
crisis (Goedhart and Meltzer, 2013).  
In one notable vignette, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Report (2011) chronicles 
one occasion at Merrill Lynch in 2007 when business-line executives reported to 
the board for the first time about a material $32 billion build-up of sub-prime 
exposure. This was an obvious case of the board failing to establish and 
monitor Risk Appetite boundaries over its trading division. As Stulz (2008) 
points out, it is possible for traders to take risks that escape detection, 
depending on the firm’s risk culture and incentives. Similarly, Dionne (2013) 
argues that clear articulation and monitoring of Risk Appetite is a key lesson 
from the financial crisis and its aftermath.  
Risk Appetite statements are flexible tools. Bank boards may choose specific 
Risk Appetite triggers that are updated at each Risk Committee meeting. A 
typical Risk Appetite statement may include qualitative and quantitative 
measurements of credit, market and operational risk (Gontarek, 2016).  
Examples of measures used in risk appetite statements include Tier 1 ratios, 
expected or actual loan losses (or provisions), credit rating volatility, 
reputational incidents and CAMELS ratings (Hyde, Leibert and Wackerbeck, 
2009; McKinsey, 2014). Some of these measures are considered in Section 3.4 
as outcome variables for risk in this study. Davies (2014) posits that soft Risk 
Appetite triggers relating to operational risk, such as reputational or fraud 
events may be challenging for banks to measure and monitor. 
A firm’s Risk Appetite is represented by explicit decisions of the board on risk 
and return trade-offs. This includes a process to determine the nature and 
quantity of risk it is willing to assume, and to make risk allocation decisions 
(Lawrence, 2011). Stulz (2015) posits that a well-governed firm identifies, 
measures and aggregates risks and ensures that the remaining risk is 
consistent with its Risk Appetite; however, importantly, having no risk is neither 
a realistic nor a desirable outcome for banks. The most significant challenge for 
board directors is to improve their oversight of Risk Appetite and risk tolerance 
boundaries (Conference Board, 2014).  
Smith (2014) identifies challenges still observed in Risk Appetite related 
processes, such as insufficient board involvement and monitoring compliance, 
insufficiently broad ranges of values, an inability to aggregate data thoroughly, a 
lack of expertise among board members, and insufficient CRO independence. 
Validating Risk Appetite is vital to the corporate governance framework of 
financial institutions (Davies, 2013).  
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Articulating the firm’s Risk Appetite is an essential part of implementing the 
bank’s risk management framework, and cascading it allows consistent risk-
based decisions to be made (Lam, 2014). There are already signs that cultural 
change is taking place. Tidjane Thiam, CEO of Credit Suisse Group, describes 
his firm’s appetite for earnings and capital volatility: 
“Post-crisis, regulations have changed, the interest rate environment has 
changed, and the macroeconomic environment has changed. Tolerance for 
a certain level of volatility of earnings in regulated companies has gone 
down. People have no appetite”. (Bloomberg, 2016, p.64). 
Experts argue that use of Risk Appetite processes, when accompanied by a 
strong risk culture and related infrastructure, will not only instill good 
governance practice, but also potentially improve firm performance (Alix, 2014).  
Effective Risk Appetite arrangements call for the contribution of multiple internal 
and external parties before adoption. Risk Appetite is developed in collaboration 
with senior management, who translate board’s expectations into specific 
targets and constraints for risk takers in the business lines and legal entities 
(Jackson, 2014). Internal and external auditors perform an initial and on-going 
review of Risk Appetite implementation and monitoring for the board of 
directors. 
The link between Risk Appetite and performance is subtle but critical to 
appreciate. Banks take credit, market and operational risks every day, but the 
expected gains should ideally outweigh the related economic or reputational 
costs (Stulz, 2015). These gains result in contributing to a bank’s performance. 
Consistent with agency theory, this author argues that bank shareholders 
expect the adoption of a well-structured corporate governance framework and 
risk oversight system to maximise shareholder wealth. However, managers 
regularly face value-maximising trade-offs between risk and reward, operating 
within a defined set of regulatory constraints on one-hand and incentive 
schemes on the other hand, thus benefiting from the clarity provided by the 
articulation of Risk Appetite arrangements.  
Banks vary in their business model and mix, but all are risk-taking. A well-
governed bank takes risks that generate ex ante benefits, generating 
shareholder wealth and increasing firm value (Stulz, 2015). A good risk is one 
that generates a positive net present value on a standalone basis. Thus, 
according to Stulz (2015), firms should eliminate, or at least mitigate, so-called 
bad risks that fail that standard, to the extent that it is cost effective to do so, but 
may not necessarily reduce the bank’s total risk per se. Thus, good risk 
governance does not necessarily eliminate risk, which is the daily business of 
banking. Rather, effective risk governance practices should lead the board to 
establish effective and protective appetite boundaries and tolerance levels for 
risk, which is understood across the firm. The right amount of risk-taking for 
bank stakeholders, such as depositors, regulators and society, is likely to differ 
from that of bank shareholders (Stulz, 2015), again underscoring the need for a 
disciplined and balanced approach to allocating Risk Appetite so that board’s 
may take into account these governance actors as well.  
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Stulz (2015) extends this line of reasoning to predict that, through effective risk 
governance, banks may become not only more valuable, but also more adept at 
taking greater risks, and thus may exhibit greater risk profiles overall as a result. 
He notes that effective corporate governance may thus lead not to safer banks, 
but to more valuable and potentially more risky banks.  
This position is consistent with earlier empirical evidence on corporate 
governance mechanisms and performance and risk-taking (Pathan, 2009; 
Beltratti and Stulz, 2012; Minton, Taillard and Williamson, 2014). Risk Appetite, 
as a key part of risk governance practice of the board, can facilitate the process 
of delimiting good from bad risk-taking given the bank’s set of lending choices 
and thus serves as a in important internal monitoring tool. An alternative 
explanation is that Risk Appetite arrangements are a box ticking ceremonial 
tool, more consistent with institutional theory.  
In this study, the null hypothesis in this context is that BHCs’ adoption of Risk 
Appetite has a measurable impact on performance and risk. The alternative 
hypothesis is that Risk Appetite arrangements are window-dressing and largely 
ceremonial, thus having no discernable impact on BHC performance or risk. 
Table 2. Risk Appetite arrangements: Significant literature 
No. Name Type of 
Literature10 
 
Notes  
1. 
 
 
Sabato (2009) Conceptual Identifies the importance of establishing and setting Risk Appetite, and the failure to 
do so before the crisis, and validates that multiple metrics may be employed. 
2.  Bugalla et al. 
(2012) 
 
Conceptual  Scopes the role of Risk Appetite as a new model for risk governance. 
3.  
 
McConnell 
(2012a) 
Conceptual  Identifies Risk Appetite as a key means of breaking excessive risk-taking, as well as 
failures by firms that do not include board members in this process. 
 
4.  Wymeersch 
(2012) 
Conceptual  Identifies the new development of Risk Appetite as a phenomenon within an evolving 
regulatory framework, the need for Risk Appetite to be considered at the overall risk 
and business-line levels, and the connection with Risk Committees. 
 
5.  Jackson (2014) Conceptual  Wide-ranging literature on risk appetite statements as part of a suite of risk 
governance methods; emphasises the potential for Risk Appetite to cascade down 
the firm, potentially generating risk culture benefits. 
 
6.  
 
Yoost (2014) Conceptual  High-quality practical literature on best practice for the risk appetite framework and 
financial institutions; underscores the link between Risk Appetite and strategic 
decisions, consistent with McConnell (2012a). 
 
7.  Stulz (2015) Conceptual Risk Appetite relates to management’s assessment of good and bad risks (in the form 
of investments); connects Risk Appetite with risk management organisation, with the 
practical observation that Risk Appetite is dynamic due to business opportunities and 
changing market conditions; posits that optimal risk levels may be different for owners 
and society, and that better governance does not necessarily lead to safer banks but 
to riskier and more valuable banks. 
 
8.  Gontarek (2016) Conceptual  Scopes Risk Appetite as part of a suite of risk governance variables, including bank 
CRO, Risk Committees and risk conduct. 
 
Source: Author’s own analysis 
 
                                            
10 To the knowledge of the researcher, little if any empirical research on US BHC Risk Appetite arrangements and their 
impact on performance and risk outcomes have been disseminated or otherwise exist in the literature domain. 
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In light of the evidence on ERM adoption and performance, and Stulz’s (2015) 
compelling arguments, this study hypothesises that US BHCs with Risk Appetite 
arrangements will be positively related to BHC performance and be negatively 
related to BHC risk. The testable hypotheses for Risk Appetite are: 
Hypothesis H1a: The existence of BHC Risk Appetite arrangements is 
positively related to performance.11 
Hypothesis H1b: The existence of BHC Risk Appetite arrangements is 
negatively related to risk. 
These hypotheses acknowledge that banks continue to have incentives to take 
risks; however, risk governance frameworks may, over time, restrain unwanted 
risk-taking behaviors and curtail bad risks (Dermine, 2013; Stulz, 2015). The 
key literature on Risk Appetite is summarised in Table 2. 
2.3.2 Hypothesis development: The Risk Committee 
Risk Committees have the potential to play a major role in the adoption of risk 
governance practice. Adams and Mehran (2003) explain that bank boards of 
directors are critical to corporate governance activities. Boards of directors 
establish monitoring committees that mitigate the costs associated with larger 
boards (Upadhyay, Bhargava and Faircloth, 2014). 
The Risk Committee is a specialist committee of the full board charged with 
overall oversight of the bank’s risk. Its oversight role includes responsibility for 
the risk management function, advising the full board on the bank’s overall Risk 
Appetite and risk strategy, and overseeing its implementation (FSB, 2013a). 
Bank board directors may find their risk oversight duties challenging, as they 
may lack the time, skills or information necessary for effective risk oversight 
(Ingley and van der Walt, 2008; Beasley et al., 2009). 
Bank directors’ duties have become significantly more demanding. Prior to the 
crisis, the typical duties of a bank director included agreeing on long-term 
strategy, ensuring risk management responsibility by others, and validating the 
existence of loan monitoring processes (Charkham, 2003). Even before the 
recent round of new regulation, bank board directors carried out certain risk 
oversight responsibilities, deriving directly from state and federal fiduciary laws, 
stock exchange listing requirements and evolving best practice. For example, 
the Delaware courts ruled on the Caremark case that directors are liable where 
there is a sustained or systemic failure to exercise oversight (Lipton et al., 
2012). Arguments for even higher standards of care by bank directors are 
increasingly being made (Macey and O’Hara, 2016). Following the crisis, policy 
makers adjusted their expectations of bank directors and began to argue in 
favor of heightened governance arrangements (FSB, 2013b).  
                                            
11 A positive relation of Risk Appetite to a BHC performance variable is indicative of positive performance, except for 
variables that are expense-related, such as the Efficiency Ratio. A declining Efficiency Ratio demonstrates an 
improvement in BHC operating performance (i.e., it costs less to produce one dollar of revenue), so in this instance a 
negative coefficient sign for Risk Appetite (as the independent variable) and the Efficiency Ratio (as the dependent 
variable) denotes positive BHC performance.  
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Many of the regulatory changes introduced since the financial crisis have 
sought to address perceived deficiencies in risk oversight. Failures of boards to 
appreciate the true risk profiles of major banks (SSG, 2009, 2010) reveal 
oversight deficiencies, and public policy bodies therefore encourage the 
formation of bank Risk Committees. Walker (2009) recommends the 
establishment of Risk Committees that focus on forward-looking risk profiles. 
Having examined the costs of the financial crisis, the United Nations (2010), 
EBA (2011) and G30 (2012) advocate the establishment of Risk Committees. 
Independently minded and experienced directors have the potential to make an 
important contribution to risk oversight and openly challenge management. Risk 
Committees of covered BHCs are to be chaired by an independent director 
(Federal Register, 2014a). Regulators have now codified the requirements for 
board-level Risk Committees, and Basel (2015a) emphasizes the composition 
requirements of Risk Committees, including director independence and 
experience levels.  
The Dodd-Frank Act and the subsequently published 12 CFR Part 252, as 
noted in the Federal Register in 2014, requires covered US BHCs to establish 
standalone, board-level Risk Committees (Federal Register, 2014b). 
Furthermore, every Risk Committee must include one director who has risk 
management expertise commensurate with the BHC’s risk profile, scale and 
size (Federal Register, 2014b). 
In carrying out their oversight duties and under the delegated authority of the 
full board, board-level Risk Committees are participants in the risk/return trade-
off debate already identified (Chen and Lin, 2016). Risk Committees have 
occasionally ignored risk warnings from executives (Yale, Grove and Clouse, 
2012). For example, the IIF (2008) makes the point that Lehman Brothers’ Risk 
Committee only met twice in 2006 and 2007, while Bear Stearns only formed a 
Risk Committee immediately prior to its failure.  
A key role of the board is the establishment of a sound risk culture and control 
framework. Board-level Risk Committees should consider the firm’s Risk 
Appetite and meet frequently with the firm’s CRO on risk matters. Walker (2009) 
calls for non-executive board directors to actively challenge the plans and 
strategies promoted by management, and have access to ongoing training to 
carry out their oversight roles.  
The practitioner literature contributes materially to knowledge on the adoption of 
board-level Risk Committees. Deloitte’s (2013c) risk governance survey reveals 
that in 2013, 53 per cent of large firms and 24 per cent of small firms had a 
single Risk Committee to carry out risk oversight, while in 54 per cent of the 
firms surveyed, a financial expert chaired the Risk Committee.  
The workloads and levels of complexity for board-level Risk Committee 
members are growing. The Federal Reserve (2013b) recommends that bank 
boards or their Risk Committees review, approve and monitor key risk policies 
and ensure that such risks are properly managed. Each BHC board articulates 
and maintains the institutional Risk Appetite, set oversight for independent risk 
management, and ensure that senior management has the expertise to manage 
the bank’s core business.  
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These regulations have a major impact on the corporate governance processes 
of US BHCs. The rules increase directors’ responsibilities and potential liabilities 
(Deloitte, 2016a); however, federal bank regulators recognise a distinction 
between the oversight responsibilities of the board and day-to-day management 
of BHCs (The Conference Board, 2014). 
As mentioned earlier, the role of a Risk Committee is both broad and 
increasingly detailed. Holmquist (2014) scopes the practical considerations of 
bank Risk Committees. His proposed Risk Committee agenda includes risk 
assessment changes versus established tolerance levels, proposals for new 
products and services, analysis of new initiatives, including strategic 
acquisitions and technology-driven conversions, stress testing updates, and 
business continuity planning.  
The regulations for BHCs that are systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFIs) indicate that Risk Committees must issue a formal written charter 
approved by the full board, approve the overall enterprise-wide risk 
management framework and Risk Appetite, document the firm’s risk 
governance policies and infrastructure, monitor policy and limit compliance, and 
integrate risk management goals into its compensation structure (Macey and 
O’Hara, 2016). 
Pressure on board directors of banks to expand and heighten their monitoring 
role since the crisis has been significant, including standalone Risk Committees, 
Risk Appetite, oversight of capital adequacy, liquidity planning, and Basel III 
implementation (Federal Register, 2014b). Boards must establish and adhere to 
ongoing training programmes for all bank directors to ensure that they have 
appropriate knowledge and experience to appreciate the firm’s risk profile, and 
conduct an annual self-assessment that includes an evaluation of its 
effectiveness (OCC, 2014).  
Board directors and their Risk Committee members are accountable for 
providing risk oversight. Moody’s (2008a) suggests several ways of improving 
board’s practices, including involvement in setting and monitoring Risk Appetite, 
ensuring appropriate bank director skills with backgrounds in risk management, 
director training, and setting the tone from the top, with a CEO who attaches a 
high priority to risk management. 
In such a period of heightened regulatory demands, the expertise and 
knowledge levels of bank directors are a relevant consideration. Deloitte 
(2016a) notes that there is a limited talent pool of qualified directors with 
financial background and experience. Its survey of BHCs reveals that only 39 
per cent of Risk Committee charters specifically require the presence of a risk 
expert on the Risk Committee. Lam’s (2014) survey of US banks finds that 71 
per cent of those with assets between $100 billion and $1 trillion have a board-
level Risk Committee. At the other extreme, 55 per cent of regional banks with 
$10 billion to $50 billion of assets have established a board Risk Committee. 
Signs of increasing risk governance activities are observed in greater 
disclosures by BHCs. Publicly-available Risk Committee charters enshrine the 
responsibilities and authority of board-level Risk Committees. For a sample Risk 
Committee charter, see Appendix 7. 
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The academic literature has begun to conceptually examine bank Risk 
Committees. Mongiardino and Plath’s (2010) survey of a panel of global banks 
reveals that dedicated Risk Committees are uncommon, while heavily-burdened 
audit committees fail to keep up with risk-related responsibilities. Battaglia and 
Gallo (2016) suggest that the Basel corporate governance rules place boards of 
directors at the epicenter of many governance reforms. 
In other conceptual research, Bugalla et al. (2012) present a model of 
governance that focuses on risk oversight by the board or its board-level Risk 
Committee. They argue that a standalone Risk Committee, distinct from the 
audit committee, may ensure the common application of risk management 
practices, a position also supported by Hopt (2013a). Yeh, Chung and Lui’s 
(2011) cross-country empirical study of the audit committees and Risk 
Committees of 20 financial institutions suggests that, during crisis periods, 
independent directors serving on both types of committee may have a positive 
influence on performance. Audit committees play an important monitoring role.  
Murphy (2011) also proposes that Risk Committees should be clearly separate 
from audit committees, as the former include both prospective and retrospective 
dimensions. However, some argue that audit committees focus backwards on 
historical accounting policy rather than looking forward at risk oversight (United 
Nations, 2010; McCormick, 2014). 
Board-level committees provide independent oversight of management’s 
activities by devoting specific attention to key areas of focus (Harrison, 1987). 
Risk oversight failures are in part the result of an information gap (Pirson and 
Turnbull, 2011). Therefore, Risk Committee members require access to relevant 
and accurate information on their institutions’ risk exposures, potential 
exposures and market information (Packin, 2013). 
The role of Risk Committees is increasingly demanding. Risk Committee 
members must determine not only their firms’ Risk Appetite, but also risk 
management framework, including the risk governance structure and roles, risk 
competencies, and impact upon strategic initiatives. Bolton (2009) reports a 
dramatic growth in the leverage of US financial institutions in the run-up to the 
financial crisis, with average leverage levels growing to 18 and 24 times. Given 
its relationship with risk-taking, Risk Committees must consider leverage 
carefully, including during periods of changing credit cycles (Saunders, Strock 
and Travlos, 1990; Admati, 2014). 
Oversight of firm-wide enterprise risks at banks has recently evolved into one of 
the board’s more important fiduciary duties (Chapman and Cutler, 2016). There 
are well-reasoned arguments that the complexity of bank risk oversight requires 
high-calibre, expert directors who can be held accountable for a higher duty of 
care (Macey and O’Hara, 2016; Pozen, 2010). This duty can be viewed from an 
agency perspective, as board monitoring ensures that directors establish 
organisational roles to identify, evaluate, report and manage risk (Beasley et al., 
2009), or through an institutional lens, as risk oversight is adopted for the 
appearance of regulatory compliance or good governance.  
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Directors and Risk Committee members increasingly interface with the regulator 
in detailed risk related issues. The Federal Reserve evaluates BHC directors on 
their ability to identify, measure and control risk (Macey and O’Hara, 2016). Risk 
Committee chairmen ideally should exhibit a mastery of the subject matter of 
their committees in order to foster debate, shape committee decision-making 
(Carrott, 2013) and provide feedback on the CRO. Fox, Bugalla and Narvaez 
(2011) report that Risk Committees are becoming a feature of best practice. 
The empirical findings on board-level committees are mixed. These committees 
incur monitoring costs, so the gains should outweigh these costs. Empirical 
evidence on the impact of board committees in general shows neither positive 
nor negative impacts, notwithstanding the fact that they are specialised and 
ought to contribute to enhanced performance (El-Faitouri, 2014). Board 
committees may also impose excessive monitoring regimes, having a 
dampening impact on performance (Vafeas, 1999; El-Faitouri, 2014). The 
contribution of independent directors appears to be important for risk oversight 
(de Haan and Vlahu, 2015). However, Prager (2013) argues that BHC boards 
are for the most part irrelevant, as any forum that meets irregularly in a global 
financial institutional setting can provide little more than broad strategic advice. 
A Risk Committee composed of heterogeneous individuals may help counter-
balance undesirable behavioural effects relating to oversight and risk-taking, 
including cognitive biases (Packin, 2013). A key premise associated with the 
adoption of risk governance arrangements is that improved familiarity with risk 
profiles and effective risk oversight will lead to fewer risk surprises and 
scandals, as well as improved performance (Sheedy and Griffin, 2016).  
An alternative view of board-level Risk Committees is that their adoption does 
not actually drive firm performance or risk-taking improvements. For example, 
Yale, Grove and Clouse (2012) chronicle many apparent risk management 
failures at Countrywide Financial Corporation, notwithstanding the existence of 
a Risk Committee. An independent and influential risk oversight function, with 
the active endorsement of regulators, may even be fundamentally flawed, 
promoting a misplaced sense of security (Lim et al., 2016). 
Risk Committee charters delineate the roles, responsibilities and scope of the 
Risk Committees, and address the objectives, size, leadership and 
qualifications of members (Chapman and Cutler, 2016). One study reports that 
86 per cent of the board-level Risk Committees of large US banks have 
developed Risk Committee charters, but only 36 per cent require the Risk 
Committee to oversee systems designed to protect the independence of the risk 
management function (Deloitte, 2016a). 
The existence of Risk Committees, along with Risk Committee experience, 
levels of board member independence and other monitoring features, have 
been used to construct risk management indices to capture risk governance in 
the banking and insurance sectors (Lingel and Sheedy, 2012; Ellul and 
Yerramilli, 2013; Magee, Schilling and Sheedy, 2014). However, the few 
existing empirical studies that exist on bank Risk Committees do not present 
compelling evidence of a link with performance. Perhaps Risk Committees are 
formed to satisfy industry led efforts to embrace better governance?  
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Hines and Peters (2015) posit that voluntary measures to establish Risk 
Committees may be a symbolic corporate governance practice, consistent with 
institutional theory and the perceptions of responsible risk management. They 
report that firms that operate internationally report greater leverage levels and 
lower financial reporting quality tend to set up Risk Committees voluntarily.  
In their examination of a panel of US banks up to the crisis period, Hines and 
Peters (2015) find no evidence that firms that voluntarily formed Risk 
Committees reported positive operational performance or risk outcomes. They 
conclude that the Risk Committee requirements of the Dodd-Frank Act may not 
necessarily increase the effectiveness of risk governance. Hines et al. (2015) 
also examine US banks and identify an association between the presence of 
Risk Committees and higher audit fees, suggesting that organisations requiring 
closer monitoring also engage in more auditing activities, which may be one 
vehicle that promotes better reporting oversight.  
Iselin (2016) also probes Risk Committees and tests the relationship with bank 
capital measures as an outcome variable for covered BHCs. This is the inverse 
of Hines and Peters’ (2015) sample, which focuses only on voluntary adopters. 
Empirically, Iselin (2016) examines BHC Risk Committees with respect to BHC 
Tier 1 ratios, both before and during the credit crisis. He finds that the existence 
of a Risk Committee is likely to increase capital ratios during times of crisis 
when systemic risks are high, while reducing Tier 1 capital levels under stable 
economic market conditions. The impact is significant, with a 0.9 per cent 
reduction in Tier 1 capital before the crisis, and a 1.16 per cent increase in 
capital levels during crisis conditions. 
Given the frequency with which Risk Committees meet and the requirement to 
provide monitoring on a real-time basis, board-level Risk Committees may not 
provide a reliable risk-monitoring role under fast-moving market conditions, 
underscoring a potential shortfall of this risk governance structure (Prager, 
2013).  
Gao, Liao and Wang (2013) consider the enhanced mechanisms introduced by 
Dodd-Frank and measure the market’s reaction in terms of stock returns and 
credit spreads as bank outcome variables. They observe mixed and limited 
market reactions, especially over the more advanced stages of the legislation.  
Tao and Hutchinson’s (2013) study of the boards of directors, Risk Committees 
and compensation committees of Australian firms observes a positive 
relationship between risk-taking and performance outcomes to Risk Committee 
composition. Forming Risk Committees also generate indirect benefits. Yale, 
Grove and Clouse (2012) argue that when the regulatory environment is 
dominant and risks are complex, creating a Risk Committee may make the risk 
profile more intelligible to the full board. Adams and Jiang’s (2016) study of the 
UK insurance industry finds that executive financial expertise levels are 
significantly positively related to financial outcomes. This is consistent with the 
position noted in Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014), that greater financial 
expertise should be consistent with lower costs of acquiring and processing 
complex banking information for directors in the boardroom (Minton, Taillard 
and Williamson, 2014, p. 352) 
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Board-level Risk Committees thus should have measurable effect on BHC 
performance and credit risk profiles over time - this is the baseline hypothesis. 
An alternative hypothesis is that it may be too soon for board-level Risk 
Committees to have had a measureable effect on legacy portfolios and return 
profiles. BHCs may still be scrambling to implement the full scope of the risk 
governance requirements in order to satisfy regulatory requirements, and thus 
Risk Committees may remain largely symbolic fixtures.  
Thus, the hypotheses on Risk Committee existence are: 
Hypothesis H2a: The existence of the Risk Committee is positively related to 
BHC performance. 
Hypothesis H2b: The existence of the Risk Committee is negatively related 
to BHC risk. 
The key literature on bank Risk Committees is presented in Table 3, and a 
conceptual map with a statement of the hypotheses is presented in Figure 4. 
2.4 Exposing the Research Gap 
The above literature review and hypothesis development section argue that the 
empirical landscape on BHC risk governance is somewhat limited, and reveals 
that there appears to have been virtually no empirical research on board-level 
Risk Appetite arrangements and BHC outcomes disseminated in the literature 
domains.  
This observation is surprising given the importance of directors to provide 
effective internal monitoring given recent supervisory-led governance 
requirements, to say nothing of the potential systemic risk associated with 
commercial banks. As one team of researchers observe: “It is our contention 
that the Fed’s BHC regulations, the principles of corporate governance 
developed here, and the basic concerns about systemic risk and bank safety all 
indicate that BHC officers and directors have fiduciary obligations that guide, 
and when necessary trump, corporate form” (Macey and O’Hara, 2016, p. 92).  
The field map presented in Figure 5 illustrates standard corporate governance 
and risk governance mechanisms, noting relevant conceptual and empirical 
research. This field map highlights the unambiguous research gap associated 
with Risk Appetite arrangements. Given the strong references in the practitioner 
literature and regulatory landscape already noted throughout this paper, there is 
a cogent and timely need to engage in and disseminate evidence-based 
research to address this gap. 
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Table 3. Significant literature on Risk Committees 
No. Name Type of 
Literature  
Notes  
1. Mongiardino & 
Plath (2010) 
Conceptual  Identifies the need for a dedicated board-level Risk Committee with a majority of 
independent members; Risk Committees meet infrequently during a crisis. 
 
2.  Murphy (2011) Conceptual  Raises the issue of CRO reporting to the Risk Committee and the independence of 
the CRO role; identifies the CRO’s role in overall enterprise risk management. 
 
3. Yeh, Chung and 
Lui (2011) 
Empirical  Employs OLS regressions to evaluate global financial institutions (n=20) in an 
international panel from eight countries; presents evidence that banks with more 
independent directors involved in risk oversight performed better during the crisis. 
 
4.  Fox, Bugalla and 
Narvaez (2011) 
Conceptual Identifies statutory requirement for a Risk Committee in a paradigm shift; argues that 
Risk Committees serve a strategic function (versus the control function of audit 
committees) and are becoming best practice for good governance. 
 
5.  Wymeersch 
(2012) 
Conceptual  Identifies CRD IV requirement for Risk Committee made up of independent members 
to oversee risk-taking, in close consultation with the CEO and CRO. 
 
6.  Lingel and Sheedy 
(2012) 
Empirical  Investigates risk governance across 60 global financial institutions with a governance 
index based on CRO and Risk Committee features; panel regression finds a negative 
relationship with risk, although no association with stock or accounting returns. 
 
7. Bugalla et al. 
(2012) 
Conceptual  Emphasises the need for a board-level Risk Committee with independent members 
and adequate expertise levels; adds that one member of the committee should take 
responsibility for internal risk intelligence and information gathering. 
 
8. Bugalla, Kallman 
and Narvaez 
(2013) 
Conceptual  Identifies Risk Committee requirement and reinforces aspects of Risk Committee and 
CRO performance that cannot be legislated for, namely failure of leadership at the 
board level and unqualified directors. 
 
9. Hopt (2013) Conceptual Advocates the establishment of a Risk Committee of the board and an independent 
CRO to enhance governance and mitigate complex and opaque risk profiles. 
 
10.  Elull and Yerramilli 
(2013) 
Empirical  Constructs a risk management index (RMI) to measure the strength of risk 
management functions at US BHCs during the financial crisis. The RMI is negatively 
related to Tail Risk and NPLs, and positively related to operating performance and 
stock performance during the financial crisis years. 
 
11.   IMF (2014)  Studies 800 banks, investment firms, mortgage firms and co-operative lenders across 
72 countries; findings include a growth in Risk Committees and CROs; employs panel 
OLS and lagged variables and finds a weak or no relationship with risk-taking. 
 
12. Andries and 
Brown (2014) 
Empirical Examines 156 banks in a multi-country study to assess risk management and 
corporate governance features; finds that a strong Risk Committee is associated with 
greater pre-crisis growth but not with lower credit losses during the crisis. 
 
13.  Battaglia and 
Gallo (2015) 
Empirical Probes risk governance structures for a panel of 36 Chinese and Indian banks; finds 
that Risk Committee size and return performance variables are positively related, 
while market valuation and market growth variables are both negatively related. 
 
14.  Hines et al. (2015) Empirical Evaluates a large sample of US banks and BHCs, finding that the presence of a Risk 
Committee is associated with higher audit fees; posits that the voluntary existence of 
a Risk Committee may result in closer financial monitoring and greater use of 
auditors. 
 
15.  Hines and Peters 
(2015) 
Empirical Examines the voluntary existence of Risk Committees over a multi-year period; finds 
that such firms exhibit no better profitability and risk outcomes, however they are 
associated with well-known audit firms, more international activity, and larger, more 
independent boards; concludes that the voluntary existence of Risk Committees may 
be established simply to present a perception of responsible risk management. 
 
16.  Iselin (2016) Empirical Investigates the mandatory adoption of Risk Committees by covered US BHCs; finds 
that their presence is consistent with increasing capital levels during crisis times and 
decreasing capital levels in stronger operating environments, effectively allowing 
banks to operate more efficiently from a capital perspective. 
Source: Author’s own analysis 
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Figure 4: Conceptual map with statement of hypotheses 
Source: Author’s own construct 
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Figure 5: Selected literature domains of corporate governance research 
Source: Author’s own analysis 
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2.5 Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature and presented an over-arching 
definition of corporate governance, suitable for commercial banks.12 Several 
primary corporate governance mechanisms have been examined, including 
board structure, internal monitoring and incentives. Two major aspects of risk 
governance with respect to internal monitoring have also been investigated, 
namely Risk Appetite arrangements and board-level Risk Committees.13 
Following the literature review, a series of risk governance hypotheses has 
been developed for testing next in this study.  
Like the exogenous governance shock observed in large Korean firms in 1999 
(Black, Jang and Kim, 2006; Black and Kim, 2012), BHC risk governance 
practices emanating externally from the regulator provide an exceptional 
opportunity for empirical examination. The hypotheses in this study relate 
directly to supervisory authority regulations applicable to BHCs, allowing the 
appropriateness of the new standards of Risk Appetite and Risk Committee 
experience to be tested. 
The research method and description of the data employed will now be 
presented. 
 
                                            
12 Recent literature reviews on bank corporate governance include de Haan and Vlahu (2015) and Maati and Maati-
Sauvez (2012a). 
13 No literature review for risk governance is yet available, although Gontarek (2016) identifies key research in this area. 
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3 RESEARCH METHOD AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
3.1 Introduction 
There is no universally agreed framework for evaluating corporate governance. 
One approach is to adopt an interpretivist method examining hermeneutical 
themes. Zattoni, Douglas and Judge (2013) argue that qualitative approaches 
are a relevant means of conducting governance research. On the other hand, 
empirical studies are positivist in nature, often evaluating quantitative 
relationships between governance and performance metrics. 
3.2 Research Method 
Having considered the philosophical and researcher stance in Chapter 1, this 
chapter presents the sample construction, data definitions and data collection 
methods, and discusses relevant ethical and practical issues. This research 
applies valid techniques to an emerging area of corporate governance research 
and relies on the collection of secondary data and statistical analysis to identify 
and test relationships between outcome measures and explanatory variables, 
while controlling for firm-specific factors and standard corporate governance 
effects. Multivariate analysis is one technique employed in this context. 
In chapter 4, the dependent (or outcome) variable is firm performance (see 
Equation 1) whereas in chapter 5 the dependent variable focuses on firm risk 
outcomes (see Equation 2). Specifically, the following two equations are 
estimated: 
Equation 1:  
 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! =  𝑎 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑒 (!,!) + 𝛽!𝑅𝐶 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠(!,!) +   𝛽!𝐶𝑅𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒(! !) + 𝛽!𝐵𝐻𝐶 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(!,!) +  𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑀𝑡𝑔 𝑁𝑢𝑚(!,!) +  𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑀𝑡𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑(!,!) + 𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟(!,!) + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒(!,!) + 𝛽!𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴(!,!) +  𝛽!"𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(!,!)  +  𝛽!!𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠(!,!) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + Error Term  Where Performance!,! ∈ ROA,NIM, Efficiency Ratio,HPRs  for firm i at time t.     
Equation 2:14  
 𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘!,! =  𝑎 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑒 (!,!) + 𝛽!𝑅𝐶 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠(!,!) + 𝛽!𝐶𝑅𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒(! !) + 𝛽!𝐵𝐻𝐶 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(!,!) +  𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑀𝑡𝑔 𝑁𝑢𝑚(!,!) +  𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑀𝑡𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑(!,!) + 𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟(!,!) + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒(!,!) + 𝛽!𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴(!,!) +  𝛽!"𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(!,!)  +  𝛽!!𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠(!,!) + 𝐵!"𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠(!,!) +𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + Error Term 
 Where Risk!,!  ∈ NPL, Actual Loan lossess, Tier 1 capital, Tail Risk  for firm i at time t.     
 
                                            
14 The extent of international activities is added to the model set-up to control for any existent relationship with the 
dependent variables (i.e., risk-taking), following Berger et al. (2015). 
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Since the data are a combination of both time-series and cross-sectional data, 
panel data analysis is employed as an efficient empirical tool (de Andres and 
Vallelado, 2008). Time dummies are used to control for yearly effects. Potential 
estimation approaches include random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE).  
Following Roberts and Whited (2012), a Hausman test was performed to decide 
between RE and FE to test the null hypothesis that unique errors are correlated 
with the regressors. The outcome of the test was significant; thus, FE are 
employed in this analysis. One of the key advantages of fixed effects analyses 
is the potential of controlling for unobserved heterogeneity amongst the BHCs.15 
BHC fixed effects are employed as in other US BHC and risk governance 
studies, including Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), Duchin and Sosyura (2014) and 
Bhagat and Bolton (2014). 
3.3 Sample Construction 
US BHCs are a credible choice for sample construction. The chosen sample 
consisted of 140 large US BHCs, for the period 2012 to 2015.16 US BHCs are 
publicly listed firms and provide high levels of disclosure, so the sample in this 
study was delimited to these firms. The largest BHCs are subject to the suite of 
risk governance changes, while some others implement these arrangements 
notwithstanding the lack of formal requirement. The sample was delimited from 
non-bank financial institutions, which may be subject to different regulatory or 
business dynamics. US BHCs are commonly used in governance studies 
(Adams and Mehran, 2003; Elyasiani and Zhang, 2015; Merle, 2013). 
This study covers most of the assets of the US banking system from 2012 to 
2015. The 100 largest US BHCs control over $10 trillion (Federal Reserve 
System Board of Governors, 2016) of the total $15 trillion of US banking assets 
(Avraham, Selvaggi and Vickery, 2012). Appendix 1 provides a full list of US 
BHCs. BHCs became allowable under the Bank Holding Company Act, 1956. 
The Federal Reserve’s website of the largest BHCs was used to identify the 
sample BHCs, and BoardEx was used to remove intermediate holding 
companies (IHCs), which are reported as “private”. IHCs are de-limited from the 
sample because they are subsidiaries of foreign firms. The advantage of limiting 
the sample to one country is that no controls are needed for country effects, 
such as legal protections for minority investors and the level of economic 
development (see Doidge, Karolyi and Stulz, 2004).   
The sample comprised 560 firm-year observations for the fiscal years 2012 to 
2015. The sample of BHCs is unbalanced, as several BHCs either merged or 
went public, becoming listed firms during the four-year study period. 
                                            
15 FE is the chosen multivariate technique but pooled OLS offers an alternative examination approach (Zhou, 2001). 
Section 2.2.5 identified empirical evidence suggesting that banks may have institutional memory or other difficult to 
observe unique characteristics that may affect their performance or risk-taking, further supporting the use of FE to 
control for the potential effect of omitted variable bias.    
16 Other studies of US BHCs include Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) with a sample of 72. Minton, Taillard and Williamson 
(2014) employ an unbalanced sample, where n varies from 119 to 205 over time. In this study, data collection ceased 
when n=140 due to decreasing quality of data. There was no evidence of differing qualitative results when only the top 
100 BHCs, chosen as an arbitrary number, were examined with the suite of baseline regression tests used in this paper. 
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3.4 The Data 
A broad array of outcome variables contributes to the validity of this research. 
Studies of bank corporate governance and risk sometimes employ a single, 
one-dimensional outcome indicator, as noted by Klomp and de Haan (2012). 
This research employs a broader suite of variables, extending the potential 
range of findings. The variables employed in this study are now identified. 
3.4.1 Outcome variables: Performance 
Bank performance provides a yardstick for relative value judgments of 
commercial banks and their success. Performance and risk are examined 
through a suite of headline outcome measures and a list of further analysis 
performance variables, later in Chapter 6. The primary analysis includes an 
initial suite of four variables to examine BHC performance. 
Return on assets (ROA) is a headline performance variable. It is often used as 
an accounting-based BHC outcome variable (see Giroud and Mueller, 2010; Xu, 
Grove and Schaberl, 2013; Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012; Battalgia and 
Gallo, 2015; Lingel and Sheedy, 2012). ROA is a more widely accepted 
performance measure in practice than ROE, as it adjusts for the leverage 
effects found in this sector (ECB, 2010a; Beccalli and Poli, 2015). ROA is 
defined as the cumulative annual net income for each year divided by that 
year’s total assets. ROA is collected from Bloomberg. 
The next performance variable, net income margin (NIM), observes the 
difference between the earned spread on assets and liabilities, a sign of 
disciplined asset and liability pricing. NIM is defined as the difference between 
the blended cost of funding and the average blended interest income earned on 
the credit portfolio, and is a common means of isolating the fundamental level of 
performance in any lending operation. Effective asset and liability pricing, a 
fundamental aspect of banking, are increasingly important given the low interest 
rate environment faced by banks during the study period (Deloitte, 2015b). 
NIM performance is an important indicator for the board to monitor. Krawcheck 
(2012) explains as a practitioner, that NIM is one of the least understood parts 
of banking and yet may have a disproportionate impact on the bottom line, at 
times masking underlying strengths or weaknesses of the business. She also 
argues that boards should closely examine changes in every aspect 
underpinning NIM, such as net interest income (NII) and funding expenses to 
isolate their impact upon profits, a practice used later in his study.17 Use of NIM 
follows studies by Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2010), Minton, Taillard and 
Williamson (2014), Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011) and Gulamhussen and 
Santa (2015). NIM values are collected from Bloomberg. 
 
 
                                            
17 Thanks to Dr Stijn Claessens who suggested further examination of the factors that drive NIM in this research. 
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If a BHC’s growth opportunities remain subdued, a bank’s efficiency can 
present opportunities for self-improvement and focus (Lei and Gelly, 2016). An 
example of this phenomenon includes the recent positive credit outlook 
awarded to Zion’s Bancorporation. Moody’s (2017) reports that this BHC (which 
is covered in this sample) achieved a target Efficiency Ratio goal below 66% 
that should improve to the lower 60 per cent range over time. 
The Efficiency Ratio is a headline BHC performance variable. It is defined as 
non-interest expense divided by the sum of net interest income plus non-
interest income, thus lower ratio values denote an improvement in performance 
(Akhighbe and Stevenson, 2010). These authors fail to detect an increase in 
BHC profit efficiencies in their study within relaxed regulatory conditions 
observed after the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Jacewtiz and 
Kupiec (2012), who explain that the Efficiency Ratio measures a bank’s ability 
to generate revenues from its non-funding related expense base, find that cost 
structures can vary across different lending specializations, generating 
economies of scale. This suggests that narrower Risk Appetite with less broad 
business models (and related infrastructure) may have lower (i.e., more 
efficient) cost structures. Hays, De Lurgio and Gilbert (2009) study smaller US 
banks and find that attention must be paid to this ratio as the industry recovers 
from the financial crisis. The Efficiency Ratio is collected from Bloomberg. 
This study also includes a market-driven performance variable. Holding period 
returns (HPRs), also called annual stock returns (Magee, Schilling and Sheedy, 
2014), reflect the market’s perception of the BHC and its prospects, as proxied 
by its common share performance. This study follows Core, Guay and Rusticus 
(2006), Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012), Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011), 
Beltratti and Stulz (2012) and Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) in using HPRs for the 
annual periods from 2012 to 2015, and assumes that dividends are re-invested 
in shares. This data is collected from Bloomberg. The primary performance 
outcome variables are shown in Table 4. 
Other variables are employed in Chapter 6 and are listed in Appendix 2. These 
include a suite of measures linked to underlying operating performance, such as 
BHC Operating Income, Other Operating Income, Net Interest Income/Average 
Assets (NII), and (as noted earlier) NIM related underlying variables such as 
Total Interest Income (TII) and Total Interest Expense (TIE). 
Table 4. Primary outcome variables: Performance 
No. Name Type of Variable  Notes  
1. ROA Performance BHC annual ROA, collected from Bloomberg and Bankscope. 
 
2.  NIM Performance BHC annual NIM is collected from Bloomberg; provides an indicator of 
performance originating from asset/liability pricing discipline. 
 
3.  Efficiency 
Ratio 
Performance BHCs’ efficiency ratio is defined as non-interest expense divided by revenues, 
and is collected from Bloomberg. 
4.  HPRs Performance BHCs’ annual HPRs, collected from Bloomberg and CRSP (assumes 
dividends re-invested in securities). 
Source: Author’s own analysis 
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3.4.2 Outcome variables: Risk 
Risk-taking is commonly used as a yardstick in bank corporate governance 
studies. Although risk (such as credit, market, operational, liquidity, cyber 
threats) must be prudently adjudicated and managed, this study focuses on 
credit risk as a key risk faced by US BHCs (OCC, 1988), and other risks are 
largely delimited within this study.18 Credit risk is a primary risk facing BHCs 
(OCC, 1988). Risk management in this context is the practice of reviewing, 
assessing and categorising various types of risk faced by the firm (Raghavan, 
2003).  
Banks require reliable risk measurement approaches in order to identify and 
capitalise on business opportunities (Pyle, 1997), and risk management 
includes activities to avoid, transfer or actively manage risks (Oldfield and 
Santomero, 1997). Risk-taking is core to the business model of banking (Becht, 
Bolton and Roëll, 2011). Although macroeconomic factors played a major role in 
the crisis, risk management also had a significant impact on performance 
(United Nations, 2010; Erkens, Hung and Matos, 2012). Effective board 
monitoring is required to oversee risk-taking in banks.  
Practitioners and academics have debated various means of measuring the 
riskiness of banks (Laeven and Levine, 2009; EBA, 2011; Berger et al., 2015). 
Bank failure may have consequences for a broad range of constituents 
(Alexander, 2006; Becht, Bolton and Roëll, 2011; Sarra, 2012; Nguyen, 2013). 
Several of the variables selected in this study are similar to those found in the 
US Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s measures of capital adequacy, 
assets, management capability, earnings, liquidity and sensitivity, otherwise 
known as CAMELS ratings (Kerstien and Kozberg, 2013). The risk variables 
employed in this study focus on asset quality, capital and equity risk to proxy 
overall BHC risk profiles.  
The headline risk outcome variables are Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans 
(NPLs), Actual Net Loan Losses, the Tier 1 capital ratio and Tail Risk. 
Accounting-led measures of risk are used in this study, reflecting further on the 
distinction made earlier between good and bad risks (Stulz, 2015). The ECB 
(2010a), Kato and Hagendorff (2010), Grove et al. (2011) and Stefanelli and 
Cotugno (2011) each identify traditional measures of asset quality, and include 
non-performing loans as a measure. NPLs are the first headline risk variable 
collected and used in this study, following John, Mehran and Qian (2010), 
Klomp and de Haan (2012) and Chen and Lin (2016). NPLs can be recovered 
over time from collateral or other means before being charged off as an actual 
loan loss.  
Risks that have negative expected outcomes identified by Stulz (2015) can be 
measured for example by actual net losses that are realised, impacting capital 
after all efforts of recovery are exhausted.  
 
                                            
18 See Wang and Hsu (2013) for a review of board-related issues relating to operational risk events in financial 
institutions, Claessens (2013) regarding the liquidity and capital risks of financial institutions, and Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013) for trading risks and hedging activities. 
 46 
Thus, Actual Loan Losses (charge-offs) are also collected from Bloomberg for 
each BHC as a further credit risk variable, following Hines and Peters (2015). 
The US OCC Director’s Handbook defines loan losses as an indicator of bank 
quality, with greater net loan losses potentially reflecting severe deterioration in 
the credit portfolio, worsening management ability to detect or collect from NPLs 
in earlier stages, and the need for greater reserves (OCC, 2010, p. 44).    
Capital is important for banks, as a risk buffer to absorb unexpected losses that 
would otherwise cause them to fail (Beccalli and Poli, 2015; Demeriguc-Kunt, 
Detragiache and Merrouche, 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). In other BHC 
studies of corporate governance, capital levels have been evaluated as an 
outcome variable. There is empirical evidence that suggests capital helps banks 
during crisis times (Berger and Bouwman, 2013). Data on Tier 1 capital ratios, 
the most common measure of bank capital, are collected from Bloomberg, 
following Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014), Beltratti and Stulz (2012), 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) and Battaglia and Gallo (2015). Tier 1 is 
commonly used in both academic (Merle, 2013; Iselin, 2016) and practitioner 
publications (ECB, 2010a). 
Criticisms of Tier 1 include the potential for banks to engineer capital ratios 
(McKinsey, 2010) or undertake other forms of regulatory capital arbitrage 
(Boyson, Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2014).19 The EBA (2011) highlights the trend 
toward recognising the primacy of tangible equity (e.g. capital adjusted for 
preferred issuance, intangibles, goodwill and deferred tax assets) as a superior 
bank risk absorption measure. As such, the tangible common equity to risk-
weighted assets (TCE/RWA) ratio is used where noted for robustness. 
McKinsey (2010b) describes TCE/RWA as the capital ratio that out-performs all 
others in predicting future distress. TCE/RWA is collected from Bloomberg and 
is used as an alternative measure of capital strength.20 
Tail Risk is another headline risk outcome measure used in this study.21 Tail 
Risk reflects extreme equity risk and seeks to capture the shortfall risk 
associated with excessive risk-taking. It is particularly relevant for bank 
shareholders, as witnessed by certain European banks earlier in 2016. Lingel 
and Sheedy (2012), Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Magee, Schilling and 
Sheedy (2014) employ this variable. This study follows seminal research and 
defines it as the negative of the average return on the firm’s stock over the five 
per cent worst days in a given year, which is collected with data from 
Bloomberg (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013, p.1765). 
In summary, the headline outcome risk variables used in this study are NPLs, 
Actual Net Loan Losses, Tier 1 capital and Tail Risk. The panel of primary risk 
outcome variables is shown in Table 5 below and detailed in Appendix 2. 
 
                                            
19 See Ferri and Pesic (2016) for a description of banks’ probable manipulation of their regulatory capital requirements. 
20 This study, like all others identified in the literature review, typically uses actual or realised Tier 1 capital ratios for 
each bank. Banks commonly choose a cushion above the minimum required Tier 1 capital amount in their actual 
operations. See Guidara et al. (2013) for a description of how this cushion changes for different economic cycles. 
21 Credit risk is the primary focus of the risk measures for this study. Tail Risk is nonetheless included as a risk outcome 
measure as it is widely followed in risk governance literature (see Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013) and measures extreme 
volatility or so-called expected shortfall.   
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Table 5. Primary outcome variables: Risk 
No. Name Type of 
Variable  
Notes  
1. 
 
NPLs Risk Variable  BHC annual non-performing loans/total loans collected from Bloomberg. 
 
2.  Actual Net 
Loan Losses  
 
Risk Variable Actual realised net loan losses after provisions, collected from Bloomberg. 
3.  
 
Tier 1 Risk Variable BHC core capital divided by risk-weighted assets, the most commonly 
followed form of bank capital, collected from Bloomberg. 
    
4. Tail Risk Risk Variable Tail Risk is defined as the negative of the average return on the firm’s stock 
over the five per cent worst days in a given year, following Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013).  These authors explain that poorly designed incentives 
can encourage traders to take on excessive risks that reward shareholders 
in the short term to only damage the firm over time.  It would then follow that 
BHCs with more robust risk management functions exhibit lower Tail Risk 
on average. Daily equity returns collected from Bloomberg. 
 
Source: Author’s own analysis 
Predictor variables 
A common challenge relating to the measurement of corporate governance 
concepts is developing a reliable proxy for the unseen human element of a 
firm’s decision-making processes (Beekes, Hong and Owen, 2010). Risk 
governance mechanisms are measured in this study with two independent 
variables: Risk Appetite and the existence of the Risk Committee. Risk Appetite 
arrangements are a key headline variable relating to this emerging board-level 
oversight practice. Risk Committee existence is used to measure the 
compliance to the regulatory requirement for a BHC Risk Committee. 
Employment of the board-level Risk Appetite variable extends existing empirical 
research on bank corporate governance. Data on the articulation of Risk 
Appetite by the board are hand-collected from the annual reports of each 
BHC.22 For each BHC, the existence of a board-approved Risk Appetite 
arrangements was coded as 1 (exists) or 0 (does not exist) for each year in the 
study. 
The existence of a Risk Committee is another explanatory variable used in this 
study, following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), Minton, Taillard and Williamson 
(2014) and Magee, Schilling and Sheedy (2014). Aebi, Sabato and Schmid 
(2012) argue that Risk Committees may indicate stronger risk management 
monitoring, and hence improved corporate governance oversight.  In the 
Further Analysis section, Risk Committee expertise is also identified and 
probed, and is thus presented below.  
The key predictor variables are presented in Table 6. 
                                            
22 In an alternative data collection technique, the articulation of board-level Risk Appetite arrangements in BHC board 
Risk Committee charter statements is also measured and examined, when noted later in this paper in Chapter 6.  
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Table 6. Key predictor variables 
No. Name Variable  Notes  
1. Risk Appetite  Independent Existence of Risk Appetite arrangements was hand-collected 
from BHC 10k annual reports (or otherwise as noted). 
 
2.  Risk Committee existence  Independent The existence of a Risk Committee at the level of the US BHC 
board of directors, as reported in BoardEx.  
    
3. Risk Committee member 
financial expertise23 
Independent Risk Committee member expertise for all members (or the 
chairman) is probed in the Further Analysis chapter and follows 
definitions used by Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014) and 
was determined using BoardEx data. 
Source: Author’s own analysis 
3.4.4 Other explanatory variables   
Explanatory or control variables include business-level and bank corporate 
governance variables employed to isolate the effects examined in the dataset. 
Relevant BHC business-level control variables are described first. 
BHC year-end total assets are collected from the US Federal Reserve Board, 
following Dietrich and Wanzenried (2011), Merle (2010), Aebi, Sabato and 
Schmid (2012) and Switzer and Wang (2013). It is well recognised that BHC 
size is associated with growth, scale and business strategies (Iqbal, Strobl and 
Vähämaa, 2015). For example, BHC asset size is statistically related to the 
number of BHC subsidiaries (Avraham, Selvaggi and Vickery, 2012), 
suggesting that oversight of such organisations may be complex and need to be 
taken into account. 
Differences in BHC business models are taken into account with traditional 
control variables used within earlier literature. Total Loans/Total Assets, 
following de Andres and Valleldo, 2008; Kupeic and Lee (2012), and Battaglia 
and Gallo, 2015, is collected from Bloomberg to measure the breadth of credit 
activities. Deposits/Assets, also collected from Bloomberg, is another business 
level control variable, as banks with greater deposit financing, as opposed to 
money-market funding, may be less risky (Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012; Ellul 
and Yerramilli, 2013). 
The potential impact of BHC internationalisation on risk-taking is explicitly 
considered in all risk related regressions as a control variable. While some 
research argues that international activities promote diversification of exposure, 
Berger et al. (2015) finds in favour of the market risk hypothesis, which argues 
that international activities of US banks increase portfolio risk levels, which can 
be controlled for in the risk-based models in this study. The percentage of 
international exposure is collected from Bloomberg. 
Internal monitoring variables associated with corporate governance are 
considered next. Board size and the ratio of non-inside directors to total 
directors are both factors that may influence BHC board effectiveness (Mehran, 
Morrison and Shapiro, 2011; Switzer and Wang, 2013).  
                                            
23 The same definition is applied to the chairman of the Risk Committee in alternative specifications later in Chapter 6. 
 49 
Ferrero-Ferrero, Fernandez-Izquierdo and Munoz-Torres’ (2012) examination of 
board characteristics and risk-taking reveals that larger boards led to poorer 
corporate performance and lower risk-taking before the crisis, suggesting that 
director coordination was impaired. Thus, such findings suggest that simply 
increasing BHC board size was not a guarantee of improved risk governance as 
a regulatory led initiative. Board size is measured as the number of directors on 
a bank’s board (Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012; Adams and Mehran, 2003). 
Adams and Mehran (2003) find that, on average, BHCs have larger boards than 
non-financial firms, possibly owing to the need to meet regulatory requirements 
imposed on bank boards. The proportion of non-inside directors is measured as 
the percentage of total directors without any employment relationship with the 
company except for their board seat, following BoardEx (2016).   
McNulty, Florackis and Ormrod (2013) posit that high effort norms by directors 
may lead to lower risk-taking. Standard board-monitoring practices such as the 
board meeting frequency may impact monitoring efforts generally and 
exacerbate agency costs (Hahn and Lasfer, 2016). Attending board meetings is 
one of the basic standards to meet US bank director diligence requirements 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2012). Board meeting attendance is a further explanatory 
variable to measure internal monitoring efforts by the board (Aggarwal and 
Williamson, 2006), and is measured by the number of meetings attended as a 
percentage of total meetings held per annum. Battaglia and Gallo (2015) 
measure the number of board meetings in their risk governance study, while 
Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012) measure the degree of non-attendance of 
board directors and the number of Risk Committee meetings per year.  Neither 
Boardex nor Bloomberg provides Risk Committee meeting frequency data, so 
board-level variables are used to proxy internal monitoring. These variables are 
collected from Bloomberg. 
Demographic characteristics of executives and directors, such as age, 
education, busyness levels and firm and board tenure, are common features 
used to proxy experience and skills as noted earlier.  
Berger, Kick and Schaeck (2014) examine demographic features of executives 
and bank risk-taking, including age, as an effective substitute for workforce 
experience, which may otherwise be adversely affected by graduate-level 
education, including time spent on doctoral studies. They find that younger 
executive management teams significantly increase bank portfolio risk, and that 
banks’ risk profiles decline with more advanced age of senior executives. The 
age of senior executives’ is used as a control variable in banking studies (Grove 
et al., 2011, Switzer and Wang, 2013, and Cooper and Uzun, 2012. Thus, in 
this study, CRO age is used in all regressions as a control variable and is 
collected from BoardEx. 
CEOs are particularly well-placed to limit banks’ excessive risk-taking (Fortin, 
Goldberg and Roth, 2010; Gropp and Köhler, 2010; Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 
2012). Unlike diversified investors, CEOs may lose their invested wealth if the 
BHC fails (Devriese et al., 2004). CEO Shares are determined as the dollar 
amount of equity ownership of the CEO, as reported by Bloomberg. 
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Table 7. Explanatory variables 
No. Name Type of 
Variable  
Notes  
 
 
1. BHC Assets Explanatory USD value of BHC assets from the US Federal Reserve Bank website for 
each year-end reporting period. 
 
2.  Total Loans to 
Total Assets 
Explanatory Ratio of total BHC loans to total BHC assets as a measure of BHC 
business model; collected from Bloomberg. 
 
3. Board Size Explanatory Number of total BHC board members collected from BoardEx. 
 
4. BOD meetings 
Number 
Explanatory Number of board meetings held within that year, a proxy for board 
monitoring, collected from BoardEx. 
 
5.  BOD Attendance 
percentage 
Explanatory Average percentage of board members attending each board meeting 
throughout the year, collected from BoardEx. 
 
6. Busyness  Explanatory Total number of boards held by the governance actor as per BoardEx. 
 
7. CRO Centrality Explanatory  The ratio of the CRO’s total compensation less stock options to CEO total 
compensation, collected from Bloomberg and Morningstar.  Follows Ellul & 
Yerramilli (2013) and Keys et al. (2009) as a proxy for power. 
8. CEO Education Explanatory The CEO holds a graduate business school, graduate legal or banking 
degree, hand-collected from Bloomberg. 
 
9. CEO Duality Explanatory The CEO and Chairman are the same person at reporting date, as 
reported in BoardEx. 
 
10. CEO Shares Explanatory USD amount of share ownership by the CEO, as reported by Bloomberg. 
 
11. CEO Board of 
Director Years 
Explanatory Number of years that the CEO has served on the BHC board of directors, 
hand-collected from BoardEx. 
 
12. CEO Bank Years Explanatory Number of years that the CEO has served with the BHC, hand-collected 
from BoardEx. 
 
13. Deposits/Assets 
 
Explanatory Measured as the dollar amount of deposits divided by the dollar amount of 
BHC assets, as reported by Bloomberg. Follows usage as a BHC level 
control variable in Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012) and Minton, Taillard 
and Williamson (2014). 
 
14. Educational 
Background 
Explanatory Advanced business, graduate, banking education or holds a CPA or legal 
designation. 
15. Executive Age Explanatory Age as published by BoardEx or Bloomberg for the CEO or CRO. 
 
16. Institutional 
Shareholding 
Explanatory Percentage of shareholding by institutional investors collected from 
Bloomberg and used in risk-related estimations. 
 
17. International 
Activities 
Explanatory Percentage of non-domestic revenue for each BHC collected from 
Bloomberg and used in risk-related outcome estimations. 
 
18.  Non-inside 
Directors 
percentage 
Explanatory Percentage of supervisory directors, as published by BoardEX, denoting 
directors who are not currently affiliated with management; also referred to 
as non-inside directors (Lingel and Sheedy, 2012). 
19. Risk Committee 
Gender 
 
Explanatory A dummy variable coded as one (or zero) if the Risk Committee chairman 
is a female, as published in BoardEx.   
20. Tenure Explanatory Number of years the bank executive has worked for the BHC in total, as 
published by BoardEx. 
 
Source: Author’s own analysis 
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The key explanatory variables are shown in Table 7.  
In the Further Analysis Chapter, several other risk governance variables are 
employed as inputs into an index construction. The role of the CEO is 
specifically examined and an index is created to test the influence of this 
important risk governance role. These characteristics include CEO Age, CEO 
Tenure, CEO education, CEO duality, the number of years the CEO has sat on 
the BHC board of directors, CEO total compensation, and CEO busyness. 
Several of these executive characteristics have been noted above such as age. 
CEO education in the context of board risk oversight has been shown to 
encourage hedging activity and risk awareness (Dionne and Triki, 2005). Better-
educated bankers (with advanced degrees) are positively related to lower bank 
risk levels (Berger, Kick and Schaeck, 2014), so this variable is used later in the 
index construction. Busyness of the directors and CEO may be associated with 
worse BHC performance, as governance actors holding more board seats may 
become distracted (Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro, 2011; Cooper and Uzun, 
2012), so these effects are controlled for in the index. 
CEO duality is measured with a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the same 
individual holds the Chairman and CEO role, and 0 otherwise. In a banking 
context, the relationship between duality and performance remains ambiguous. 
Pi and Timme (1993) find a positive relationship between CEO duality and lower 
ROA and lower bank efficiency ratios, while Fogelberg and Griffith (2000) find 
no relationship with bank performance. For a sample of commercial banks, 
Grove et al. (2011) also find that CEO duality is negatively related to financial 
performance.  However, Byrd et al. (2012) produce empirical evidence that the 
presence of duality for a sample of US thrifts was related to lower failure rates 
on average in the 1980s. CEO duality is also used in the construction of the 
index. 
The number of years the CEO has sat on the BHC board of directors, as a 
proxy for power, is also considered in the index construction. Demographic data 
on CEOs was collected from BoardEx. CEO total compensation, which appears 
in the CEO Power section later, considers the total compensation of the CEO 
and was collected from Morningstar for each BHC. This includes cash 
compensation, including bonuses, unlike the control variable of CEO Shares 
used in the baseline regressions. Data were collected from Bloomberg for 
international activities (the percentage of international revenue divided by 
assets) to control for any effect associated with international activities. All 
control variables, including the above variables, are detailed in Appendix 2. 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter has described the research methods and background to the study. 
The study relies on the collection of secondary data and the use of statistical 
analysis to identify and test relationships between a broad suite of predictor 
variables and a range of outcome variables relating to performance and risk. A 
conceptual plan of the research design is presented in Figure 4 to illustrate its 
structure, including predictor, outcome and control variables.  
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Corporate governance theories have been reviewed and agency theory has 
been identified as the most natural lens through which to consider the adoption 
of risk governance practice, although other theories, including institutional 
theory, may also play a role in understanding the dynamics at play in this study. 
Standard corporate governance mechanisms have been identified, namely 
board structure, incentives and internal monitoring. The evidence probed for 
internal monitoring argues in favour of a potential relation with bank 
performance and risk-taking, and is most naturally aligned with risk governance 
oversight. 
Given their growing prominence in the Basel corporate governance literature, 
two key risk governance mechanisms have been probed within internal 
monitoring: Risk Appetite arrangements and board-level Risk Committees 
(Gontarek, 2016). Based on the conceptual and empirical studies in the 
literature, the conceptual map has been updated to include several hypotheses 
relating to performance and risk for each of the predictor variables. 
Importantly, a material empirical research gap has been identified for further 
examination in this study: the use of Risk Appetite by banks. The current limited 
level of empirical research on BHC Risk Committees and their adoption since 
the financial crisis is also addressed by this research. A suite of primary 
outcome variables has been identified for BHC performance and risk. Predictor 
variables have also been identified and defined for each of the hypotheses 
noted above. Control variables have been defined and inventoried at the 
business and standard corporate governance levels. 
The following three chapters present the empirical results of this study.  
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4 RISK GOVERNANCE AND PERFORMANCE 
4.1 Introduction 
Having defined the research project, methodology, framework and relevant 
variables in the previous chapter, this chapter describes and explains the 
research model used to test the developed hypotheses. Descriptive statistics 
are introduced before presenting and discussing the empirical results. 
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Summary statistics for the sample are presented in Table 8 for the key 
outcome, corporate governance and BHC-level variables. The panel data 
covers the period from 2012 to 2015 for 140 of the largest US BHCs. This is a 
promising dataset, with both accounting variables (ROA, NIM and the Efficiency 
Ratio for performance; NPLs, Actual Loan Losses, and Tier 1 capital for risk) 
and market-determined variables (HPRs and Tail Risk). This sample covers a 
significant proportion of the US banking system.24 
With regard to the key BHC performance variables, the mean ROA of this 
sample is 1.02 per cent. This compares with a mean ROA of 1.10 per cent 
reported by Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and 1.20 per cent by Minton, Taillard and 
Williamson (2014). NIM has a mean value of 3.49 per cent, compared with 3.71 
per cent in Fernandes and Fich’s (2013) pre-crisis sample. The Efficiency Ratio 
mean is 65.04, versus 64.96 observed in Akhighbe and Stevenson (2010). The 
mean HPR for this study is 20.68 per cent, which reflects strong post-financial 
crisis equity performance. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) report a negative 7 per 
cent mean annual return for the period covered including the crisis.  
Risk Appetite arrangements are published by an average of 22 per cent of the 
total sample. Risk appetite usage by US BHCs in this sample has grown from 
14% in 2012 to 30% by 2015.25 Risk Appetite usage by covered BHCs is noted 
in 82 per cent of the sample versus 10 per cent for un-covered firms. 
Risk Committees exist in 67 per cent of the observations, growing from 58 per 
cent to 74 per cent between 2012 and 2015. These numbers are higher than 
the eight per cent noted for the crisis period by Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012 
and Hines and Peters, 2016, reflecting growing compliance to the new rules.  
The mean value of financial experience as a percentage of Risk Committee 
membership is 71 per cent, while the Risk Committee chairman meets this 
standard in 74 per cent of the sample. Risk Committee financial expertise has 
grown since the crisis period, with Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014) 
reporting a mean value of 26 per cent (for financial experts among independent 
directors in 2008), Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012) and Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013) reporting a mean value of 22 per cent and 30 per cent respectively.  
                                            
24 The US banking system represents some $16 trillion as of April 2016 (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis, 2016). This 
study includes BHCs representing $11.3 trillion of US BHC assets, or just over 70 per cent of total US BHC assets. 
25 Risk Appetite arrangements are used in 17.3% of BHCs prior to the 2014 adoption date across the full sample, 
including 71% of covered BHCs and 7% of smaller uncovered BHCs. 
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The mean number of Risk Committee members is five (versus three in Battaglia 
and Gallo’s (2015) Asian focused study) and the mean Risk Committee member 
age is 63 years. In this study, Risk Committee members have been board 
members for an average of eight years. On average, 61 per cent of Risk 
Committee members hold advanced business-related educational credentials. 
Turning to executive demographic characteristics, the mean CRO age is 54.9 
years and the mean CEO age is 58 years. CEOs in this study hold an average 
of 14 years of tenure, versus nine years in Ellul and Yerramilli’s (2013) study. 
In terms of standard corporate governance measures, the average board size is 
11 members (versus 10 for Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012; 11 in Fernandes 
and Fich, 2013; and 13 in Iselin, 2016). On average, 10 of these, or 86 per cent 
of the total board, are non-insiders (versus 73 per cent in Zagorchev and Gao, 
2015 and 79 per cent in Iselin, 2016). The data for this study reveal a mean of 
10 board meetings per annum (versus 8.5 in Adams and Mehran, 2003 and 9.0 
in Iselin, 2016). The 77 per cent board attendance rate is unsurprising, given 
the typical board quorum requirements. CEO duality applies to 52 per cent of 
the sample, versus 44 per cent in Berger et al. (2015). 
With regard to BHC-level variables, the mean of the deposits/assets measure 
noted is 74 per cent, as in Zagorchev and Gao (2015), versus 73 per cent in 
Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012) and 68 per cent, in Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). 
The mean ratio of total loans to total assets (TLTA) is 64 per cent, versus 66 
percent in Zagorchev and Gao (2015), 69 per cent in Aebi, Sabato and Schmid 
(2012), and 62 per cent, in Ellul and Yerramilli (2013). The mean value of BHC 
international activity in this sample is three per cent. The mean of total BHC 
assets is $74 billion, versus $84 billion in the smaller sample constructed by 
Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), and $82 billion noted by Elyasiani and Zhang (2015).  
4.3 Correlation Analysis 
Pearson pairwise correlation results are presented in Table 9 for the key BHC 
outcome and risk governance variables of interest. No evidence for 
mutlicollinearity was identified after running a VIF test for the independent 
variables. Risk Appetite arrangements are slightly positively correlated with 
performance variables such as ROA (0.03) and the Efficiency Ratio (.12), and 
slightly negatively correlated with NIM (-0.12) and HPRs (-0.11).  The existence 
of a board-level Risk Committee is slightly negatively correlated with ROA, NIM 
and HPRs (-0.08, -0.11 and -0.09 respectively). Unsurprisingly, the existence of 
a Risk Committee and Risk Appetite are positively correlated (0.34). Other 
notable relationships include a positive correlation between ROA and NIM 
(0.40) and between ROA and HPRs (0.05).  
Since the above analysis does not include any variables that would otherwise 
control for BHC corporate governance or business characteristics, no robust 
conclusions can be made regarding these results. Next, multivariate regression 
analysis is performed that enables these various firm-level and standard 
corporate governance characteristics to be controlled for within the sample to 
better understand the nature of the relationship of BHC risk governance to 
performance. Table 8 presents descriptive statistics for this study. 
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Table 8. Descriptive statistics   
 
 
                                            
26 CEO Power is a corporate governance variable created by principal component analysis, following its use in seminal 
literature as explained in Appendix 8. 
27 Negative values are not uncommon in PCA. See Burstyn (2004) for a brief discussion as well as Larcker, Richardson 
and Tuna (2007) for examples of negative component loadings in PCA.  
28 Large BHC CEOs can enjoy material stock, stock and option and overall compensation levels that accumulate over 
time. For example, the CEO of JP Morgan & Co. is believed to have made a total $229 million gain in early 2017 alone 
following his purchase of additional shares. See http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/06/jamie-dimons-holdings-have-surged-
by-229-million-since-his-2016-bottom-buy.html for more information. 
Variable name  Variable  Obs Mean Std Dev. Min Max 
Key Predictor Variables       
Risk Appetite (Dummy)  Independent 563 .22 .41 0 1 
Risk Committee Exists (Dummy) Independent 564 .68 .46 0 1 
Risk Committee Financial Expertise (%) Independent 267 .72 .24 .14 1.00 
Risk Committee Chairman Expertise (%) Independent 286 .75 .43 0 1.00 
Risk Charter Determined Risk Appetite  Independent 564 .2602 .4393 0 1 
CEO Power Index26 Independent 541 -.0127 1.56 -3.21 4.93 
       
Corporate Governance Variables       
Board Size (Number) Explanatory 557 11.93 3.05 6 29 
Board Meeting Attendance (%) Explanatory 453 .77 .06 .70 1.00 
Board Meeting Number (per year) Explanatory 470 10.18 3.99 2 26 
Board Non-Inside directors (%) Explanatory 557 .86 .07 .16 1.00 
CEO Age (Years) Explanatory 561 58 6.40 37 81 
CEO Bank Years Explanatory 563 14.5 10 0 47 
CEO Duality (%) Explanatory 563 .52 .49 0 1.00 
CEO Board Years Explanatory 564 11 8 0 44 
CEO Education (Dummy) Explanatory 561 .56 .49 0 1 
CEO Busyness (Number of board roles) Explanatory 564 2.90 1.60 0 8 
CEO Shares ($ million)28 Explanatory 545 29 81 .07 629 
CEO Total Compensation ($ million) Explanatory 548 45 54 .03 31 
CRO Age (Years) Explanatory 396 54 6.78 34 70 
CRO Centrality (Ratio) Explanatory 412 0.36 0.25 0.03 4.34 
CRO Tenure (Years) Explanatory 429 9.71 8.26 0 39 
Risk Committee Busyness (Number) Explanatory 280 2.14 1.41 0 9 
Risk Committee Chair Gender (Dummy)  Explanatory 286 0.15 0.36 0 1 
       
Financial Characteristics        
Actual Net Loan Losses ($ million) Dependent 544 321 1415 -33 14,908 
BHC Assets ($) Explanatory 564 74 billion 268 billion 1.1 billion 2.09 trillion 
Deposits/Assets (Ratio) Explanatory 560 74.55 11.45 22.00 90.59 
Efficiency Ratio Dependent 549 65.04 14.85 33.64 250.72 
Holding Period Returns (Annual %) Dependent 535 20.68 26.99 -24.21 284 
International Activities (%) Explanatory 564 .03 .09 0 .58 
Institutional Shareholdings (%) Explanatory 545 .75 .20 .68 1.00 
Net Interest Income / Total Assets (Ratio) Dependent 560 3.07 .96 -2.97 7.95 
NIM (%) Dependent 560 3.49 1.15 -6.15 8.93 
NPL / Total Loans (%) Dependent 537 1.00 .80 .01 7.73 
Operating Income ($ million) Dependent 561 1246 4307 -824 330,915 
Other Operating Income ($ million) Dependent 561 325 1885 -1839 22,378 
ROA (%) Dependent 560 1.02 .56 -1.87 4.33 
ROE (%) Dependent 560 9.09 5.09 -17.07 49.25 
Tail Risk (see Appendix 2 definition) Dependent 541 -27.56 25.38 -221.73 -3.30 
TCE/RWE Ratio (%) Dependent 533 13.26 8.060 5.56 95.77 
Tier 1 Ratio (%) Dependent 549 13.8 4.36 7.50 51.90 
Total Interest Income ($ million)  Dependent  551 3438 11,032 23 67,982 
Total Interest Expense ($ million) Dependent  551 657 2250 2 20.612 
Total Loans to Total Assets (Ratio) Explanatory 560 64.22 15.57 5.52 96.16 
Source: Author       
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Table 9. Correlation table: Key variables 
 ROA NIM Eff. 
Ratio 
HPRs NPLs Act. LL Tier1 Tail 
Risk 
Risk 
App 
CEO 
Power 
Risk 
Com. 
RC 
Expert. 
ROA 1.00            
NIM  .40 1.00           
Eff. Ratio -.45 -.31 1.00          
HPRs  .05  .04 -.03 1.00         
NPLs -.12  .01 .17  .26 1.00        
Act. LL -.01 -.01 .02  .09  .09 1.00       
Tier1  .08 -.02 .09 -.02  .13 -.06 1.00      
Tail Risk -.10 -.10 .12  .06  .17  .22 -.06 1.00     
Risk App   .03 -.12 .12 -.11 -.08  .30 -.15 -.20 1.00    
CEO Pwr  .07  .08 -.09 -.10 -.04 -.08 -.04 -.19  .07 1.00   
Risk com -.08 -.11 .08 -.09  .01  .15 -.09 -.19  .34  -.04 1.00  
RC Exp. -.08 -.09 .18  .09  .02  .16  .08  .03  .22 -.07   .01 1.00 
 
Source: Author 
  
 57 
4.4 The Research Model 
As discussed in chapter 3, Equation 1 is used to assess the effect of Risk 
Appetite and the Risk Committee on firm performance. For convenience, this 
equation is presented below.   𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒!,! =  𝑎 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑒 (!,!) + 𝛽!𝑅𝐶 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠(!,!) +   𝛽!𝐶𝑅𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒(!,!) + 𝛽!𝐵𝐻𝐶 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(!,!) +  𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑀𝑡𝑔 𝑁𝑢𝑚(!,!) +  𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑀𝑡𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑(!,!) + 𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟(!,!) + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒(!,!) + 𝛽!𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴(!,!) +  𝛽!"𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(!,!)  +  𝛽!!𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠(!,!) + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + Error Term Where Performance!,! ∈ ROA,NIM, Efficiency Ratio,HPRs  for firm i at time t.     
4.5 Empirical Results for Performance 
This section presents and discusses the empirical results for Risk Appetite and 
the Risk Committee, using a suite of performance measures as the dependent 
variable. Risk Appetite is the first explanatory variable, followed by the presence 
of a Risk Committee in each model.29 The results of these estimations are 
reported in Table 10 for ROA, NIM, the Efficiency Ratio and HPRs.  
Risk Appetite demonstrates a promising early relationship to BHC accounting 
performance measures. For example, in Model 1a, Risk Appetite exhibits a 
positive coefficient value which is significant at the one per cent level, indicating 
that firms that adopt this risk governance practice report higher levels of ROA. 
The value of the coefficient for Risk Appetite in this Model is 0.30% indicating 
adopters of this practice realise on average a higher ROA of 0.30%.   
Risk Appetite also exhibits a significant positive relation to NIM, at the one per 
cent level, indicating that BHCs that adopt this practice enjoy greater net 
interest margins.    
In Model 1c, Risk Appetite exhibits a negative coefficient of 6.88 and is 
statistically significant at the one per cent level. The dependent variable this 
time is the Efficiency Ratio, which as noted above defines how much a BHC 
must spend to produce one dollar of revenue. The negative sign of the 
coefficient indicates that Risk Appetite arrangements play an important role in 
driving positive BHC efficiency gains (and thus improved operating 
performance).30  Risk Appetite does not exhibit a positive association for HPRs. 
In fact, the coefficient of Risk Appetite is significant, as reported in Model 1d, 
indicating a negative relation to equity returns for BHCs that adopt this risk 
governance practice. In summary, Risk Appetite demonstrates a significant 
relationship for headline BHC accounting performance variables.  
 
                                            
29 The findings related to the baseline dependent variables do not change if the model is operated by removing either 
Risk Appetite or Risk Committee within the estimations; thus including both within the estimations conserves space. 
30 The Efficiency Ratio, a key BHC operating outcome measure used in practice and examined in academia, has been 
described as “.. a popular tool used by bank financial analysts” and “..a commonly used financial performance measure 
that relates non-interest expenses to total operating income (Hays, De Lurgio and Gilbert, 2009, p. 2). These authors 
explain “… a decrease in the ratio is viewed as a positive while a rising efficiency ratio is generally undesirable” (Hays, 
De Lurgio and Gilbert, 2009, p. 4). A decline in this ratio is viewed as evidence of favorable performance factor.  
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The presence of Risk Committee is also reported in this model, which does not 
exhibit a significant outcome for the suite of BHC accounting performance 
variables, consistent with earlier research (Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012, p. 
3222). However, it is notable that the coefficient for both risk governance 
mechanisms are negative and significant in Model 1d, indicating equity markets 
do not appear to reward BHCs who adopt these practices, in fact both Risk 
Appetite and the Risk Committee are negatively related to HPRs.    
Other variables of interest in Table 10 include a significant and negative relation 
at the one per cent level for CRO age in Model 1b. This indicates that older 
CROs are consistent with lower BHC net interest margins, which may mean 
they impose more conservative underwriting credit standards, generating lower 
BHC asset returns and NIMs. The coefficient for the Deposit/Asset ratio is 
significant at the one per cent level and positive in Models 1a and 1b, 
demonstrating its role as a business level control variable.  BHCs with higher 
level of deposits relative to assets produce greater NIM and ROA.    
What other corporate governance factors may be influencing these results? 
Final implementation for these two risk governance mechanisms occurred on 11 
September 2014 (Federal Register, 2014a, p.54547). It is acknowledged that 
other regulatory-driven processes could have contributed to the outcomes 
already observed as BHCs geared up for implementation before the final 
deadline. The Federal Register (2014a) identifies, amongst others, director 
talent management processes, director training plans and director 
independence requirements as some of the new regulatory requirements facing 
BHCs. Thus, the results of this study may arguably be driven and confounded 
by one of these or other corporate governance factors adopted before or during 
2014. Thus an empirical challenge of this study is to assess whether an 
increase in BHC performance levels across the sample occur for reasons other 
than the adoption of Risk Appetite. 
While the range of explanatory variables used in this study mitigates the impact 
of omitted variables, other methodological refinements can be carried out to 
further strengthen this analysis and its findings. For example, examining BHCs 
that adopted the risk governance practices well before the compliance date in 
2014 is one way to augment the findings, especially given the lack of direct 
emphasis given to Risk Appetite in the earlier Dodd Frank Act. An early 
adopters analysis of Risk Appetite Arrangements can estimate more precisely 
the relationship between Risk Appetite and outcome measures, in order to 
mitigate the potential effect of later adopters who may have adopted Risk 
Appetite and a wider range of risk governance practices in the period 
immediately preceding the 2014 period.  
To this end, further empirical analysis is conducted where the risk governance 
variable is coded the value of one if this practice was adopted in 2012 and 
2013, and zero otherwise. The results for this time determined sub-sample for 
annual periods 2012 and 2013 are presented in Table 11 Models 2a to 2d. 
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These results continue to validate a promising relationship for Risk Appetite and 
all BHC accounting performance variables. A statistically significant coefficient 
is noted for Risk Appetite in Models 2a, 2b and 2c, indicating an improvement in 
performance measures ROA, NIM and the Efficiency Ratio respectively for early 
adopters. The sign of the coefficient once again in the first two models is 
positive, indicating early adopting BHCs experience higher ROA and NIM. The 
sign of the coefficient for Risk Appetite in Model 2c is negative for the Efficiency 
Ratio as the dependent variable, thus validating in all three tests a positive link 
between Risk Appetite and BHC accounting performance variables, as before.  
Risk Committee existence fails to exhibit a significant relationship within Table 
11 Model 2, across the suite of BHC outcome measures. These later findings 
are consistent with seminal literature that fails to observe a significant relation 
for Risk Committee (Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012, p. 3211; Minton, Taillard 
and Williamson, 2014, p. 360).  
The early adopter analysis contributes to the understanding of Risk Appetite 
and its relation with performance outcome variables. It specifically mitigates 
concerns that other supervisory-led risk corporate governance measures 
implemented later in the sample period drive the results noted in Model 1. The 
estimations in Model 2 are based on the existence of Risk Appetite 
arrangements several years before the final rules were agreed and published by 
the Federal Register (2014a and 2014b), and thus seem unlikely to be affected 
by the subsequent adoption of other board-level or supervisory-led measures 
from 2014 or immediately prior to when final codification of the rules were being 
drafted. 
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Table 10. Model 1: Performance measures  
Variable Model 1a 
(ROA) 
Model 1b 
(NIM) 
Model 1c 
(Efficiency 
Ratio) 
Model 1d 
(HPRs) 
     
Risk Appetite 0.300*** 0.493*** -6.889*** -11.54** 
 (2.79) (3.12) (-2.64) (-2.28) 
     
RC Exists 0.126 0.0897 -0.226 -17.87*** 
 (0.90) (0.44) (-0.07) (-2.71) 
     
CRO Age 0.00178 -0.0585** -0.0694 0.477 
 (0.11) (-2.48) (0.18) (0.63) 
     
BHC Assets -.00000035 -.0000025 .000006 .000058 
 (-0.30) (-1.49) (0.51) (1.09) 
     
BOD Meeting  -0.00768 0.0143 0.193 -1.162** 
Number (-0.74) (0.94) (0.76) (-2.36) 
     
BOD Meeting  0.0102 -0.0122 0.139 0.589* 
Attendance (1.50) (-1.23) (0.85) (1.72) 
     
BOD Non-insider 0.181 -0.767 -4.759 9.277 
 (0.37) (-1.07) (-0.40) (0.40) 
     
Board Size 0.0524** 0.0532* -0.551 1.928* 
 (2.44) (1.68) (-1.03) (1.90) 
     
TLTA -0.00526 -0.00888 0.279 -0.0180 
 (-0.65) (-0.75) (1.41) (-0.05) 
     
Deposits / Assets 0.0232*** 0.0543*** -0.363* -0.204 
 (2.65) (4.22) (-1.70) (-0.49) 
     
CEO Shares 2.39e-10 2.85e-10 -1.43e-08 -1.45e-08 
 (0.18) (0.14) (-0.43) (-0.23) 
     
Observations 314 314 305 308 
     
R2 0.1318 0.2043 0.1011 0.6703 
     
AIC31 49 291 1988 2420 
     
BIC 106 347 2044 2476 
     
Year Dummies Yes     Yes     Yes      Yes 
     
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes      Yes 
     
 
Notes: Table 10 Models 1a to 1d reports fixed effects (FE) estimations with Risk Appetite observed in BHC annual reports and 
Risk Committee exists as the two key explanatory variables. The dependent performance variable is labeled underneath the 
Model number. Significant findings are denoted with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively with coefficient values 
reported (and t values reported in parentheses).   
 
  
                                            
31 Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) tests scores are reported to assess model 
complexity and goodness of fit (as well as R-Squared values), following Demigüc-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) and Sheedy, 
Griffin and Barbour (2015). Lower values (and even negative) of one value versus another generally indicates that the model 
has more validity than other models with higher values or greater differences (Sterba and Pek, 2012, p. 585).  
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Table 11. Model 2: Early adopter analysis - performance32 
Variable Model 2a 
(ROA) 
Model 2b 
(NIM) 
Model 2c 
(Efficiency Ratio) 
Model 2d 
(HPRs) 
     
Risk Appetite 0.594*** 0.745** -15.22*** -9.502 
 (3.33) (2.28) (-3.89) (-0.87) 
     
RC Exists 0.266 -0.1290 -0.7302 3.454 
 (0.96) (-0.25) (-0.10) (-0.20) 
     
     
CRO Age -0.0457 -0.1253 0.6843 .6104 
 (-1.07) (-1.61) (0.73) (0.23) 
     
     
BHC Assets -.0000023 -.00001 .000111 .00001 
 (-0.62) (-1.46) (1.34) (0.11) 
     
     
BOD Meeting Number 0.0232 0.0159 -0.1106 -1.275 
 (1.13) (0.49) (-0.23) (-1.01) 
     
     
BOD Meeting  0.0306*** -0.00621 0.148 1.087 
Attendance  (2.84) (-0.31) (0.62) (1.44) 
     
     
BOD Non-insider 4.025 6.372 -93.22 165.73 
 (1.63) (1.41) (-1.62) (1.09) 
     
     
Board Size 0.0060 -0.0493 -0.1956 1.071 
 (0.13) (-0.58) (-0.17) (0.38) 
     
     
TLTA -0.0182 -0.1088*** 0.4818 0.2946 
 (-0.89) (-2.91) (1.06) (0.24) 
     
     
Deposits / Assets 0.0322 0.0842** -0.853* -0.4824 
 (1.42) (2.02) (-1.70) (-0.34) 
     
     
CEO Shares -3.43e-09 -4.20e-09 -1.69e-08 2.16e-08 
 (-1.28) (-0.76) (-0.24) (-1.17) 
     
     
Observations 165 165 161 160 
     
     
R2 0.3203 0.2796 0.2844 0.4537 
     
     
AIC 50 144 1985 1289 
     
     
BIC 106 181 2029 1326 
     
     
Yearly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
     
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Notes: Table 11 Models 2a to 2d reports fixed effects (FE) estimations with Risk Appetite observed in BHC annual reports and 
Risk Committee exists as the two key explanatory variables. The dependent performance variable is labeled underneath the 
Model number. Significant findings are denoted with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively with coefficient values 
reported (and t values reported in parentheses).   
  
                                            
32 To further assess the impact of early adoption, the existence of board-approved Risk Appetite arrangements as an 
independent variable can also be delimited to its value only in 2012, examining only firms with this corporate 
governance mechanism in place for this first year and then estimated in the regression. The outcome of this exercise for 
the same set of variables produces a significant and positive result for ROA and the Efficiency Ratio at the five per cent 
level, but not significant results for NIM or HPRs. 
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4.6 Summary 
The two hypotheses relating to risk governance practices stated earlier have 
been examined across a suite of BHC performance metrics, both across the full 
sample and in the early adopter sub-sample tests. 
Risk Appetite indicates an early significant relationship in both testing regimes, 
to ROA, NIM and the Efficiency Ratio. Early adopter analysis of these risk 
governance mechanisms corroborates the initial findings reported for the full 
sample.33  
These estimations provide preliminary evidence for the positive association of 
Risk Appetite arrangements to BHC performance and call for further reflection. 
Stulz (2015) suggests that one key of an effective risk management function is 
the ability to facilitate good risk-taking:  “By contrast, in those cases where too 
much risk-taking results in sharp drop in a bank’s value, a risk management 
function that is designed to limit excessive risk-taking while still allowing the 
bank to pursue promising opportunities has the potential to create a lot of value” 
(Stulz, 2015, p. 13). The findings in this chapter are consistent with this 
prediction for BHC accounting performance measures.   
The Further Analysis chapter will probe deeper into this relation in order to 
ascertain the source of the performance gains noted here.  
Interestingly, there is certain evidence now observed that risk governance 
adoption is negatively related to BHC equity returns, finding no support thus far 
that equity markets may favour BHCs with greater risk governance 
arrangements. It is plausible that equity investors may not fully appreciate the 
adoption of heightened risk governance or may be unaware of the full potential 
impact of risk governance, and Risk Appetite practices in particular, occurring 
within BHCs today.   
No evidence is found for any significant positive link between the Risk 
Committee and the performance suite of variables.  
This study next continues with risk related outcome variables. 
 
 
                                            
33 Interestingly, it can be also argued that late adopters present a truer sub-sample to test as the early adapters already 
may have established better across the board risk management practices, however these results do not bear this 
interpretation out as late adopters do not exhibit significant findings with this suite of outcome variables. 
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5 RISK GOVERNANCE AND RISK-TAKING 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, substantially the same series of estimations are again 
undertaken, except that this time the suite of dependent variables is changed 
from performance-based measures to BHC risk measures (i.e., NPLs, Actual 
Loan Losses, Tier 1 capital and Tail Risk). This testing procedure changes the 
empirical lens from performance measures to risk outcomes to asses the impact 
of the adoption of the two risk governance mechanisms. Stulz (2015) does not 
necessarily envision a reduction in overall risk-taking with growing risk 
governance practice, and notes that well governed banks may in fact be riskier, 
a prediction that can now be further tested in this section of the study.  
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 8 (page 55) reports risk-related summary statistics. Several risk variables 
of interest are now considered.  The mean value of NPLs in this study is 1.00 
per cent, versus 0.99 per cent reported by John, Mehran and Qian (2010), 1.60 
per cent by Berger et al. (2015), and 0.74 per cent in the pre-crisis sample of 
Fernandes and Fich (2013). Actual Loan Losses are recorded in Table 8 at a 
mean value of $321 million across the sample.  
BHC capital levels are also assessed. The mean value of Tier 1 is 13.8 per cent 
in this study. Before this study period, capital levels were noticeably lower. Iselin 
(2016) reports a mean Tier 1 capital level of 11.0 per cent for the earlier period 
2004 to 2010 before capital requirements were raised by regulatory fiat. 
Fernandes and Fich (2013) report a Tier 1 capital ratio of 11.1 per cent, which 
validates that bank capitalisation appears to have risen since the financial crisis, 
very likely as a result of other regulatory-driven initiatives. Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013) also report lower BHC capitalisation for a period spanning the pre-crisis 
and regulatory adjustment periods, with a mean value of only 8.1 per cent.  
The mean value of Tail Risk is -27.56 per cent, versus 4.7 per cent in Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013) and 14.3 per cent in Lingel and Sheedy (2012), reflecting the 
existence of vibrant equity markets for bank shares post financial crisis during 
this sample period of 2012 to 2015. 
5.3 Correlation Analysis 
This section examines the correlation between the selected risk outcome 
measures and independent variables. Risk Appetite exhibits a slight negative 
correlation with NPLs (-0.08) and Tier 1 capital (-0.15), but a positive 
relationship with Actual Net Loan Losses (0.30). Actual net loan losses are also 
positively correlated with the presence of a Risk Committee (0.16). Risk 
Committee is slightly negatively correlated with Tail Risk (-0.19).  
Next, further regressions are undertaken with controls to better understand the 
nature of the relationship with BHC risk governance risk measures for a more 
robust analysis. 
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5.4 The Research Model 
As noted in Chapter 3, Equation 2 is now used to assess the impact of Risk 
Appetite and the Risk Committee on firm risk measures. For convenience, this 
equation is presented below. The empirical definition of these variables is 
presented in Appendix 2.   
Equation 2:  𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘!,! =  𝑎 + 𝛽!𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘  𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡𝑒 (!,!) + 𝛽!𝑅𝐶 𝐸𝑥𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑠(!,!) +  𝛽!𝐶𝑅𝑂 𝐴𝑔𝑒(! !) + 𝛽!𝐵𝐻𝐶 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(!,!) +  𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑀𝑡𝑔 𝑁𝑢𝑚(!,!) +  𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑀𝑡𝑔 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑑(!,!) + 𝛽!𝐵𝑂𝐷 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑟(!,!) + 𝛽!𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒(!,!) + 𝛽!𝑇𝐿𝑇𝐴(!,!) +  𝛽!"𝐷𝑒𝑝𝑜/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠(!,!)  +  𝛽!!𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑘𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠(!,!) + 𝐵!"𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠(!,!) +𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑒𝑠 + Error Term  Where Risk!,!  ∈ NPL, Actual Loan lossess, Tier 1 capital, Tail Risk  for firm i at time t.     
 
5.5 Empirical Results for Risk 
Estimations for Risk Appetite are undertaken across the suite of risk outcome 
measures, as shown in Table 12 Models 3a to 3d. These tests probe the 
relationship of Risk Appetite to NPLs, Actual Loan Losses, Tier 1 capital and 
Tail Risk, as dependent variables. The coefficient for Risk Appetite is not 
significant across any of these tests (with the exception of Models 3b and 4b 
which report a negative relation to loan losses).  
For example, Risk Appetite does not exhibit a significant association for Tier 1 
capital in Model 3c.34 These results somewhat contrast with those of Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2013) report that capital levels decline as risk governance activities 
increase during the crisis period. While BHC risk governance appears to be on 
the increase, these tests suggest that absolute regulatory and risk-adjusted 
capital levels are largely unaffected with Risk Appetite adoption. A plausible 
explanation is that the regulatory requirement for higher risk based capital 
surcharges (Ellis, Haldane and Moshirian, 2014; Admati, 2016) outweighs any 
potential effect of more focused risk-taking.   
However, the coefficient for Risk Appetite is statistically significant at the one 
per cent level, in Model 3b for Actual Loan Losses, with a negative coefficient 
sign. Lagging the independent variable, Risk Appetite arrangements, for one 
and two-years in this model, continues to exhibit a significant relation at the five 
and one per cent level respectively (in un-reported results to conserve space), 
indicating loan losses continue to decline over time for this risk governance 
practice adopters. Model 4b also reports evidence, which is consistent with this 
finding for early adopters of this practice as well. The relationship of Risk 
Appetite to Actual Loan Losses holds promise for further investigation. 
                                            
34 In unreported results, estimations were carried out, with TCE/RWA, a risk adjusted capital measure, replacing Tier 1 
capital as the independent variable, also with insignificant findings observed. 
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Table 12. Model 3: Risk measures 
Variable Model 3a 
(NPLs) 
Model 3b 
(Actual Loan 
Losses)35 
Model 3c 
(Tier 1)36 
Model 3d 
(Tail Risk) 
 
     
Risk Appetite 0.0270 -644.0*** 0.441 -0.783 
 (0.24) (-5.05) (0.64) (-0.38) 
     
RC Exists 0.0590 203.9 0.159 1.604 
 (0.42) (1.21) (0.18) (0.60) 
     
CRO Age 0.001 -31.26 -17.21 -53.85 
 (0.09) (-1.60) (-0.92) (-0.97) 
     
BHC Assets -0.0000015 -0.0160*** -.0000066 -.0000132 
 (-1.28) (-11.57) (-0.88) (-0.59) 
     
BOD Meeting 
Number 0.0130 -11.78 0.0514 -0.111 
 (1.27) (-0.95) (0.77) (-0.56) 
     
BOD Meeting             
Attendance  0.00234 -0.132 0.110** -0.387*** 
 (0.33) (-0.02) (2.53) (-2.99) 
     
BOD Non-insider -0.781 195.3 0.103 -7.266 
 (-1.62) (0.33) (0.03) (-0.78) 
     
Board Size 0.00186 -1.698 0.0234 0.199 
 (0.09) (-0.06) (0.17) (0.48) 
     
TLTA -0.00128 7.284 -0.244*** 0.0194 
 (-0.16) (0.75) (-4.75) (0.13) 
     
Deposits / Assets 0.000937 5.746 -0.0978* -0.321* 
 (0.10) (0.55) (-1.74) (-1.92) 
     
CEO Shares 2.46e-09* -.00000052 2.32e-08*** -.00000012*** 
 (1.70) (-0.32) (2.70) (-4.49) 
     
International Activity 0.00141 22330.0*** 0.0803 -0.165 
 (0.09) (6.47) (0.76) (-0.53) 
     
Observations 300 304 310 310 
     
R2 0.5235 0.6891 0.2564 0.5656 
     
AIC 33 4346 1198 1876 
     
BIC 93 4405 1258 1936 
     
Yearly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
 
Notes: Table 12 Model 3 consists fixed effects (FE) estimations with Risk Appetite observed in BHC annual reports and Risk 
Committee exists as the explanatory variables. The dependent risk outcome variable is named underneath the Model number. 
Significant findings are denoted with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively with coefficient values reported (and t 
values reported in parentheses). 
 
                                            
35 Lagging the independent variable in this model by one-year results in a statistically significant and negative relation at 
five per cent to Risk Appetite (R-Squared value of 0.5556 across 230 observations) while lagging by 2-years results 
again in a statistically significant negative relation of one per cent (R-Squared value of 0.3987 across 144 observations). 
36 Substituting TCE/RWA, as a risk adjusted capital dependent variable versus Tier 1, leaves these results qualitatively 
similar with no significant relation noted.  
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Table 13. Model 4: Early adopters analysis and risk37 
Variable Model 4a 
(NPLs) 
Model 4b 
(Actual Loan 
Losses) 
Model 4c 
(Tier 1) 
Model 4d 
(Tail Risk) 
 
     
Risk Appetite -0.111 -887.0*** 0.330 -2.059 
 (-0.54) (-5.97) (0.39) (-1.25) 
     
RC Exists 0.1908 -57.19 -0.0903 1.977 
 (0.57) (-0.20) (-0.07) (0.76) 
     
CRO Age 0.0003 -77.03** 0.0126 -0.0129 
 (0.01) (-2.17) (0.06) (-0.03) 
     
BHC Assets 1.24e-06 -.03310000*** -.00000926 .0000225 
 (-0.22) (-9.68) (-0.48) (0.60) 
     
BOD Meeting Number -.002943 18.47 -0.0675 -0.125 
 (-0.12) (1.03) (-0.69) (-0.66) 
     
BOD Meeting             
Attendance  -0.0141 4.444 0.174*** -0.247** 
 (-0.98) (0.48) (3.36) (-2.47) 
     
BOD Non-insider -3.969 2346.3 1.247 19.92 
 (-1.42) (1.07) (0.11) (0.88) 
     
Board Size 0.0675 -76.95* 0.151 -0.133 
 (1.19) (-1.76) (0.67) (-0.31) 
     
TLTA -0.0191 -26.81 -0.193* -0.307 
 (-0.41) (-1.54) (-1.97) (-1.64) 
     
Deposits / Assets 0.0053 5.006 -0.103 -0.117 
 (0.20) (0.26) (-0.93) (-0.54) 
     
CEO Shares 3.15e-09 -.0000069** -5.17e-10 -.00000026*** 
 (0.65) (-2.56) (-0.04) (-9.36) 
     
International Activity 5.409 24257.4*** -12.19 -16.25 
 (0.50) (4.98) (-0.44) (-0.30) 
     
Observations 158 160 162 163 
     
R2 0.4730 0.8679 0.3135 0.7941 
     
AIC 15 2085 444 663 
     
BIC 54 2128 488 707 
     
Yearly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Table 13 Model 4 consists reports fixed effects (FE) estimations for early adopters of BHC Risk Appetite at the board- level as the key 
explanatory variable. In this set of estimations, early adopters are BHCs that adopted risk appetite statements during the 2012 and 
2013 fiscal years only. The dependent performance variable is again labeled underneath the Model number. Significant findings are 
denoted with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively with coefficient values reported (and t values reported in 
parentheses).   
  
                                            
37 To further assess the impact of early adoption, the existence of board-approved Risk Appetite arrangements as an 
independent variable can also be delimited to its value only in 2012, taking only those firms with this risk governance 
mechanism in place for this first year and then estimating in the regression. The outcome of this exercise for the same 
set of variables reports a significant and negative result for Risk Appetite (as the predictor variable) and NPLs at a one 
per cent level but not significant results for Actual Loan Losses, Tier 1 or Tail Risk. 
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Risk Committee presence again fails to report a significant relationship, this 
time to BHC risk measures. More tests are undertaken in the Further Analysis 
chapter to continue to probe the role of the BHC Risk Committee.  
Other explanatory variables that exhibit significant relationships in Model 3 
include BHC Assets, Board of Directors’ attendance percentage, TLTA, and 
CEO Shares, validating their role as control variables within each model. 
In both Tables 12 and 13, it is interesting to highlight the positive and one per 
cent significant relationship of international activities as an explanatory variable 
to Actual Loan Losses. This finding is consistent with seminal research by 
Berger et al. (2015) that demonstrates that US BHCs with greater international 
exposures exhibit greater levels of portfolio risk.  
5.6 Summary 
This chapter has described the substitution of BHC risk-based measures for the 
performance metrics used earlier in Chapter 4. These estimations indicate the 
impact of Risk Appetite arrangements upon reducing Actual Loan Losses in 
both the full sample and the early adopter sub sample. BHCs that adopt this risk 
governance practice experience lower Actual Loan Losses, whereas Risk 
Appetite fails to produce compelling relation to NPLs, Tier 1 capital and Tail 
Risk, thus far.  
Actual Loan Losses can be viewed as failed attempt, as evidence of ineffective 
risk-taking for the BHC. Thus, the significant and negative relationship of Risk 
Appetite to this dependent variable provides material validation in both the full 
sample, lagged and early adopter examinations. 
Risk Committee existence fails to exhibit a significant relationship with risk 
measures across the estimations. Certain explanatory variables continue to 
control the relationship with outcome measures, including BHC Size, Board 
Attendance, TLTA, CEO Shares and International Activities.  
International exposures have in fact been found to be related with riskier 
portfolio profiles in seminal literature for US banks (Berger, 2015, p. 18) and the 
findings above of significant and positive outcomes for this explanatory variable 
to losses is consistent with the market risk hypothesis. This hypothesis 
suggests (in this context) that exposures far from home can lead to an increase 
is bad risks due to market-specific factors involved in international markets 
(Berger et al., 2015). Rather than enjoying the fruits of greater portfolio 
diversification, international activities, in both Berger et al. (2015) and this study, 
is significantly related to BHC risk measured by greater risk measures.  
Further research might examine how Risk Appetite might be potentially 
employed to curtail losses within international activities, as such exposures are 
likely to be captured and delimited as the board establishes its risk boundaries 
for international exposures within its Risk Appetite processes.   
This study continues in the next chapter with a further analysis of the impact of 
Risk Committees and Risk Appetite upon BHC outcome measures. 
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6 FURTHER ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction 
Given the results described thus far in Chapters 4 and 5, this chapter 
undertakes further examination in order to develop a more detailed 
understanding of the two risk governance practices of interest. First, a new 
independent variable, Risk Committee Financial Expertise, is collected and 
employed as an alternative to Risk Committee existence, to test its impact on 
BHC outcome measures.  
Next, the relative power of the CEO, an important actor relating to risk 
governance, is probed to determine if its influence may somehow be driving the 
results observed thus far. A series of horserace regressions are then 
undertaken to determine the impact of Risk Appetite arrangements across 
different sub-samples. The final baseline regressions conclude the analysis with 
a broader suite of outcome variables and also re-testing the baseline 
estimations with an extended set of control variables to mitigate any potential 
concerns of omitted variables. This study concludes with a simple difference-in-
difference analysis to bolster the interpretation of these findings.  
6.2 Risk Committee Expertise 
As shown earlier in Tables 10, 11, 12 and 13, the existence of the Risk 
Committee failed to exhibit a significant relationship to BHC outcome measures 
across a battery of examinations. How else can the impact of US BHC Risk 
Committees be probed? 
Beyond the presence of a Risk Committee, the heightened risk governance 
standards also require covered BHCs38 to ensure that the Risk Committee has 
at least one member with risk expertise in identifying, assessing, and managing 
risk exposures (Federal Register, 2014b, p. 17286).39 This may provide a further 
opportunity to test the role of the Risk Committee in providing heightened 
governance during this early phase of their adoption by US BHCs.40 
The existing evidence presented within the literature domains relating to 
directors’ risk expertise levels is mixed. On the one hand, Fernandes and Fich 
(2013) find that the presence of experienced directors is associated with 
reduced risk exposure prior to the crisis, greater stock returns, and lower TARP 
funding. Hau and Thum’s (2009) examination of the demographic details of 
supervisory board members reveals that the monitoring abilities and 
competence levels of these monitors relate positively to profitability. Conceptual 
research argues that Risk Committees (along with other mechanisms) may also 
curtail excessive risk-taking (IMF, 2014; Yeh, Chung and Lui 2011).  
                                            
38 In this instance, a covered BHC for Risk Committee expertise is defined as BHC, with at least $10 billion of assets if 
publicly traded, otherwise the $50 billion asset size requirements still holds. 
39 The heightened risk governance standards also require at least one Risk Committee member of the board of directors 
to be independent in order to ensure an objective view of its operations and the Risk Committee meet quarterly (Federal 
Register, 2014b, p. 17287). 
40 The Pearson pairwise correlation between Risk Committee Exists and Risk Committee Financial Expertise is 0.01. 
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However, other research challenges this position. Lam (2014) posits that bank 
boards’ risk governance shortcomings include fragmented or ambiguous 
oversight responsibilities, insufficient risk expertise among board members, and 
a lack of integration between strategy and risk. Empirical research has found 
that financial institution Risk Committees have little if any measurable 
association with financial outcomes (Hines and Peters, 2015), and may be only 
a symbolic forum to demonstrate good governance. Other findings are 
presented by Andries and Brown (2014) reports that greater expertise on bank 
boards is associated with rapid pre-crisis credit growth and greater credit 
contraction after the crisis. Seminal research by Minton, Taillard and Williamson 
(2014) examine US BHCs and find that independent directors’ expertise is 
strongly associated with greater risk-taking and lower BHC performance, during 
the crisis period.  
In view of the mixed position taken by the academic literature, board-level Risk 
Committee member expertise, as a predictor variable, is now tested with BHC 
performance and risk outcomes, given the unambiguous requirement voiced by 
bank supervisors for experienced directors and Risk Committee members. The 
predictor variable in this next battery of estimations is Risk Committee financial 
expertise as defined in the literature.41 These results are presented in Tables 14 
and 15 (Models 5 and 6) for all outcome measures.42   
Models 5a to 5c in Table 14 relate to BHC performance outcomes ROA, NIM 
and the Efficiency Ratio. The coefficient for Risk Committee financial expertise 
is not significant in this round of estimations. However, interestingly in Model 5d, 
the independent variable exhibits a positive coefficient for HPRs and is 
statistically significant at the one per cent level. This provides evidence that 
equity markets appear to value greater levels of Risk Committee financial 
expertise, not withstanding the lack of compelling evidence presented from 
headline BHC accounting measures noted in this analysis. 
Risk Committee financial expertise is again tested, this time on a suite of risk 
outcome variables presented in Models 6a to 6d in Table 15. In these tests, the 
level of Risk Committee financial expertise does not exhibit a significant 
association. Once again, notwithstanding the efforts undertaken, this study has 
failed to unearth a material impact of the Risk Committee upon BHC operating 
results. In examining coefficients and t-score values within Models 5a and 5b for 
performance, and 6b for risk, it is Risk Appetite as an explanatory variable that 
exhibits a more significant relationship to BHC outcomes than the expertise 
composition of BHC Risk Committee members.43 
                                            
41 Risk Committee financial expertise is defined as the percentage of Risk Committee member with previous executive 
responsibilities in a banking firm, executive responsibilities in a non-bank financial firm or executive financial 
responsibilities in a non-financial firm, or being an academic in finance or a related discipline, or a professional investor, 
following seminal literature (Minton, Taillard and Williamson, 2014, p.355). 
42 The testing set up is similar as before except Risk Committee exists is replaced with Risk Committee expertise levels 
and Risk Appetite arrangements are added as a control variable given the findings observed in this study. 
43 In one final set of unreported tests (to conserve space), Risk Committee financial expertise percentage is replaced 
with a dummy variable of one (or zero) if the chairman of the Risk Committee meets the same noted expertise definition. 
The chairman of the Risk Committee should meet the heightened regulatory experience levels, given his or her 
prominence to the regulator and role to coordinate committee activities with the CEO and CRO. However this predictor 
variable fails again to exhibit any significant relationship to the suite of performance and risk measures employed in this 
study thus far. 
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Empirical predictions easily may have been different, as noted earlier, that 
financial expertise should produce lower costs of acquiring and processing 
financial data and information related to complex banking activities (Minton, 
Taillard and Williamson, 2014, p. 352). Across multiple test settings and after 
substituting different variable definitions relating to the heightened risk 
governance standards of the BHC Risk Committee, this study fails to find a 
positive empirical relationship between Risk Committees features and BHC 
accounting outcomes, and instead chimes with the position that Risk 
Committees may simply be satisfying “the perception of responsible risk 
management” (Hines and Peters, 2015, p. 267).  
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Table 14. Model 5: Risk Committee expertise and performance 
Variable Model 5a 
(ROA) 
Model 5b 
(NIM) 
Model 5c 
(Efficiency Ratio) 
Model 5d 
(HPRs) 
     
     
Risk Committee  0.183 -0.340 1.138 30.42*** 
Financial Expertise (0.61) (-0.78) (0.15) (2.82) 
     
CRO age 0.00358 -0.0486 0.170 0.188 
 (0.12) (-1.14) (0.23) (0.18) 
     
BHC assets -.00000152 -.00000444* .0000378 .000115* 
 (-0.84) (-1.68) (0.82) (1.75) 
     
BOD meeting 0.000369 0.00237 0.148 -0.498 
Number (0.02) (0.11) (0.39) (-0.91) 
     
BOD meeting  0.0190* -0.0117 0.112 0.763* 
Attendance  (1.81) (-0.76) (0.42) (1.80) 
     
BOD non-insider  -0.0886 -2.751 0.874 85.92 
 (-0.05) (-1.11) (0.02) (1.40) 
     
Board size  0.0430 0.0441 -0.854 1.724 
   (1.17) (0.83) (-0.83) (1.31) 
     
TLTA -0.0204 -0.0277 0.658* -0.435 
 (-1.37) (-1.28) (1.68) (-0.80) 
     
Deposits/Assets 0.0296* 0.0473** -0.590 -0.270 
 (1.84) (2.02) (-1.42) (-0.47) 
     
CEO Shares -5.41e-10 2.97e-09 -1.38e-08 -.00000021** 
 (-0.20) (0.77) (-0.18) (-2.19) 
     
Risk Appetite 0.427*** 0.745*** -7.501* -6.678 
 (2.67) (3.20) (-1.86) (-1.16) 
     
Observations 197 197 189 195 
     
R2 0.1841 0.1826 0.1116 0.7183 
     
AIC Test 78 226 1284 1473 
     
BIC Test 123 272 1330 1518 
     
Yearly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Table 14 Model 5 reports fixed effects examinations for BHC Risk Committee expertise44 levels as the independent variable. The 
dependent variable for performance is named underneath the model number. Significant findings are denoted with *, ** and *** for 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively with coefficient values reported (and t values reported in parentheses).   
 
  
                                            
44 The definition of BHC Risk Committee expertise follows Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014). 
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Table 15. Model 6: Risk Committee expertise and risk measures 
Variable Model 6a 
(NPLs) 
Model 6b 
(Actual Loan 
Losses) 
Model 6c 
(Tier 1) 
Model 6d 
(Tail Risk) 
     
Risk Committee  0.309 -20.40 -0.0773 0.697 
Financial Expertise (1.13) (-0.07) (-0.05) (0.16) 
     
CRO age 0.00793 4.433 0.155 -0.0984 
 (0.32) (0.15) (1.09) (-0.24) 
     
BHC assets -.00000101 -.0174*** -.00000428 .0000346 
 (-0.57) (-9.07) (-0.46) (1.28) 
     
BOD meeting 0.00408 -12.32 0.0294 -0.0865 
Number (0.31) (-0.80) (0.40) (-0.40) 
     
BOD meeting  0.00265 3.535 0.136*** -0.173 
Attendance  (0.27) (0.33) (2.66) (-1.16) 
     
BOD non-insider  -1.403 -1270.6 15.30 42.30 
 (-0.96) (-0.64) (1.86) (1.76) 
     
Board size  0.0396 -9.291 -0.0319 0.0782 
   (1.21) (-0.23) (-0.18) (0.15) 
     
TLTA 0.00399 8.424 -0.222*** -0.108 
 (0.30) (0.54) (-3.08) (-0.51) 
     
Deposits/Assets 0.000430 -2.564 -0.187** -0.554** 
 (0.03) (-0.15) (-2.35) (-2.38) 
     
CEO Shares 3.90e-09 -.00000102 1.32e-08 -.0000003*** 
 (1.33) (-0.33) (1.02) (-7.05) 
     
Risk Appetite 0.103 -775.2*** 0.439 -1.095 
 (0.71) (-4.85) (0.57) (-0.49) 
     
International activities -1.908 26022.7*** 7.095 90.11 
 (-0.34) (5.11) (0.29) (1.25) 
     
Observations 187 188 189 196 
     
R2 0.5415 0.7738 0.2892 0.6849 
     
AIC Test 15 2660 1284 1116 
     
BIC Test 63 2709 1330 1117 
     
Yearly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Table 15 Model 6 reports fixed effects examinations for BHC Risk Committee expertise45 levels as the independent variable. The 
dependent variable for risk measures is named underneath the model number. Significant findings are denoted with *, ** and *** 
for 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively with coefficient values reported (and t values reported in parentheses).   
  
                                            
45 The definition of BHC Risk Committee expertise follows Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014). 
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6.3 Examination of Risk Governance Indices: CEO Power Index 
The CEO has been described as “… the top risk manager of a bank…” (Stulz, 
2015, p. 16). Therefore, the role of the CEO now deserves further empirically 
focus. This section explains how an index (created with principal component 
analysis) can be used to proxy the power of the CEO, in order to further test 
whether or not this important actor may be driving the results observed thus far 
in this study.  
Principal component analysis (PCA), a multivariate technique that extracts 
information from data to represent a new set of variables known as principal 
components, is used to display patterns of similarity. It is one of the most 
popular statistical techniques used across scientific disciplines (Adbi and 
Williams, 2010). Its use in the corporate governance arena has been motivated 
by a desire to create governance indices or reduce the number of variables 
within a model. Jolliffe (2002) also explains that PCA identifies different linear 
combinations of the variables of interest, and the linear combination with the 
maximal variance is defined as the first principal component.   
Risk governance literature has also employed PCA to create risk management 
indices as a practical tool to assess risk management structures, often during 
the financial crisis period. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) construct a risk 
management index (RMI) to measure the strength of BHC risk management 
functions before the financial crisis, finding that BHCs with higher RMI at the 
onset of the financial crisis had lower Tail Risk during the crisis years.  
This research stream has spawned a series of working papers using PCA to 
create different risk governance indices for other financial institutions. Lingel 
and Sheedy (2012) create an RMI using PCA to test associations for a panel of 
60 international banks for the period 2007 to 2010. They find a significant 
relationship between RMI and selected risk outcomes, but fail to detect an 
association with performance. Magee, Schilling and Sheedy (2014) examine the 
insurance sector across 18 countries during the crisis period and find that their 
RMI is negatively associated with Tail Risk and default predictors in 2008, and 
positively associated with performance measures. 
Seminal research investigates the potential for CEO Power to impact on 
financial outcomes. Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014) acknowledge that a 
competing explanation for their risk governance findings is that strong CEOs 
may be prone to recruit directors who rubber-stamp their decisions. In order to 
mitigate the concern that CEO Power characteristics may drive the results, 
these authors use alternative methods to validate their position that their results 
are not driven by the existence of powerful CEOs.  
Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014) employ four CEO Power proxies in their 
extended analysis, including CEO duality, the time period (in years) of 
independent director tenure relative to CEO tenure, and two further variables 
directly relating to director tenure and CEO tenure. Their further analysis 
reveals evidence that powerful CEOs do not select weaker independent 
directors to approve risk-taking objectives. 
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Other risk governance empirical research has considered this issue. Pathan 
(2009) examines whether powerful BHC boards relate positively to bank risk-
taking, and whether CEO Power (proxied by CEO duality and internal 
recruitment) is inversely related to risk. He finds that CEO Power is associated 
with lower bank risk in this pre-crisis sample. Other empirical studies find that 
CEO Power is positively related to excessive risk-taking in financial institutions, 
necessitating a range of mechanisms to balance CEO Power (Lewellyn and 
Muller-Kahle, 2012). These authors gather data on a series of variables to proxy 
CEO Power, including duality, incentives and tenure.   
Inspired by the same concerns as Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014) and 
others, that a powerful CEO may somehow drive the observed results, this 
study identifies relevant proxies of CEO Power. Seven CEO-related measures 
of power are identified for inclusion in the index: CEO age, CEO years on the 
board of directors, CEO tenure, CEO busyness, CEO duality, CEO education 
and CEO total compensation.46 Thus, rather than employing several multiple 
regressions, an index can now be used to test the relationship between CEO 
Power and the suite of performance and risk-taking measures.47  
This analysis is presented in Table 16 Model 7 and includes both performance 
and risk measures within one empirical framework. The same model set-up is 
used as before using fixed effects, except that CEO Power is now the 
independent variable, and Risk Appetite is added as an incremental explanatory 
variable given earlier observations in this study.  
Tellingly, the coefficient of CEO Power is not significant in Models 7a to 7g used 
to assess the impact of the CEO upon the standard suite of outcome variables.  
However, other explanatory variables are noted in the analysis. The coefficient 
for Risk Appetite arrangements is significant across five of the eight models at 
either a one or five per cent level, continuing to demonstrate its important role 
as a risk governance variable. The coefficient for Risk Appetite is significant in 
this battery of tests, where the dependent variable is ROA, NIM, and the 
Efficiency Ratio, as well as Actual Loan Losses, with t-values demonstrating its 
importance relative to the CEO Power variable. 
CEO Shares deserves further focus in Table 16. In banking, managerial 
incentives matter (Bhagat and Bolton, 2014) and they may interact with other 
aspects of corporate governance (Lasfer, 2006). In a general sense, CEO 
ownership may be used to overcome risk aversion, which may otherwise 
manifest as an agency cost (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).48 CEO Shares as an 
explanatory variable is always negatively and significantly related to Tail Risk, 
as noted in Models 3, 4, 6, and now 7h.  Later in Further Analysis, the negative 
relation of CEO Shares to Tail Risk continues to be observed.49  
                                            
46 These variables are defined in further detail in Appendix 2.  
47 The methodology to create the first principal component (labeled CEO Power) is explained in Appendix 8. 
48 See Spong and Sullivan (2007) for analysis of how agency costs are mitigated by share ownership of the CEO in a 
US banking context.    
49 Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) examine CEO incentives including shares for US financial institution performance and 
risk for the period prior to and during the crisis. They note that CEOs failed to sell their shares and experienced on 
average at least $30 million of personal losses as share prices fell. It is plausible that BHC CEOs with large 
shareholdings face incentives to not incur excessive risk-taking and mitigate Tail Risk measures following these losses. 
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This revelation indicates that BHCs in which the CEO enjoys higher ownership 
levels exhibit lower Tail Risks. This observation is broadly consistent with the 
literature that suggests that bank executive wealth concentration is negatively 
related to bank risk levels (Spong and Sullivan, 2007). These findings suggest 
an area of future examination for researchers who wish to evaluate incentives 
and bank risk-taking. 
From the review of the CEO Power index estimations performed in this section, 
it can reasonably concluded that the power of the CEO is not driving the 
headline outcome measures observed thus far in this study. Following the 
reasoning of Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014), if CEO Power exhibits a 
consistent significant (positive or negative) relationship with outcome measures, 
it might be argued that a powerful CEO might be driving the findings presented 
in this study. Instead, there is no such finding observed across the battery of 
tests and it appears that CEO Power is not a material or significant driver of 
BHC outcome measures.  
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Table 16. Model 7: CEO Power index – performance and risk 
Variable Model 7a 
(ROA) 
  
Model 7b 
(NIM) 
  
Model 7c 
(Eff Ratio) 
 
Model 7d 
(HPRs) 
  
Model 7e 
(NPLs) 
 
Model 7f 
(Actual 
LL) 
Model 7g 
(Tier 1)50 
 
Model 7h 
(Tail Risk) 
 
CEO Power 0.0729 0.0359 -1.184 -0.180 -0.00773 0.0571 -0.145 -0.407 
 (1.61) (0.55) (-1.07) (-0.08) (-0.17) (0.00) (-0.50) (-0.47) 
         
RC 0.130 0.103 -0.240 -17.9*** 0.0610 209.8 0.143 1.568 
Exists (0.93) (0.51) (-0.07) (-2.69) (0.43) (1.24) (0.16) (0.58) 
         
CRO Age .00426 -.0512** 0.0286 0.429 0.00199 -29.39 0.0794 -0.200 
 (0.26) (-2.21) (0.07) (0.56) (0.12) (-1.48) (0.74) (-0.63) 
         
BHC Assets -.00001 -.000003 .0000172 .000059 -.000001 -0.016*** -.000006 -.000012 
 (-0.47) (-1.60) (0.61) (1.09) (-1.24) (-11.38) (-0.86) (-0.52) 
         
BOD Mtg. -0.0057 0.0168 0.157 -1.163** 0.0137 -10.56 0.0379 -0.118 
Number (-0.54) (1.12) (0.61) (-2.32) (1.31) (-0.83) (0.56) (-0.59) 
         
BOD Mtg. 0.0108 -0.0131 0.129 0.599* 0.00232 -0.294 0.105** -0.38*** 
Attend. (1.58) (-1.35) (0.78) (1.73) (0.32) (-0.04) (2.42) (-2.95) 
         
BOD Non- 0.245 -0.720 -5.984 8.566 -0.790 198.6 0.0721 -7.827 
insider (0.50) (-1.02) (-0.50) (0.37) (-1.62) (0.34) (0.02) (-0.83) 
         
Board  0.05** 0.0603 -0.587 1.809 .00052 -1.134 0.0482 0.132 
Size (2.52) (1.93) (-1.08) (1.74) (0.02) (-0.04) (0.34) (0.32) 
         
TLTA -0.0047 -0.0175 0.265 0.0150 -0.00211 5.360 -0.25*** 0.0438 
 (-0.57) (-1.48) (1.28) (0.04) (-0.25) (0.53) (-4.79) (0.28) 
         
Deposits  0.02** 0.06*** -0.35 -0.24 0.001 8.11 -0.09 -0.34* 
/Assets (2.49) (4.81) (-1.58) (-0.57) (0.21) (0.75) (-1.58) (-1.97) 
         
CEO Shares 1.16e-10 5.57e-11 -1.24e-08 -1.27e-08 2.45e-09 -.000001 2.33e-08*** -.0001*** 
 (0.09) (0.03) (-0.37) (-0.20) (1.68) (-0.36) (2.70) (-4.40) 
         
Risk Appetite  0.31*** 0.377** -7.005** -10.91** .00988 -677.3*** 0.342 -0.448 
  (2.75) (2.36) (-2.57) (-2.05) (0.08) (-5.07) (0.48) (-0.21) 
         
International         0.262 22318*** -16.79 -54.12 
Activities     (0.07) (6.42) (-0.90) (-0.97) 
         
Obs. 311 311 302 305 297 301 307 307 
         
R2 0.1413 0.2287 0.1025 0.6703 0.5228 0.6912 0.2547 0.5669 
         
AIC 49 270 1971 2401 38 4306 1187 1861 
         
BIC 108 330 2039 2460 101 4369 1250 1924 
         
Yearly  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies         
         
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
         
Notes: This table presents FE estimations, with CEO Power index designated as the predictor variable defined in Appendix 2 in terms of 
seven CEO demographic features. The dependent variable is named underneath the model number. Significant findings are denoted 
with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, reporting coefficient values (with t values in parentheses). 
  
                                            
50 Substituting TCE/RWA for Tier 1 does not qualitatively change the results and the coefficient of the predictor variable 
remains not statistically significant.  
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6.4 Channels of Impact  
This section seeks a more detailed understanding of the underlying relationship 
between risk appetite statements and performance. In order to accomplish this, 
further performance and risk outcome data are identified, collected and tested in 
a similar empirical framework. The purpose of this section is to test key 
underlying sources of income to determine whether a thread of underlying 
performance drivers can be detected beneath the headline ROA and NIM 
measures, in order to gain an improved understanding of channels of impact 
relating to Risk Appetite. 
Roman (2015) employs an analysis of the channels of impact to determine the 
underlying drivers of her empirical results for US BHCs. This analysis of risk 
governance seeks further evidence of the potential underlying channels of 
impact to explain the headline results already observed.  
Copeland (2012) helpfully identifies the key components of BHC operating 
revenue attribution as interest income, other operating income (non-interest 
income), and loan losses provisions and actual loan losses.51 These elements of 
underlying income are defined further below: 
− Interest income (less interest expense), which may be thought of as the 
traditional banking activities of borrowing and lending, at different interest 
rates in order to create a positive lending margin. 
− Other operating income is more volatile, and includes service charges, 
trading revenues, fees, investment banking and advisory services 
(Duane, Schuermann and Reynolds, 2013).52  
− Provisions for loan losses53 and Actual Loan Losses, resulting in the so-
called bad risks identified by Stulz (2015) in the conceptual literature if 
not otherwise recovered.54 
In order to probe the headline performance measures more deeply, further data 
is collected from Bloomberg for various underlying BHC variables, including 
Operating Income, Other Operating Income, Net Interest Income (as a 
percentage of average assets), and Total Interest Income and Total Interest 
Expenses.  
These variables, defined in Appendix 2, may serve as more precise underlying 
BHC performance variables, potentially driving the headline source of BHC 
performance gains noted earlier in this study.55 
                                            
51 See Copeland 2012, Chart 1, p 86. DeYoung and Rice (2004) and Li and Zou (2014) who use similar descriptions of 
this bank revenue-modeling frameworks. 
52 In Chapter 1, it was noted that some firms began to increase this source of revenue and alter their risk governance 
structures just as the credit cycle was beginning to turn, as described in Blundell-Wingnall, Atkinson and Lee, 2008. 
53 This study has focused on Actual Loan Losses consistent with Hines and Peters (2015) as a proxy for credit risks that 
generate a negative net present value. Loan loss provisions (LLPs) would have been an alternative variable of choice, 
however recent evidence argues that LLPs are positively, as opposed to negatively, related to good corporate 
governance as boards embrace income smoothing and compliance to reserving standards (Zagorchev and Gao, 2015).   
54 Many thanks to Tom Millar, Partner of Deloitte LLP, for guidance related to basic BHC accounting practices. 
55 The first two of these three variables rest within the conceptual diagram framework illustrated earlier as BHC 
performance variables. As such, they are consistent with hypotheses H1a and H2a. Actual Loan Losses, on the other 
hand, rest within BHC risk variables as noted earlier in this paper in Table 5. It rests with hypotheses H1b and H2b, 
which have already been tested in Chapter 5. 
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Table 17 presents the results of this set of new estimations. Starting with the 
first two models, the coefficient values observed for Risk Appetite are significant 
and positive in Models 8a and 8b, indicating improved BHC performance 
demonstrated by greater Operating Income and greater Net Interest Income 
(NII). This suggests that adopters of Risk Appetite arrangements report greater 
Net Interest Income that may find its way up to Operating Income and ROA.  
It may be that improvements in ROA through this NII channel are a result of 
either better (i.e., higher) asset or improved (i.e., lower) liability-pricing discipline 
on the part of BHCs that have adopted Risk Appetite arrangements. However, it 
is not possible to ascertain, at this stage, whether improved performance relates 
to higher-priced assets or lower-cost BHC liabilities and debt structure. In order 
to probe this question, it is necessary to delve deeper and examine BHC 
interest income and expense profiles separately and in greater detail. 
Interest income and interest expense can now be isolated in this regard. Table 
17 considers the relationship of Risk Appetite arrangements to Total Interest 
Income (TII) and Total Interest Expense (TIE) in Models 8c and 8d. Model 8c 
reports that the coefficient for Risk Appetite is not significant, suggesting the 
performance gains do not originate with more disciplined asset pricing which 
might otherwise come with the greater focus associated with Risk Appetite 
setting. 
However, Risk Appetite in Model 8d does report a significant and negative 
coefficient at the one per cent level, indicating that TIE (i.e., funding costs) are 
lower on average for Risk Appetite adopters. This indicates that adopters of 
Risk Appetite enjoy a lower cost of funding relative to other BHCs, which 
appears to also contribute to improved headline performance measures.56    
This finding provides preliminary evidence that BHCs that adopt Risk Appetite 
arrangements appear to enjoy higher levels of ROA, NIM and NII levels, 
apparently originating with lower funding costs (typically from depositors and 
other debt capital providers). This analysis unearths a plausible and precise 
source of the value created by the adoption of Risk Appetite arrangements, 
which originates with TIE and makes its way up the NII channel to Operating 
Income and eventually contributes to broad BHC headline measures such as 
ROA.57  
  
                                            
56 This observation calls out for a plausible explanation. Why would adopters of Risk Appetite arrangements enjoy a 
lower cost of funds relative to non-adopting BHCs?  Effective liquidity is a first order requirement for BHCs. BHCs face 
liquidity risks given their asset and liability mismatch but may also expose firms to a bank run (Elyasiani and Zhang, 
2015, p. 240). Certain banks may have impaired liquidity and engage in excessive risk-taking, especially in the 
presence of a public safety net (Claessens, 2013, p. 756). It may be that BHCs that are perceived in the funding 
markets as better managed and also use Risk Appetite arrangements may attract funding at superior (i.e., lower) rates 
relative to BHCs that are perceived to be less well managed, thus needing to “pay up” for money market and deposit 
funding, especially in difficult market conditions. Thanks to Dr Gabriele Sabato for insight into this plausible explanation.  
57 The Pearson pairwise correlation of TIE and ROA is -0.07.  
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Table 17. Model 8: Examining the channels of impact upon performance 
Variable Model 8a 
(Operating 
Income) 
Model 8b 
(NII) 
Model 8c 
(Total Interest 
Income) 
Model 8d 
(Total Interest 
Expense)58 
Model 8e 
(Other Op. 
Income) 
      
      
Risk Appetite 1183.5 *** 0.243*** -658.7 -752.3*** 226.7** 
 (2.83) (2.66) (-0.52) (-2.94) (2.18) 
      
RC Exists -39.29 0.0407 -26.42 207.3 160.7 
 (-0.07) (0.34) (-0.02) (0.61) (1.19) 
      
CRO Age 50.30 -0.0259* 98.66 20.73 -13.93 
 (0.80) (-1.90) (0.52) (0.54) (-0.90) 
      
BHC Assets .0121*** -.000001 -0.00881 -.00757*** -.00233** 
 (2.74) (-1.02) (-0.66) (-2.79) (-2.12) 
      
BOD Meeting  -59.33 0.00888 38.88 5.007 11.04 
Number (-1.47) (1.01) (0.32) (0.20) (1.10) 
      
BOD Meeting -1.409 -0.00487 -16.58 0.0363 -5.928 
Attendance  (-0.05) (-0.85) (-0.21) (0.00) (-0.91) 
      
BOD Non-insider 446.1 -0.482 -317.5 26.85 146.1 
 (0.23) (-1.16) (-0.05) (0.02) (0.31) 
      
Board Size 11.06 0.0325* 27.72 -67.27 11.45 
 (0.13) (1.79) (0.11) (-1.28) (0.55) 
      
TLTA 16.70 0.00639 18.37 -1.714 -3.739 
 (0.53) (0.94) (0.19) (-0.09) (-0.48) 
      
Deposits / Assets 67.00* 0.0285*** 49.38 -31.23 2.792 
 (1.97) (3.85) (0.48) (-1.49) (0.33) 
      
CEO Shares .000003 8.46e-11 -.000006 -.000004 -.000001 
 (0.50) (0.07) (-0.38) (-1.23) (-1.08) 
      
Observations 314 314 306 306 314 
      
R2 0.1782 0.2012 0.0322 0.1848 0.0896 
      
AIC 5241 -54 5781 4802 4365 
      
BIC 5297 2 5837 4858 4421 
      
Yearly Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
 Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
   
   
Notes: Table 18 and Model 9 probes further into what may be driving BHC performance observed thus far (ROA and NIM) across a set of 
underlying BHC performance metrics in order to better appreciate potential channels of impact of Risk Appetite. It consists of fixed effects 
estimations with Risk Appetite as the predictor variable. The dependent variable is named underneath the Model number, such as 
Operating Income, NII, Interest Income and Expense, and Other Operating Income. All dependent variables defined in Appendix 13.2.  
Significant findings are denoted with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively with coefficient values reported (and t values 
reported in parentheses).      
 
 
 
  
                                            
58 Total Interest Expense is an expense line item and part of net interest income, a performance measure. Thus, Risk 
Appetite arrangements are related to improved BHC performance levels when its coefficient sign is negative in model 
8d. 
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6.5 Risk Appetite: Mandatory versus Voluntary Adoption  
This section describes an extended analysis of Risk Appetite arrangements 
using sub-samples (determined by BHC size) to examine their impact upon the 
suite of performance measures. Covered BHCs are those with assets of $50 
billion or more, are required to adopt Risk arrangements over a phased period 
(Federal Register, 2014a). Below this level, adoption is not a requirement, but 
firms may voluntarily adopt such measures. Thus, two types of BHCs are 
present in the full sample: covered BHCs (mandatory adopters) and uncovered 
BHCs (including non-adopters and voluntary adopters).59 
Although the two types of BHCs arguably face different motivations for Risk 
Appetite arrangements, the same model set up can be applied to each sub-
sample. Next, following Black and Kim (2012) and Fogel, Ma and Morck (2014), 
a horserace regression is run, pitting the two camps in a horserace to evaluate 
the strength of any relationship across several BHC performance variables. 
Table 18 Model 9 reports the findings of a series of baseline regressions to 
estimate the relationship between Risk Appetite arrangements and BHC 
performance for both mandatory and voluntary adopters. The coefficient for 
Risk Appetite is not significant for mandatory adopters as noted in Models 9a 
and 9b.60 BHC’s that voluntarily adopt Risk Appetite reports a positive 
association at the one per cent significance level in Models 9c and 9d, 
indicating these BHCs report higher ROA and NIM. Moreover, the coefficient 
values are 0.51% and 1.20% for ROA and NIM, indicating a material economic 
impact for voluntary adopters of Risk Appetite of 0.51% and 1.20% respectively 
on average upon their performance. 
The voluntary adopters are further split in columns 9e and 9f, creating a third 
sub-sample of BHCs, with assets of less than $25 billion. Once again, Risk 
Appetite exhibits a positive significant association with ROA and NIM at the one 
per cent level. This indicates that where this risk governance practice is 
adopted, regardless if directly covered by regulations or not, significant and 
impactful performance results are reported. Moreover, the coefficient values 
portray an economically impactful relation for these voluntary adopters.  
These results are both surprising and enlightening. There was no expectation 
that voluntary adapters of this risk governance mechanism would report a 
significant and impactful link with BHC performance.  
This suggests that institutional corporate governance theories (which might view 
BHCs adopting risk governance for appearances purposes only on a voluntary 
basis) are unsupported, as these BHCs instead appear to be contributing to the 
strong associations and impact across BHC performance measures.    
 
                                            
59 As of 2015, 29 per cent of the BHCs reported using Risk Appetite arrangements, up from 23 per cent in 2014. 
60 Interestingly, for the first time, these two models report that the coefficient for Risk Committee Exists is positive and 
significant for these large BHCs, indicating ROA and NIM gains within this sub-sample for large BHCs with a Risk 
Committee. This is an area deserving of examination in future research.  
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Table 18 Model 9: Mandatory vs. voluntary adopters horserace #1   
Variable Model 9a 
(ROA)  
Model 9b 
(NIM) 
Model 9c 
(ROA) 
Model 9d 
(NIM) 
Model 9e 
(ROA)61 
Model 9f 
(NIM)62 
 
 Mandatory 
Adaptors 
(>$50bio) 
Mandatory 
Adaptors 
(>$50bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$50bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$50bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$25bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$25bio) 
       
       
       
Risk Appetite  0.145* -0.102 0.514*** 1.200*** 0.740*** 1.789*** 
 (1.97) (-0.90) (2.81) (4.80) (4.44) (5.68) 
       
Risk Committee  0.639*** 0.726** -0.0747 -0.209 -0.141 -0.443 
Exists (3.41) (2.51) (-0.40) (-0.83) (-0.93) (-1.56) 
       
CRO Age 0.00714 -0.0387*** -0.0674 -0.312** -0.0647 -0.244* 
 (0.87) (-3.05) (-0.73) (-2.46) (-0.94) (-1.88) 
       
BHC Assets .000000243 -.0000019** .0000173 .0000344 .0000245 .0000335 
 (0.40) (-2.08) (1.02) (1.47) (1.50) (1.09) 
       
BOD Meeting 
Number 0.00175 0.00897 0.00104 0.0332* -0.00715 0.0336 
 (0.18) (0.61) (0.07) (1.66) (-0.65) (1.62) 
       
BOD Meeting  0.00113 -0.0234*** 0.0161 -0.00409 -0.0191 -0.00857 
Attendance  (0.22) (-2.96) (1.52) (-0.28) (-1.98) (-0.47) 
       
BOD Non- -0.668 -1.068 0.0757 -1.068 0.00264 -1.252 
Insider (-0.84) (-0.88) (0.13) (-1.33) (0.01) (-1.53) 
       
Board Size 0.0126 -0.0211 0.0576* 0.0723 0.0459* 0.0735 
 (0.66) (-0.71) (1.78) (1.63) (1.86) (1.57) 
       
TLTA 0.0182* 0.00572 -0.0106 -0.00828 -0.0110 -0.0106 
 (2.00) (0.41) (-0.94) (-0.54) (-1.27) (-0.65) 
       
Deposits /  0.0196** 0.0475*** 0.0187 0.0443** 0.0211** 0.061*** 
Assets (2.09) (3.29) (1.45) (2.52) (2.07) (3.21) 
       
CEO Shares 6.84e-10 1.26e-09 1.51e-09 1.80e-09 1.50e-09 3.05e-09 
 (0.62) (0.74) (0.74) (0.65) (0.98) (1.06) 
       
Observations 86 86 228 228 204 204 
       
R2 0.4323 0.5829 0.1842 0.3298 0.3744 0.4258 
       
AIC63 -110 -35 84 227 -65 193 
       
BIC -75 -125 135 278 -15 243 
       
Yearly 
Dummies Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Notes: Table 16 Model 7 presents FE estimations, with BHC Risk Appetite as the independent variable. The dependent variable, either 
ROA or NIM, is named underneath the model number. This horserace compares the ROA and NIM performance of mandatory adopters 
(BHCs >$50 billion) and all voluntary adopters (all BHCs < $50 billion), and a third sub-set of even smaller voluntary adopters with (only 
BHCs < $25 billion). Significant findings are denoted with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively, reporting coefficient 
values (with t values in parentheses).  
  
                                            
61 Lagging the independent variable by one-year results in a positive finding for ROA at the one per cent significance 
level. 
62 Lagging the independent variable by one-year results in a positive finding for NIM at the five per cent significance 
level. 
63 As noted earlier on Table 10, negative values for AIC and BIC are not at all problematic. 
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As a result of these estimations, a growing body of evidence is emerging 
suggesting that Risk Appetite arrangements may be an important addition to the 
current suite of established risk governance mechanisms for banks, regardless 
of whether adoption is on a mandatory or voluntary basis. These estimations 
also refute any evidence of institutional corporate governance theory at work. 
Instead of adopting this board-level practice as a box-ticking exercise, voluntary 
adopters are demonstrating greater performance, seemingly more in tune with 
effective internal monitoring. 
Given these results observed in horserace #1, two more sets of horserace 
regressions can now be estimated by delving deeper into underlying 
performance measures to further validate the adoption by voluntary adopters. 
The first set examines the relation of Risk Appetite to Operating Income and Net 
Interest Income (as reported in Table 19 Model 10), and the final set considers 
this risk governance mechanism and its relation to Other Operating Income and 
the Efficiency Ratio (as reported in Table 20 Model 11).  
Tables 19 and 20 now present further evidence that voluntary adopters of Risk 
Appetite arrangements exhibit significant positive associations with underlying 
BHC performance measures. Horserace regression #2, Table 19 probes how 
Risk Appetite impacts Operating Income and NII across the different sub-
samples. In Table 19, a positive and one per cent significant coefficient for Risk 
Appetite is observed, exhibiting an association with Operating Income and NII 
for voluntary adopters in Models 10c and 10d.  
These findings suggest an impactful relationship as well. The coefficient values 
for Risk Appetite are noted as 0.56 and 0.83 per cent in Models 10d and 10f 
respectively for NII, indicating on average economically impactful relationship 
for voluntary adopters in both sub-samples.    
Earlier in this study, Risk Appetite arrangements exhibited significant positive 
results across the full sample for the Efficiency Ratio (in Tables 10 and 11) and 
for Other Operating Income (in Table 17). Horserace regression #3 now probes 
this relationship within the mandatory and voluntary adopter sub-sample 
framework. These estimations continue to validate the impact of this risk 
governance mechanism in Table 20 for voluntary adopters. Risk Appetite does 
not report a significant relation for mandatory adopters in Models 11a and 11b. 
However, the coefficient for this risk governance practice becomes significant in 
Model 11e for voluntary adopters relating to Other Operating Income.64 Also, a 
significant coefficient for Risk Appetite is observed at the one per cent level in 
both sets of voluntary sub-samples for the Efficiency Ratio, as reported in 
Models 11d and 11f. This round of horserace regressions indicate that BHCs, 
which voluntarily adopt Risk Appetite arrangements, report greater underlying 
operating performance measures, even if their motivation for adoption was not 
strictly a regulatory driven requirement.65  
 
                                            
64 Income and losses from the Trading Book and other risk-taking activities typically roll up to Other Operating Income, 
providing a prism through which to view the impact of Risk Appetite arrangements outside of the NII channel. 
65 Separately, it is noted that RC Exists exhibits a positive and significant association to Other Operating Income in 
Model 11a for mandatory adopters, providing an opportunity for further examination in later research. 
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Table 19 Model 10: Mandatory versus voluntary adaptors horserace #266   
Variable Model 10a 
(Operating 
Income) 
  
Model 10b 
(NII) 
Model 10c 
(Operating 
Income) 
  
Model 10d 
(NII)67 
Model 10e 
(Operating 
Income)68 
  
Model 10f 
(NII)69 
 Mandatory 
Adaptors 
(>$50bio) 
Mandatory 
Adaptors 
(>$50bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$50bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$50bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$25bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$25bio) 
       
       
       
Risk Appetite  1680.8 -0.0396 176.7*** 0.564*** 317.6*** 0.833*** 
 (1.45) (-0.58) (2.94) (3.81) (6.46) (4.35) 
       
RC 1853.5 0.403** -39.59 -0.107 -78.53* -0.199 
Exists (0.63) (2.32) (-0.65) (-0.72) (-1.77) (-1.15) 
       
CRO Age 11.33 -0.0139 -14.11 -0.179** -10.57 -0.143* 
 (0.09) (-1.82) (-0.46) (-2.39) (-0.52) (-1.81) 
       
BHC Assets 0.0125 -.00000088 .0139** .0000106 .00950* .0000108 
 (1.31) (-1.57) (2.48) (0.77) (1.98) (0.58) 
       
BOD Meeting  -290.4* 0.0115 2.944 0.0160 3.185 0.0155 
Number (-1.93) (1.30) (0.61) (1.35) (0.98) (1.23) 
       
BOD Meeting  -1.764 -.0138*** -4.959 0.000761 -2.631 -.000369 
Attendance  (-0.02) (-2.91) (-1.43) (0.09) (-0.92) (-0.03) 
       
BOD Non- -3087.1 -0.720 -28.11 -0.665 -54.87 -0.727 
Insider (-0.25) (-0.98) (-0.15) (-1.40) (-0.43) (-1.46) 
       
Board Size 247.9 -0.0146 8.287 0.0421 5.257 0.0466 
 (0.82) (-0.82) (0.78) (1.61) (0.72) (1.65) 
       
TLTA 46.83 0.0226** -6.588* 0.00567 -5.029* .00565 
 (0.33) (2.67) (-1.79) (0.62) (-1.97) (0.57) 
       
Deposits /  126.9 0.0261*** 6.140 0.0213** 5.980** .0305*** 
Assets (0.86) (3.01) (1.45) (2.05) (1.99) (2.61) 
       
CEO Shares -.000001 9.17e-10 .0000009 7.65e-10 .000001** 1.22e-09 
 (-0.06) (0.89) (1.47) (0.47) (2.25) (0.70) 
       
Observations 86 86 228 228 204 204 
       
R2 0.4323 0.6280 0.2307 0.2736 0.4829 0.3326 
       
AIC 1553 -123 2726 -12 2254 -9 
       
BIC 1590 -88 2778 39 2304 40 
       
Yearly 
Dummies Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Notes: Table 19 and Model 10 consists of fixed effects estimations with BHC Risk Appetite as the independent variable and the 
dependent variable named underneath the model number, either Operating Income or Net Interest Income. This horserace Regression 
compares the performance of Mandatory Adapters (BHCs >$50bio) and all Voluntary Adapters (all BHCs <$50bio), and a third subset 
of even smaller Voluntary Adapters with (only BHCs <$25bio). Significant findings are denoted with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively with coefficient values reported (and t values reported in parentheses).        
 
 
                                            
66 Using Total Interest Income (TII) and Total Interest Expense (TIE) as an outcome variable in these estimations was 
ambiguous within the BHC size bucketing approaches used herein (>$50 billion, <50 billion and < $25 billion). However, 
TIE is significant for BHCs greater than $30 billion at the five per cent level (93 observations, R-Square value of 
0.4798), which becomes more significant at the one per cent level if the sample is further delimited to BHCs greater 
than $30 billion level and less than $100 billion.   
67 Lagging the independent variable by one-year results in a negative coefficient at the five per cent significance level in 
this model run, perhaps a sign of greater asset pricing discipline or otherwise.  
68 Lagging the independent variable by one-year results in a positive finding at the one per cent significance level. 
69 Lagging the independent variable by one-year results in a negative finding at the five per cent significance level.  
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Table 20 Model 11: Mandatory versus voluntary adapters horserace #3 
Variable Model 11a 
(Other 
Operating 
Income) 
  
Model 11b 
(Efficiency 
Ratio) 
Model 11c 
(Other 
Operating 
Income) 
  
Model 11d 
(Efficiency 
Ratio) 
Model 11e 
(Other 
Operating 
Income)70 
  
Model 11f 
(Efficiency 
Ratio)71 
 Mandatory 
Adaptors 
(>$50bio) 
Mandatory 
Adaptors 
(>$50bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$50bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$50bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$25bio) 
Voluntary 
Adaptors 
(<$25bio) 
       
       
       
Risk Appetite  367.9 -1.971 17.23* -12.18*** 28.45*** -19.87*** 
  (1.26) (-0.97) (1.90) (-2.74) (2.79) (-4.99) 
       
RC 1509.7** -3.196 -1.599 1.235 -8.560 5.117 
Exists (2.04) (-0.62) (-0.17) (0.27) (-0.93) (1.38) 
       
CRO Age -3.529 -0.108 -27.85*** 1.051 -25.70*** 1.158 
 (-0.11) (-0.48) (-6.05) (0.47) (-6.13) (0.71) 
       
BHC Assets -0.00215 -0.0000015 0.000793 -0.000612 0.00259** -0.000615 
 (-0.89) (-0.09) (0.94) (-1.45) (2.60) (-1.53) 
       
BOD Meeting  9.419 0.0597 0.250 -0.0132 0.505 0.0331 
Number (0.25) (0.23) (0.34) (-0.04) (0.75) (0.12) 
       
BOD Meeting  -7.540 0.0659 -0.299 0.286 -0.582 0.387* 
Attendance  (-0.37) (0.47) (-0.57) (1.11) (-0.99) (1.68) 
       
BOD Non- 50.76 9.877 -3.952 -2.671 -12.80 -0.909 
Insider (0.02) (0.46) (-0.14) (-0.19) (-0.48) (-0.09) 
       
Board Size 69.89 -0.168 2.819* -0.526 2.596* -0.110 
 (0.93) (-0.32) (1.76) (-0.64) (1.72) (-0.18) 
       
TLTA 10.15 -0.174 -0.109 0.460* -0.314 0.298 
 (0.28) (-0.69) (-0.20) (1.65) (-0.59) (1.41) 
       
Deposits /  -12.10 -0.539** 2.235*** -0.165 2.847*** -0.128 
Assets (-0.33) (-2.10) (3.50) (-0.52) (4.57) (-0.52) 
       
CEO Shares -0.0000038 -2.51e-08 -8.23e-08 -1.24e-08 -5.43e-08 -2.14e-08 
 (-0.87) (-0.82) (-0.82) (-0.25) (-0.58) (-0.57) 
       
Observations 86 84 228 221 204 197 
       
Adjusted R2 0.2116 0.2747 0.4798 0.1496 0.6172 0.3497 
       
AIC 1316 449 1864 1489 1613 1182 
       
BIC 1352 485 1916 1540 1666 1232 
       
Yearly 
Dummies Yes 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
Notes: Table 20 Model 11 consists of fixed effects estimations with BHC Risk Appetite as the independent variable and the dependent 
variable named underneath the Model number (either Other Operating Income or the Efficiency Ratio). This horserace regression 
compares the performance of Mandatory Adaptors (BHCs >$50bio) and all Voluntary Adaptors (all BHCs <$50bio), and a third subset 
of even smaller Voluntary Adaptors with (only BHCs <$25bio). Significant findings are denoted with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% 
levels respectively with coefficient values reported (and t values reported in parentheses).        
 
 
  
                                            
70 Lagging the independent variable by one-year results in positive finding at the one per cent significance level. 
71 Lagging the independent variable by one-year results in a positive finding at the five per cent significance level. 
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6.6 Mitigating Omitted Variables 
A final set of full sample baseline regression estimations are now undertaken 
within this research. Robust empirical research seeks to mitigate omitted 
variables and include all reasonable control variables (Antonakis et al., 2010, p. 
1091). The following estimations are carried out using the same set-up as found 
in Models 10 and 11, but now add an extended suite of controls after further 
consultation of the literature, following Vyas (2010) and Black and Kim (2012). 
The further control variables added to the estimations include: Institutional 
Shareholdings, Risk Committee Busyness, CRO Centrality, CRO Tenure and 
Risk Committee Chairman Gender. 
The rationale for selecting these variables now follows. Institutional 
shareholders may have the power, influence, incentives and access to monitor 
bank risk-taking (Laeven and Levine, 2009; Aebi, Sabato and Schmid, 2012). 
BHC director busyness levels suggest an element of director distraction, 
however Elyasiani and Zhang (2015) present evidence of improved 
performance measures (ROE, Tobin’s Q and EBIT) and lower risk measures 
(credit risks) associated with busy BHC directors. Other research validates a 
positive association between busyness and BHC risk (Cooper and Uzun, 2012).  
Female representation on banks’ boards of directors may also be associated 
with better performance. Emerging research reveals that BHCs with more 
female directors performed better or exhibit lower risk during the crisis (St Claire 
et al., 2016; Gulamhussen and Santa, 2015).  
The important role of the CRO as a key risk governance actor can also be 
catered for in this analysis. Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) use the concept of CRO 
Centrality to proxy empowerment and independence from the CEO.72 CRO 
Tenure measures the number of years of service with that particular BHC, 
providing a proxy for experience sought by regulators specifically “in identifying, 
assessing, and managing risk exposures of large, complex financial firms” 
(Federal Register, 2014b, p. 17289). The regulator seeks that in every case, the 
BHC shall demonstrate that the CRO’s experience is relevant to the kind of 
risks facing the company and commensurate with the BHC’s structure, risk 
profile, complexity, activities and size (Federal Register, 2014b, p 17251). 
Definitions for these control variables are reported in Appendix 2.  
Across the standard suite of estimations including the extended suite of 
controls, Risk Appetite continues to relate to key accounting performance 
measures (ROA and NIM) and a risk measure (Actual Loan Losses). Tables 22 
and 23 are presented in the Appendix with the empirical results reported.73 This 
exercise of adding a broader suite of control variables presents further evidence 
of the impact of Risk Appetite upon BHC outcomes while further mitigating the 
risk of omitted variables confounding the reported findings.74 
                                            
72 CRO Centrality is strictly followed following seminal research (Ellul and Yerramilli, 2013, p. 1799), and is determined 
by the calculating the ratio of the CRO’s total compensation, less stock options and awards, to the CEO’s total 
compensation. As within this literature, if the CRO compensation level is not publically available, one per cent is 
removed from the compensation of the fifth highest paid executive and this is used as a conservative proxy.   
73 Only the estimation for Risk Appetite and its relation to the Efficiency Ratio fails perform in this round of testing.  
74 The use of FE in the estimations should also mitigate any time-invariant omitted variables.  
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6.7 Differences-in-Differences Analysis   
Love (2011) challenges researchers to produce robust corporate governance 
studies. She argues that while research often supports a positive correlation 
between governance practice and market-based measures of performance, 
such findings are weaker for operating performance. Love (2011) adds that 
while it is important to control for unobserved firm level heterogeneity using FE, 
this approach itself does not credibly establish causality (Love, 2011, p. 15).  
She also indicates that the direction of the relation in this literature domain is not 
always clear, suggesting that causality may operate in reverse. Reverse 
causality occurs when better firm performance leads to better corporate 
governance practices. While a randomized experiment would be an ideal 
remedy, replicating such opportunities are rare and impractical. Love (2011) 
does however explain that the next most credible means to establish a true 
causal relationship is to use a change in laws or regulation, as it is likely to be 
exogenous to the firm. The legal or regulatory shock can be combined with a 
differences-in-differences approach. 
The differences-in-differences (DiD) design method in empirical finance has a 
long history in econometrics generally and in banking-led research specifically. 
It is often used in empirical research for estimating the effects of policy change 
or intervention in economics (Lechner, 2010; Black and Kim, 2012).   
The DiD methodology has been employed in earlier related research. Berger, 
Roman and Sedunov (2016) assess the impact of the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) on US BHCs using DiD and find that that the bailout led to 
statistically significant decreases in systemic risk levels. Berger, Kick and 
Schaeck (2014) consider changes in executive board composition with DiD 
estimation and find a robust positive relationship between younger executives 
and risk-taking. Black and Kim (2012) use DiD in their sample of Korean firms 
after the changes to corporate governance regulations for large (treated) and 
small (control) firms, and find that the latter enjoy valuation gains. 
DiD facilitates an assessment of the impact of regulatory intervention for control 
and treated groups of BHCs.75 The applicable treatment here, is the adoption of 
Risk Appetite arrangements by boards of directors from 2012 to 2015. In this 
sample, twenty BHCs were already treated (i.e. already using Risk Appetite) in 
the first year of the sample in 2012, so the impact of these early adopters were 
coded within the DiD analysis in order to ensure all BHCs were untreated in 
2012 (effectively removing treated BHCs from the pre-treatment period). In this 
way, the sample now includes only untreated BHCs for 2012 while BHCs begin 
to adopt Risk Appetite only in 2013. A weakness of this approach is that sample 
bias is introduced, but this is necessary to use the DiD method.76 
                                            
75 It could be argued that early and voluntary adopting BHCs may be different from later and mandatory adopting BHCs 
in such a way that is not otherwise controlled for in the earlier estimations, such as conservative risk management 
practices. Thus the use of DiD may be viewed as a superior test as it can control for unobservable differences not 
captured in earlier estimations.  Thanks to Dr Stijn Claessens for this observation.  
76 Section 6.2 has already provided certain evidence that early adopters exhibit a statistically strong relationship with 
certain outcome variables, so it might be argued that removing these early adopters might result in conservative results 
in the DiD estimations. 
 88 
This DiD analysis produces further evidence of the impact of Risk Appetite upon 
BHC outcome measures. Models 12a to 12g report the findings of the DiD 
estimation, including the time, treated and DiD variables typically produced in 
such estimations in Panel A.77  
The DiD coefficient (the third variable reported in the table) is positive and 
significant in Model 12c, indicating a positive impact upon BHC Operating 
Income. Further, the DID coefficient for Risk Appetite in Model 12d is negative 
and significant at the one per cent level, validating earlier findings reported 
establishing the impact of lower BHC funding costs and thus improved BHC 
operating performance.   
The DiD analysis also presents further evidence for some impact of Risk 
Appetite arrangements upon selected BHC risk measures. The coefficient for 
DiD is both negative and significant at the one per cent level when evaluating its 
relation to both Actual Loan Losses and Tail Risk.78   
On the whole, these results provide further evidence of the impact of Risk 
Appetite Arrangements upon BHC operating measures, relying on an alternative 
empirical method.   
6.8 Risk Appetite Arrangements: Alternative Settings 
Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014) employ alternative variable definitions to 
add to the robustness of their findings for risk governance. In this study, the 
existence of Risk Appetite arrangements has been observed through board-
articulated risk appetite statements noted in BHC annual reports. This section 
now changes tack and describes the use of a different data source than that 
used thus far to observe Risk Appetite practice by BHCs.   
Risk Committee charters provide an alternative means of observing the 
adoption of Risk Appetite arrangements, independent of BHC annual reports. A 
risk charter by Wells Fargo and Co. is presented at Appendix 7. As 
demonstrated in this document, the Risk Committee reviews and recommends 
the company’s Risk Appetite to the full board, and approves any amendments 
to Risk Appetite. Thus, BHC risk charters may provide an independent window 
for researchers to observe the practice of articulating board-level-approved Risk 
Appetite. BHC risk charters were hand-collected for the 2012 to 2015 sample 
period and were manually reviewed to determine whether or not responsibility 
for BHC Risk Appetite articulation and formal approval rests with the Risk 
Committee.79 
                                            
77 DiD regressions are undertaken for Risk Appetite and its impact upon the noted dependent variables noted in Model 
12. The output of seven models is reported in Table 21, Model 12. Risk Appetite in the DiD exercise does not exhibit a 
significant outcome using the remaining dependent variables, which is unreported to conserve space. 
78 Risk Appetite arrangements report a positive outcome for NPLs in the DiD estimations. Further data collection and 
analysis for final publication may shed light on this finding. 
79 Risk Committee charters are relatively recent phenomenon for US BHCs and have only accelerated recently. This 
data collection technique records the articulation of this practice by BHC Risk Committees within their charters as 
opposed to the full board’s responsibility as documented within BHC annual reports. Also, in certain cases, earlier BHC 
Risk Committee charters have been removed from BHCs’ websites and only the most recent risk charters remain. In 
such cases, the previous quarterly BHC proxy statement was inspected for evidence of approval of the Risk Committee 
charter by the board or board Risk Committee, noting whether or not risk approval had occurred in order to generate the 
dummy value of one or zero for that period. 
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A new dummy variable, labeled Risk Charter Determined Risk Appetite, is 
coded with a value of one (otherwise zero) if the BHC Risk Committee Charter 
explicitly records the requirement for an approval and articulation of Risk 
Appetite by the full board of directors or the Risk Committee of the board. This 
new dummy variable relies on a different data collection method, independent 
of the previous method and source, to collect Risk Appetite practices at the 
board level.80  
Table 14 Models 12h to 12n in Panel B reports the results of these 
estimations.81  
Risk Charter Determined Risk Appetite, as an independent variable, continues 
to validate the impact of this board level practice upon BHC operating 
performance and selected risk measures. In terms of BHC operating 
performance measures, the coefficient of this risk governance mechanism is 
significant at the one per cent level, providing evidence that Risk Appetite 
impacts BHC performance via the NIM, Operating Income and TIE channel of 
impact in Models 12i to 12k respectively, in Panel B.  As before, the coefficients 
for NIM and Operating Income are positive signs while the coefficient in Model 
12k is negative and significant for TIE, validating a positive impact to 
performance. 
Negative coefficients are reported for Risk Appetite in Models 12m and 12n 
which are significant at the one per cent level, indicating that adopting BHCs 
experience lower Actual Loan Losses and also lower Tail Risk measures. This 
provides validation of the similar findings in Panel A of the DiD examination for 
these two BHC outcome measures. Risk Appetite is not significant related to 
NPLs in this round of estimations. Once again, the coefficient for Risk Appetite 
is negatively related and significant to Actual Loan Losses, as observed in 
Table 21, corroborating the findings across all the earlier standard regressions.  
This exercise demonstrates the findings of an alternative data collection 
specification for BHC Risk Appetite, using an independent secondary source 
from the earlier examinations. In this round of estimations, Risk Appetite 
continues to indicate a positive relation to BHC performance measures, 
including the role of revenue-based channels of impact underpinning these 
results.   
  
                                            
80 The pairwise correlation of Risk Appetite arrangements and this new variable, risk charter risk appetite, is 0.4842. 
81 Control variables are not included in these estimations as they are directly affected by the treatment and the passage 
of the heightened guidelines that may taint casual inferences (Lechner, 2010, p. 187; Roberts & Whited, 2012, p.35).   
 90 
Table 21. Model 12: Differences-in-differences examination 
Panel A: Risk Appetite 
Variable Model 
12a 
(ROA) 
Model 
12b 
(NIM) 
Model 
12c 
(Oper. 
Income)82 
Model 
12d 
(Total 
Interest 
Expense) 
Model 
12e 
(NPLs) 
Model 12f 
(Actual 
Net Loan 
Losses) 
Model 
12g 
(Tail Risk) 
        
        
Time 0.00913 -0.138*** 107.2 -83.99 -0.745*** -79.18 -6.918*** 
 (0.19) (-2.85) (0.96) (-1.19) (-12.98) (-1.24) (-9.58) 
        
Treated 0.323** 0.247 320.1 115.0 -0.324 65.03 -0.324 
 (2.09) (1.57) (0.88) (0.51) (-1.69) (0.32) (-0.14) 
        
Difference in -0.0336 -0.00849 718.5** -608.3*** 0.347** -720.4*** -6.294*** 
Difference (-0.27) (-0.07) (2.49) (-3.34) (2.28) (-4.38) (-3.32) 
        
        
Observations 560 560 561 561 537 544 541 
        
R2 0.0191 0.0276 0.0691 0.0716 0.3229 0.1221 0.3314 
        
AIC 502 515 9212     8513 657 8283 3390 
        
BIC 519 532   9229    8530 674 8310 3410 
        
        
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Panel B: Risk Charter Determined Risk Appetite 
Variable Model 
12h 
(ROA) 
Model 
12i 
(NIM) 
Model 12j 
(Operating 
Income)83 
Model 
12k 
(Total 
Interest 
Expense) 
Model 12l 
(NPLs) 
Model 
12m 
(Actual 
Net Loan 
Losses) 
Model 
12n 
(Tail Risk) 
        
        
        
Time 0.000592 -0.163*** 91.84 -121.0 -0.710*** -113.5 -6.391*** 
 (0.01) (-3.35) (0.81) (-1.69) (-12.22) (-1.73) (-9.10) 
        
Treated -0.208 -0.422*** -661.8** 537.4*** -0.482*** 588.8*** -2.404 
 (-1.55) (-3.15) (-2.10) (2.69) (-3.03) (3.24) (-1.25) 
        
Difference in 0.218* 0.373*** 1088.0*** -610.5*** 0.273* -759.7*** -5.821*** 
Difference (1.79) (3.07) (3.82) (-3.38) (1.92) (-4.62) (-3.33) 
        
Observations 560 560 561 551 537 544 541 
        
R2 0.0093 0.0409 0.0624 0.0550 0.3308 0.0928 0.3823 
        
AIC 507 507      9216    8522 650 8311 3350 
        
BIC 525 524 9233 8540 668 8328 3367 
        
        
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
        
Notes: Table 21 Model 12 consists of differences-in-differences regressions using fixed effects for Risk Appetite as the 
independent variable. Panel A consists of differences-in-differences regressions using fixed effects for Risk Appetite as normal. 
Panel B consists of differences-in-differences regressions using fixed effects for Risk Appetite as collected and identified from Risk 
Committee charters as the independent variable. The dependent variable is named underneath the model number and was 
selected from previous FE tests reported in this study producing significant results. All dependent variables defined in Appendix 2.  
Significant findings are denoted with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively with coefficient values reported (and t 
values reported in parentheses).  Early adopter BHCs in 2012 are coded in the sample to exclude from the Time variable in order 
to create a before and after treatment effect for these estimations.   
 
                                            
82 Delimiting the sample again to small BHCs (voluntary adopters with assets of less than $50 billion) again reports a 
positive DiD coefficient at the one per cent significance level for Risk Appetite and its impact upon Operating Income, 
further corroborating the earlier findings.  
83 As in Panel A, Risk Charter Determined Risk Appetite indicates a positive DiD coefficient for Operating Income at the 
one per cent significance level if the sample is delimited to voluntary adopters. 
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6.9 Summary 
This chapter presents a further analysis of the relationship of risk governance 
mechanisms to selected BHC outcome measures. Specifically, Risk Committee 
expertise has been employed as a further robustness check on the otherwise 
insignificant findings observed thus far for existence of the Risk Committee, with 
underwhelming results.84 The presence of Risk Committees which are a 
requirement for certain BHCs, fail to exhibit an enduring relationship with return 
or risk measures in the post-crisis environment, other than noted in limited sub-
sample estimations.  
As for Risk Appetite, the evidence validates a positive and significant 
relationship between Risk Appetite and BHC performance measures across a 
series of alternative analyses. The relationship between Risk Appetite and risk 
measures remains an open question deserving further testing, although loan 
losses appears to be negatively related to the risk governance practice.85 
The robustness checks carried out in this chapter also include probing CEO 
Power as an alternative explanation for these results. This however fails to 
refute the initial findings. An extended and more detailed set of performance 
outcome variables has also been collected and used in testing to unearth an 
underlying thread of value associated with Risk Appetite, such as Operating 
Income, Other Operating Income and funding costs.  
The sample was further decomposed into both mandatory and voluntary 
adopters, to observe significant findings for voluntary adopters, which suggests 
that the benefits of Risk Appetite is not limited to those covered by regulatory 
fiat. Following Cornett, McNutt and Tehranian (2009), influential observations 
may be removed from the sample using Cook’s (1997) with qualitatively similar 
findings and similar or improved R-Square values. Risk Appetite exhibits a 
positive five per cent significant relation with ROA and NII and a one per cent 
significant relation with Operating Income, Other Operating Income, TIE and 
Actual Loan Losses when removing outliers.     
Reverse causality, as noted in Section 6.7, is always a possible concern in the 
design of governance studies; however this study is driven by the occurrence of 
an external regulatory-driven or shock event, in which Risk Appetite exhibits a 
significant relation in both early adopter analysis and the DiD analysis. 
To summarize, the existence of Risk Appetite arrangements has a consistent 
and compelling association with select BHC performance measures in multiple 
empirical settings. A conceptual map showing the outcomes of testing is 
presented in Figure 6, illustrating the original hypotheses and the empirical 
findings. 
                                            
84 As observed in Table 18, the coefficient for Risk Committee Exists is significant and positive in in Models 9a, 9b and 
10b, indicating an impact to certain performance measures in this one sub-sample. In unreported results (to conserve 
space), the sample BHC size sub-sampling technique was applied to Risk Committee Financial Expertise to observe if 
mandatory or voluntary adopters of this risk governance mechanism exhibited positive results, with no significant 
findings.  
85 Stulz (2015) concludes his seminal paper with the final line: “Nevertheless, while better risk management should lead 
to better risk-taking, there is no reason for a bank with good risk management to have low risk” (Stulz, 2015, p. 17). 
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Hypotheses H1a and H1b relate to the existence of Risk Appetite arrangements 
and their positive (negative) relationship with performance (risk). H1a is 
supported, but H1b is not fully supported in this study. 
Hypotheses H2a and H2b relate to the existence of the BHC board-level Risk 
Committee for a positive (negative) relationship with performance (risk). Neither 
hypothesis is fully supported.  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Conceptual map with statement of hypothesis outcomes 
Source: Author 
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7 CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FURTHER STUDY 
7.1 Conclusions 
Certain aspects of recent bank regulation may have an adverse impact on 
external monitoring of banks, underscoring the role of internal monitoring. For 
example, greater capital cushions alone, which mitigate on the one hand 
systemic risks, but may have the unintended effect of reducing incentives for 
effective external monitoring and market discipline by depositors, customers 
and supervisors on the other hand (Dermine, 2013). Regulatory practices that 
promote improved internal monitoring may mitigate agency rents, resulting in a 
complementary relationship between governance and regulation (de Haan and 
Vlahu, 2015). Thus, activities that facilitate more focused risk-taking are 
consistent with these attempts to better control agency costs.   
Given the idiosyncratic nature of this industry, including information 
asymmetries, greater risk opacity, and its systemic risk profile, internal 
monitoring has been identified as a key corporate governance mechanism (de 
Andres and Vallelado, 2008). Following the financial crisis, bank regulators 
intervened with a set of heightened regulations to improve internal monitoring 
(Federal Register, 2014, Basel, 2015). But simply relying on larger boards may 
be insufficient as they face coordination challenges (Upadhyay, Bhargava and 
Faircloth, 2014 and Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash, 2011).  
Risk governance mechanisms have been introduced to enhance monitoring, 
including the requirement to form a Risk Committee and the articulation and 
approval of firm-wide Risk Appetite. 
Risk governance mechanisms associated with the Dodd-Frank Act but only 
codified into law in 2014 (Federal Register, 2014) have been analysed in this 
study for their relation to BHC performance measures and risk profiles. 
Specifically, Risk Appetite arrangements and the existence of Risk Committees 
are key aspects of the heightened standards tested for 2012 to 2015 inclusive.  
There is little doubt banks require a strong and knowledgeable board (Greuning 
and Bratonovic, 2003). But there is limited evidence to put forward to 
demonstrate the Risk Committee of the full board exhibits a significant 
relationship to BHC performance measures (beyond share returns), consistent 
with empirical studies by Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012) and Hines and 
Peters (2015).  
The latter authors posit that risk management committees may represent a 
symbolic governance practice to enhance the firm’s reputational legitimacy 
(Hines and Peters, 2015, p. 288). Similarly, the findings of this study find little to 
overturn this position, unless other explanations can be identified. 
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Moving on to more promising territory, Risk Appetite arrangements are 
expected to have a fundamental effect on how banks are managed (Jackson, 
2014). However, until now, there has been little empirical testing of the efficacy 
of this risk governance practice.  
Compelling empirical evidence is presented in this study for the adoption of 
board-level Risk Appetite arrangements and their impact to BHC outcomes. 
Risk Appetite is positively and significantly related to a suite of BHC operating 
performance measures and negatively related to Actual Loan Losses, on a 
consistent basis and in a variety of settings.  
Moreover, a channel of impact analysis of Risk Appetite unearths evidence of 
improvements that originate with greater Net Interest Income (driven by lower 
funding costs), supporting higher Operating Income levels, and eventually 
driving improved NIM and ROA levels at the top line performance levels. 
In effect, Risk Appetite arrangements lead to more profitable banks. 
There is no obvious alternative explanation for these findings. The results 
cannot be explained by differences in BHC managerial qualities, given the use 
of fixed effects in all the regressions. Year dummies control for time trends.   
The evidence presented expands the typical limited headline factors found in 
many bank governance studies, with significant findings also reported for a 
broader set of BHC operating performance measures. A variety of robustness 
checks have been performed, including time (for early adopter) and size-based 
sub-samples (indicating the impact of Risk Appetite practices appear to be 
realised by voluntary adopters).    
Omitted variables have been addressed by a series of further analyses. A suite 
of extended control variables have been added to the baseline estimations with 
reasonably consistent results observed, further mitigating omitted variable bias. 
An index has been designed to measure CEO Power in order to test this 
potential predictor, but in the end not providing an alternative explanation for the 
findings observed. 
These findings chime with the seminal conceptual literature in bank corporate 
governance. Kashyap, Rajan and Stein (2008) flag the potential for agency 
conflicts within banks and posit that risk managers were unaware or unable to 
restrain traders and risk-takers effectively during the financial crisis. Risk 
Appetite arrangements can contribute to that daily challenge. Stulz (2015) 
states that risk managers must determine or assist in determining when a limit 
should be changed and when it is appropriate for the institution to adjust its Risk 
Appetite for better risk governance (Stulz, 2015, p.15).  
The findings within this study also resonate with Jackson (2014) whom argues 
that better Risk Appetite articulation by bank boards should improve firm 
performance and with Gontarek (2016) who posits that the cascading of Risk 
Appetite arrangements can encourage the development of a more effective risk-
taking culture within banking, currently a leading area of interest. 
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Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) observe in seminal research that BHCs underlying 
business model or possibly risk culture may determine the choice of risk and the 
strength of their risk management system. These authors posit that 
conservative BHCs may take lower risk and establish stronger risk management 
systems, while aggressive BHCs take higher risks and put into place weaker 
risk management controls.  
Given the evidence presented in this research, the articulation, approval and 
monitoring of Risk Appetite boundaries by BHC boards, whether required by 
regulators or otherwise embraced as a better risk management practice by 
voluntary adopters, sit comfortably within the former, more conservative risk 
management ethos noted by Ellul and Yerramilli (2013).   
A somewhat surprising secondary outcome is that, while Risk Appetite 
arrangements and BHC accounting measures are significantly and positively 
related, BHC stock returns do not exhibit a significant positive relationship with 
Risk Appetite. In fact, some evidence in this study suggests equity markets may 
react negatively to risk governance practices. This suggests that public markets 
may not be aware of the significance of the use of Risk Appetite arrangements 
and the potential to impact underlying operating performance.  
Of direct relevance to practitioners, regulators may consider publishing in their 
call reports (including BHC Y9 reports) information on the use of Risk Appetite 
in order to illuminate this practice for investors, counterparties and bank 
customers. This measure might also promote greater market discipline, another 
corporate governance monitoring mechanism, and improve the transparency of 
BHC risk profiles in historically opaque risk-taking activities. 
Bank corporate governance researchers call for the development of better 
indicators and tools that may signal risks in a timelier manner as well as 
selective dissemination of risk based information as a means to enhance 
market discipline (Claessens and Kodres, 2014). Bank supervisors echoed 
these calls with the requirement to adopt new corporate governance standards:  
“Another important objective is to emphasize key components of the risk 
governance responsibility of the board of directors, such as a Risk Committee, 
Risk Appetite and its relationship to a bank’s risk capacity” (Basel, 2015a, p. 4).  
An unambiguous claim of contribution to knowledge, however modest, is made 
with respect to the impact of Risk Appetite practices upon selected BHC 
outcome measures.  
This claim is based on the empirical evidence presented herein and the 
observed findings presented in this research. This study has identified a new 
and emerging practice worthy of further investigation and explanation.  
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One expert writes: “Better articulation of Risk Appetite, facilitated with the 
appropriate infrastructure and supported by a strong risk culture, should 
improve firm governance and performance… While global regulators have 
pushed for progress, this cannot be viewed as simply a regulatory compliance 
exercise - or it will be doomed to fail” (Jackson, 2014, p. 78 Chapter 5).  This 
relevance of this observation is underscored given the voluntary adopter 
evidence presented herein.  
The popular press has started to speculate that certain aspects of US banking 
regulations might soon be relaxed, specifically with respect to the Dodd-Frank 
Act (PBS, 2016). If true, policy makers and bank supervisors will benefit from an 
evidence-based approach when considering the appropriateness of the key risk 
governance arrangements adopted thus far. This research seeks to contribute 
meaningfully to this current and impactful debate. 
7.2 Limitations 
As with all empirical studies in the social science arena, this research has its 
limitations.  
First, this study covers a time period which is relatively early in the phased 
adoption of risk governance arrangements. As more time passes, more data 
can be collected relating to the practice of risk governance practices.  
Next, the techniques employed herein have certain limitations. It is 
acknowledged that governance and risk oversight arrangements or their proxies 
are endogenous by nature (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams, Hermalin 
and Weisbach, 2010; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). For example, Board Attendance 
may be determined in part by BHC performance or risk related developments. 
Moreover, risk governance has not been randomly allocated across BHCs, 
presenting methodological challenges to prove causality. Nonetheless, applying 
the DiD approach in the context of exogenous regulatory change appears to be 
one of the more reliable means to approach causal inferences (Love, 2011, 
p.19). 
Another limitation is that representations from governance actors relating to the 
adoption of Risk Appetite arrangements are not necessarily a guarantee that 
BHCs adopt this practice on a uniform basis with an equal degree of 
seriousness of purpose. 
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Lastly, as also acknowledged by Hines and Peters (2015), the actual scope of 
responsibilities of the Risk Committees observed in this study may vary across 
different BHCs (notwithstanding the regulatory guidelines defining their 
characteristics), which may explain the lack of a relationship between this risk 
governance practice and the outcome variables.  
There are two potential interpretations of these findings for the relationship 
between Risk Appetite arrangements and BHC outcomes. The first is that risk 
governance practices may lead to improved bank performance, as posited by 
Jackson (2014) and Stulz (2015). Alternatively, selected risk governance 
mechanisms such as Risk Appetite may be determined by other unobserved 
time-varying influences, which simultaneously impact these findings.   
All that can be said is that reasonable efforts were made to test the heightened 
regulatory standards across a variety of empirical settings, with reasonably 
consistent results across the full sample and sub-samples for Risk Appetite 
arrangements and BHC performance measures.  
7.3 Further Study 
The findings of this study provide ample opportunities for further investigation of 
Risk Appetite specifically, and risk governance generally.  
This sample comprised only US BHCs, which brought certain data collection 
and empirical benefits. However, banks outside the US face similar regulatory 
shocks and requirements to adopt Risk Appetite arrangements and a broader 
set of risk governance measures. Future research might apply the framework 
used in this study to a panel of global banks or other international financial 
institutions. A sample of US BHCs may not be generalisable to a global scale, 
notably in cross-country banking contexts. Appropriate country-specific 
variables might be collected to test the hypothesis relating to Risk Appetite with 
an international sample of large banks, notably in Europe where challenges 
relating to the banking sector continue to this day.  
From a methodological perspective, expanding the data to the beginning of the 
financial crisis period or earlier would permit further examination to supplement 
the methods used in this study.   
This study is not the first to fail to identify compelling associations between the 
Risk Committee and performance or risk, which deserves further empirical 
consideration. It may be that critical board features that do promote better 
performance or lower risk-taking are not captured by the academically driven 
definitions adopted within the existing literature and adopted in this study, or 
perhaps other explanations may be subsequently offered or the large BHC sub- 
sampling may provide further opportunities to examine this risk governance 
mechanism further. 
Actual Loan Losses is used here as one proxy for bad risks, identified by Stulz 
(2015) with compelling effect. However this is in some ways not so challenging 
given such measures are identified on an ex-post basis.  However, the question 
arises how can bank governance researchers proxy good risks identified by 
Stulz (2015), where the risk-taking benefits outweigh their costs?  
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For example, can Tail Risk as a market determined measure serve as a proxy? 
Alternatively and more likely, can changes in risk adjusted capital levels, such 
as TCE/RWA or economic capital play a more prominent role?  Developing new 
risk proxies within this framework would shed light on risk profiles as this sector 
faces the next risk-based challenge, preferably on a predictive or ex ante basis. 
Lastly, both quantitative and qualitative research approaches might be used to 
investigate extended areas of Risk Appetite. The process and effectiveness of 
cascading the risk appetite statement, and critically probing for any links with 
banker conduct, would offer great insights into this topical area, given the 
missteps observed by banking firms in recent history. Of particular promise is 
the phenomenon of cascading the Risk Appetite practice down the organisation 
and evaluating its impact upon risk culture (Jackson, 2014; Gontarek, 2016), 
including any reduction in bank fines and enforcement actions. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1: List of BHCs 
(in size order as of 2014, the year of the final passage of the Federal Register) 
# BHC Name # BHC Name # BHC Name 
1 JP MORGAN CHASE & CO 47 TEXAS CAPITAL BANCSHARES 94 FIRST FNCL BSHRS 
2 BANK OF AMERICA CORP 48 PACWEST BANCORP 95 First Bank 
3 WELLS FARGO & CO 49 UMB FINANCIAL CORP 96 RENASANT CORP 
4 CITIGROUP INC 50 PRIVATEBANCORP INC 97 FIRST MERCHANTS CORP 
5 US BANCORP INC 51 IBERIA BANCORP 98 TOWNEBANK 
6 PNC FINANCIAL SERVICES INC 52 F N B CORP 99 OPUS BK 
7 BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON  53 BANK OF HAWAII CORP 100 EAGLE BANCORP, INC 
8 STATE STREET CORP 54 ASTORIA FINANCIAL CORP  101 TALMER BANCORP INC. 
9 CAPITAL ONE FINANCIAL CORP 55 WASHINGTON FED INC  102 UNITED BANKSHARES INC/WV 
10 SUNTRUST BANKS INC 56 MB FINANCIAL INC/MD 103 STIFEL FNCL CORP 
11 BB&T CORP 57 RAYMOND JAMES FNCL  104 FLUSHING FC 
12 AMERICAN EXPRESS CORP 58 BANCORPSOUTH INC 105 WESTAMERICA BANC CORP 
13 FIFTH THIRD CORP 59 FLAGSTAR BANCORP INC 106 NATIONAL BK HOLDS CORP 
14 GOLDMAN SACHS GROUP INC 60 TRUSTMARK CORP 107 S & T BANCORP INC 
15 MORGAN STANLEY 61 CATHAY GENERAL BANCORP 108 BANNER CORP 
16 REGIONS FINANCIAL CORP 62 OLD NATIONAL BANCORP 109 CENTRAL PACIFIC FINANCIAL  
17 NORTHERN TRUST CORP 63 WESTERN ALLIANCE BANC 110 BANCORP  
18 ALLY FINANCIAL CORP 64 INTL BANCSHARES CORP 111 1ST SOURCE CORP 
19 M&T BANK CORP 65 CAPITOL FEDERAL FINANCIAL  112 SIMMONS FIRST NAT CORP 
20 KEYCORP 66 FULTON FINANCIAL CORP 113 TRUSTCO BANK CORP/NY  
21 DISCOVER FINANCIAL SERVICES 67 NATIONAL PENN BANCSHARE 114 WILSHIRE BANCORP INC. 
22 COMERICA INC 68 PROVIDENT FINANCIAL SVSC  115 SANDY SPRING BANCORP INC. 
23 HUNTINGTON BANCSHARES 69 COLUMBIA BANKING SYSTEM  116 SERVISFIRST BANCSHARES  
24 FIRST REPUBLIC BANK 70 FIRST INTERSTATE BANCSYS  117 NEW YORK CMNTY BANCORP  
25 FIRST NIAGARA FINANCIAL GRP 71 GLACIER BANCORP, INC. 118 YADKIN FINANCIAL CORP 
26 SVB FINANCIAL GROUP 72 NBT BANCORP INC 119 BNC BANCORP 
27 PEOPLES UNITED FINANCIAL INC 73 STERLING BANCORP 120 AMERIS BANCORP 
28 CITY NATIONAL CORP  74 UNITED COMMUNITY BANKS  121 HANMI FIN CORP 
29 KEYCORP 75 COMMUNITY BANK SYSTEM  122 GREAT SOUTHERN BANCORP  
30 BOK FINANCIAL CORP 76 CHEMICAL FINANCIAL CORP 123 FIRST NBC BHC 
31 EAST WEST BANCORP 77 HOME BANCSHARES, INC. 124 REPUBLIC BANCORP 
32 SIGNATURE BANK 78 CVB FINANCIAL CORP 125 TRICO BANCSHARES 
33 CULLEN/FROST BANKERS INC 79 UNION BANKSHARES CORP  126 CENTERSTATE BANKS INC. 
34 SYNOVUS FINANCIAL CORP 80 BBCN BANCORP INC 127 FIRST BUSEY CORP 
35 ASSOCIATED BANC-CORP 81 PARK NATIONAL CORP 128 CENTURY BANCORP INC 
36 FIRST HORIZON NATIONAL CORP 82 FIRST FINANCIAL BANCORP  129 COMMUNITY TR BANCORP INC 
37 FIRSTMERIT CORP 83 CUSTOMERS BC 130 LAKELAND BANCORP INC 
38 UMPQUA HOLDINGS CORP 84 CAPITAL BK FNCL CORP  131 WASHINGTON TR BC INC 
39 PROSPERITY BANCSHARES INC 85 INDEPENDENT BANK Corp 132 HERITAGE FC 
40 CIT GROUP 86 POPULAR INC 133 CARDINAL FC 
41 HANCOCK HOLDING CO 87 BOSTON PRIVATE FINL  134 FIDELITY SOUTHERN CORP 
42 TCF FINANCIAL CORP 88 BANCFIRST CORP 135 WINTRUST FINANCIAL CORP 
43 BANKUNITED INC 89 BERKSHIRE HILLS BANCORP  136 DIME COMMUNITY BANCS 
44 ZIONS BANCORPORATION 90 LEGACYTEXAS FNCL GRP 137 MAINSOURCE FNCL GRP 
45 VALLEY NATIONAL BANCORP 91 FIRST COMMONWLTH FINL 138 COBIZ FNCL INC 
46 SUSQUEHANNA BANCSHARES  92 PINNACLE FNCL PTNR 139 BRYN MAWR BK CORP 
  93 BANC OF CALIFORNIA INC. 140 BANK MUTUAL CORP 
Source: Author, based on US Federal Reserve data 
(http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr/current/)86 
 
 
                                            
86 This website reports both BHCs and IHCs, the latter of which are wholly owned by non-domestic banks domiciled 
elsewhere in the world. This study focuses on BHCs only. 
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Appendix 2: Extended Variable Definitions 
No. Name  Period Type Comments – headline or secondary variable.  
1. Actual Net Loan 
Losses 
2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
performance 
Following Hines and Peters (2015), actual level of net loan 
losses (charge-offs after recoveries) reported by Bloomberg.  
Stulz (2015) identifies negative net present value that destroys 
value as standalone bank risks. Actual net loan losses of banks 
can be viewed as the ultimate bad risk.   
2. BHC Assets 2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable 
Following Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012), Battaglia and Gallo 
(2015), Pathan (2009), Peni and Vahämaa (2012), Zagorchev 
and Gao (2015), total assets in USD and reported by US 
Federal Reserve (https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/lbr). 
3. Board Size  2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable 
The number of board members following Aebi, Sabato and 
Schmid (2012) and Pathan (2009); small boards or less 
restrictive boards who may be powerful are associated with 
greater risk-taking, while strong CEO is associated with less 
risk-taking; collected via BoardEx. 
4.  BOD Attendance 
Percentage 
2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable 
Defined as the percentage of directors in attendance for a board 
meeting, via Bloomberg.  High meeting attendance by directors 
can enhance performance of the firm, as observed in Chou, 
Chung and Yin (2013). 
5. BOD Meeting 
Number 
2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable 
Number of board meetings held per year by the BHC, via 
Bloomberg, following Vafeas (1999) and de Andres and 
Vallelado (2008). 
6. Busyness of an 
executive or 
director 
2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable 
Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012), Fich and Shivdasani (2006), 
Sun and Liu (2013), Elyasiani and Zhang (2015), Nguyen, 
Hagendorff and Eshraghi (2015), Cooper and Uzum (2012); 
measured as total number of board positions held via BoardEx. 
7. CEO Duality  2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable 
Dummy of one (or zero) depending whether CEO holds both 
positions at year-end.  Follows Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012), 
Coles et al. (2008), Weir, Laing and McKnight (2002), Pathan 
(2009), Zagorchev and Gao (2015), Pi and Timme (1993), Chen, 
Lin and Yi (2008), Byrd et al. (2012) in a banking context; 
collected via BoardEx. 
8. CEO Educational 
Background 
2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable 
Hand collected via BoardEx data coding a one (or zero) value of 
advanced business or law degree or similar qualifications 
following Güner, Malmendier and Tate (2008) and IMF (2014). 
9. CEO Shares  2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable 
Coles et al. (2008), Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash (2011), and 
others find either no or a complex U-shaped relationship 
between ownership and share holdings; measured in USD 
collected from Bloomberg. 
10.  CEO Tenure 2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable  
Follows other leading corporate governance research for CEOs 
(Belghitar and Clark, 2012; Tung and Wang, 2012) as a proxy 
for strong CEO via CEO tenure; see also Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2013) and Pathan (2009); uses BoardEx data. 
11.  CEO Board 
Years 
2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable 
used for 
index 
construction 
Measures the number of years a CEO has been on the board of 
directors as a proxy for CEO Power, collected from BoardEx; 
Hermalin and Weisbach (1988) argue that CEO Power 
increases over time, while the power of the board potentially 
declines, leading to lower monitoring effectiveness in an agency 
theory context. 
12. CEO Power  
 
2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
Variable    
An independent variable created with principal component 
analysis comprised of seven other CEO variables, namely CEO 
age (measured in years), CEO years on the board of directors 
(measured in years), CEO tenure (measured as number of 
years at the BHC in any capacity), CEO busyness (measured by 
the number of board seats held), CEO Duality (a dummy 
variable if the CEO also is chairman), CEO education, and CEO 
annual compensation. Data collected from BoardEx except for 
CEO total annual compensation (Bloomberg and Morningside).  
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13. CRO Centrality 2012 to 
2015 
Additional 
Control 
Variable 
Measured as the ratio of CRO compensation to CEO total 
compensation as a proxy of CRO power and influence versus 
other risk-taking incentives, following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), 
Keys et al. (2009), and Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2007).  
14. 
 
 
CRO Tenure 2012 - 
2015 
Additional 
Control 
Variable 
Following Belghitar and Clark (2012) who employ CEO Tenure 
as an explanatory variable, CRO experience levels are proxied 
by measuring the number of years within a BHC. This data is 
collected from Bloomberg. 
15. Deposits to 
Assets 
2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable 
Deposits/Assets is a control variable collected from Bloomberg, 
following Ellul & Yerramilli (2013). Typically banks with greater 
deposit financing (as opposed to money market funding) is less 
risky (also see Aebi, Sabato & Schmid, 2012).  
16. Executive Age 
(CEO or CRO) 
2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable  
Following Faleye, Hoitash and Hoitash (2011), Hagendorff, 
Collins and Keasey (2010) and Nguyen, Hagendorff and 
Eshraghi (2014), the age of the CEO (and CRO) is collected and 
measured as a continuous variable from BoardEx. Used in index 
construction for CEO Power or as a control variable for CRO. 
18. 
 
 
Efficiency Ratio 2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
performance 
BHC non-interest costs divided by revenue, collected from 
Bloomberg.  Practitioners consider this the per cent of a dollar 
required to produce one dollar of bank revenue, so lower values 
show greater levels of efficiency. Hand collected from 
Bloomberg and following Pi & Timme (1993) and more recently 
for US banks by Jacewtiz and Kupiec (2012).  
19. HPRs 2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
performance 
Annual total equity returns assuming dividends are re-investored 
in shares.  Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012), Peni and 
Vahämaa, (2012), Battaglia and Gallo (2015), Fahlenbrach and 
Stulz (2011), Beltratti and Stulz (2010) all use this outcome 
variable to measure the equity markets’ reaction to investment 
proposition; collected via Bloomberg data as annual returns. 
20. Institutional 
Shareholdings 
2012 – 
2015 
Additional 
Control  
Following Aebi, Sabato and Schmid (2012), Erkens et al. (2010), 
and Beltratti & Stulz (2011). Suggests greater institutional 
ownership may related to greater monitoring, Laeven & Levine 
(2009); Switzer & Wang (2013) where risk-taking varies 
positively with comparative power of shareholders.  Collected 
via Bloomberg data as the percentage institutional shareholder 
listed on the current of share register. 
21. International 
Activity 
2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable  
Used in risk-related estimations; measured as the percentage of 
gross income originating from BHC non-domestic activities, 
collected from Bloomberg; Berger et al. (2015) empirically find 
that US banks with greater international exposure are riskier 
across a series of econometric tests and samples. 
22. NPLs/Total Loans 2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
risk 
Following Berger et. al. (2012), Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), 
Zagorchev and Gao (2015); collected via Bloomberg as non-
performing loans as percentage of total loans. 
23. Net Interest 
Income / Average 
Assets (NII) 
2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
performance 
The net of BHC interest income and investment income less 
interest expenses divided by total assets, as reported in 
Bloomberg. 
24. NIM (Net Interest 
Margin)  
2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
performance 
Following Fernandes and Fich (2013), Minton, Taillard and 
Williamson (2014), Gulamhussen and Santa, (2015); considers 
the difference between the BHC asset spread and BHC liability 
spread, a measure of pricing discipline and performance 
measure, hand collected from Bloomberg. 
25. Non-Insider 
Percentage on 
Board of 
Directors  
2012 – 
2015 
Explanatory 
variable 
Yermack (1996) and Fernandes and Fish (2013) find high levels 
of director expertise related to better performance; Barakat and 
Hussainey (2011) find higher proportion of independent directors 
results in better disclosure quality, while Zagorchev and Gao 
(2015) and Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014) find 
independence relates to lower risk and income smoothing; 
reported as a percentage of total directors, via BoardEx. 
26. Operating Income 2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
performance 
Earnings before taxes but after expenses such as credit losses, 
collected from Bloomberg. 
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27. Operating Margin 2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
performance 
Also known as operating income margin, this is BHCs’ operating 
income divided by total revenue, collected from Bloomberg. 
28. Other Operating 
Income 
2012 -
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
performance 
Operating income, which is non-recurring and not from the 
difference of net interest income and expense, collected from 
Bloomberg. 
29. Risk Appetite  2012 – 
2015 
Independent 
variable 
(predictor) 
Conceptual research identifies the importance of risk (Yoost, 
2014; Stulz, 2015; Gontarek, 2016); hand-collected via annual 
reports and 10K reports as board approved and articulated risk 
appetite statements for that fiscal year.  Assigning a one (or 
zero) dummy if adopted by the BHC at the board level and 
expressly approved by the board of directors.   
30.  Risk Committee – 
Risk Appetite 
2012 – 
2015 
Independent 
variable 
(predictor) 
Also measures the articulation of the Risk Appetite levels and 
types but observed in a more strict sense by observing its use 
only from BHC Risk Committee charter statements. Hand picked 
from Risk Committee documents available on BHC websites 
and assigning a one (or zero) dummy if adopted by the BHC.  
31. Risk Committee 
Member 
Busyness 
2012 – 
2015 
Additional 
control 
variable 
The number of other board positions are collected and 
measured as a continuous variable from BoardEx for all Risk 
Committee members.  Busy directors can be associated with 
worse performance as monitoring quality declines as these 
governance actors become distracted, following Mehran, 
Morrison and Shapiro (2011) and Cooper and Uzun (2012). 
32. Risk Committee 
Chairman - 
Gender 
2012 – 
2015 
Additional 
control 
variable 
Female representation on banks’ boards of directors may be 
associated with better performance or different risk-taking levels 
(Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Adams and Ragunathan, 2013; 
Palvia, Vähämaa and Vähämaa, 2014). Newly-emerging 
research on US BHCs reveals that BHCs with more female 
directors performed better during the crisis (St Claire et al., 
2016). The gender of the Risk Committee chairman is observed 
via BoardEx and validated via Linkedin if not apparent, with a 
dummy of 1 if female otherwise 0.  
33. 
 
 
Risk 
Management 
Committee 
Financial 
Expertise  
2012 – 
2015 
Independent 
variable 
(predictor) 
Measures the financial expertise level percentage for all Risk 
Committee members for that year, relying on definitions by 
Minton, Taillard and Williamson (2014) and Güner, Malmendier 
and Tate (2008); all Risk Committee member data collected 
from BoardEx; dummy variable value of one indicates the Risk 
Committee member is a former bank executive, or holds an 
executive position in a non-bank financial institution or a 
financial position in a non-financial institution (such as 
treasurer), has an academic degree in finance or economics, or 
works in other areas of finance (fund manager etc.). 
34. Risk Committee 
Chairman 
Expertise 
2012 – 
2015 
Independent 
variable 
(predictor) 
Follows the same financial definition as for the Risk Committee 
financial expertise levels above but the dummy variable has a 
value of one if the Risk Committee chairman meets this 
definition, and zero otherwise. 
35. 
 
 
ROA 2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
performance 
ECB (2010a), Ellul and Yerramilli (2013), Aebi, Sabato and 
Schmid (2012), Peni and Vahämaa (2012), Battaglia and Gallo 
(2015); collected via Bloomberg. 
36. Tail Risk 2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
risk 
Following Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and other risk governance 
research, Tail Risk is defined as the negative of the average 
return on the BHC stock over the 5% worst return days; daily 
stock returns collected from Bloomberg. 
37. TCE/RWA  2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
risk 
Tangible common equity/risk weighted assets. McKinsey (2010), 
Das and Sy (2012) and Moody’s (2015) identify this as a key 
capital measure for banks; collected from Bloomberg. 
38. 
 
Tier 1 Capital 
Ratio 
2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
risk 
Used by ECB (2010a), Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and Iselin 
(2016) to measure regulatory capital levels, measured as a 
percentage of risk-weighted assets from Bloomberg data; Tier 1 
is the core equity capital (equity from common stock, cumulative 
preferred stock) and disclosed reserves relative to risk-weighted 
assets. 
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Source: The author’s own analysis 
39.  
 
Total Interest 
Income 
2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
risk 
Revenues generated from interest-bearing assets per annum, 
collected from Bloomberg. Used to delve deeper into underling 
BHC performance trends underneath NIM.  
40. Total Interest 
Expense 
2012 – 
2015 
Dependent 
variable – 
risk 
Expenses generated from interest-bearing expenses per annum, 
collected from Bloomberg. Used to delve deeper into underling 
BHC performance trends underneath NIM. 
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Appendix 3: Risk Appetite Statement Step Plan 
No. 
 
Role in Risk Appetite Arrangements 
 
CEO CRO Board of Directors 
or Risk Committee 
1. Establish a risk appetite framework consistent with bank strategy 
or mergers and acquisitions, earnings profile, liquidity and capital 
plans, incentives, culture and regulatory requirements ( 
✔ ✔ ✔ 
2.  Ensure that the importance of Risk Appetite arrangements are 
effectively communicated across the firm to and provide the 
necessary resources to implement and monitor these processes 
within the firm 
✔    
3.  Ensure the risk appetite statements can be used to drive the risk 
appetite framework, including the series risk limits for credit risk, 
market risk, and operational risk.  
  ✔  
4.  Translate the risk appetite statements into a set of triggers, 
reporting tools and monitoring mechanisms for the board 
  ✔  
5.  
 
Provide for the cascading of the risk appetite statement to the 
business units and upward reporting limit breaches to 
management  
✔    
6.  Provide for the cascading of the risk appetite statement to the 
board of directors and relevant committees, including the Risk 
Committee. 
  ✔  
7.  Identify and review Risk Appetite metrics for new and emerging 
business risks such as cyber risks, fraud and reputational or 
conduct risks. 
  ✔  
8. Consider subsidiary and jurisdictional issues vis-à-vis Risk 
Appetite processes including risk and regulatory differences. 
✔ ✔  
9.  Procure the approval by the board of directors of the risk appetite 
statement and related framework, including risk limits. 
✔ ✔  
10. 
 
Oversee implementation of an appropriate risk governance 
framework and (with senior management) develop and articulate 
the firm’s risk appetite statement and related framework. 
    ✔ 
11.  Examine risk capacity, Risk Appetite and the effectiveness of the 
buffer between these two metrics.  Seek to ensure that the Risk 
Appetite promotes a strong risk culture in the business, a key 
responsibility of the board. 
    ✔ 
12.  Ensure and oversee management’s implementation of the risk 
appetite statement and overall risk governance framework, 
monitor the bank’s adherence to the risk appetite statement. 
    ✔ 
13.  Oversee the design and management’s implementation of the 
firm’s compensation system and ensure its alignment with 
desired risk culture and risk appetite statement. 
    ✔ 
14 Interface with the regulator on risk appetite statements, including 
their establishment and mechanisms of reporting to regulatory 
officials and other parties if needed. Also note the board shall 
take into account the legitimate interests of depositors, 
shareholders, and other stakeholders. 
✔ ✔ ✔ 
Source: The Author, inspired by Basel (2015a), Yoost (2014), Ernst & Young (2015c), Jackson 
(2014) and Gontarek (2016) 
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Appendix 4: Sample Statement of Principal Risk Types 
(Excerpts) 
Scotia Bank 2014 
Risk Type Governing Documentation Application to Risk Appetite 
Credit Risk 
 
- Credit Risk Policy 
- Credit Risk Appetite 
- Allowance Policy for NPLs 
- Underwriting Policy 
Quantitative limits/tolerance: 
Single customer limits 
Country risk limits 
Industry concentration limits 
Market Risk Market and Structural Risk Policy Quantitative limits/tolerances, including VaR 
limits, debt instrument exposures, interest rate 
and FX exposures 
Liquidity and Funding 
Risks 
Liquidity Risk and Collateral 
Management Policy 
Quantitative limits/tolerances including levels of 
unencumbered collateral, limits to control each 
cashflow over a specific time period, 
diversification by funding source 
Operational Risks - Operational Risk Management Policy 
- Model Risk Management Policy 
- Compliance Policy 
Identification and measurement and mitigation 
over operational risk, expressed as an aggregate 
loss event, single limit and benchmarking 
Reputational Risk Reputational Risk Policy Low tolerance for reputational, legal or taxation 
risk 
Environmental Risk Environmental Risk Policy Consistency with Equator Principles by financing 
projects for which borrowers can demonstrate 
willingness to comply with processes to ensure 
the project will be financed in a socially 
responsible manner 
Strategic Risk Strategy Report to the Board of Directors Considers links between the risk appetite 
statement and enterprise strategy, and business-
line strategies and includes measuring progress 
against plans, implementation and limits 
Insurance Risk Insurance Risk Policy Maintain minimal exposure to insurance risks on a 
selective basis and seek to achieve stable and 
sustainable earnings with diversifiable limits by 
geography and product line 
 
Source: http://media.scotiabank.com/AR/2014/files/1814/1774/4832/Risk_Management.pdf 
(accessed 14 October 2016) 
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Appendix 5: Sample Risk Appetite Statement87 (Excerpts) 
PNC’s Enterprise Risk Appetite Statement, 15 December 201588 
ENTERPRISE RISK APPETITE STATEMENT 
COMPONENTS  
ENTERPRISE RISK APPETITE METRICS 
1. Achieve our business objectives and protect our brand 
by accepting risks that are understood, quantifiable, and 
analysed through all phases of the economic cycle 
Five credit risk metrics 
Four operational risk metrics 
Four market risk metrics 
One model risk metric 
One compliance risk metric 
2. Earn trust and loyalty from all stakeholders including 
employees, customers, communities and shareholders 
Six operational risk metrics 
Two reputational risk metrics 
3. Reward individual and team performance by taking into 
account risk discipline and performance measurement 
All metrics measured through Human Resources, 
including performance evaluation and compensation 
4. Practice disciplined capital and liquidity management so 
that the firm can operate effectively through all economic 
cycle 
Twenty-one liquidity metrics 
Twenty capital metrics 
Two credit risk metrics 
Two market risk metrics 
Source: Koncz (2015) 
  
                                            
87 The Risk Committee of the full board follows a Risk Committee charter, which indicates it shall annually review and 
recommend to the full board the articulation, and approval of the firm’s Risk Appetite and approve any amendments of 
Risk Appetite (see item 4 of Appendix 7).  
88 PNC is a major US BHC and mandatory adopter of Risk Appetite arrangements given is size.  
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Appendix 6: Example Risk Appetite Dashboard (Excerpts) 
As might be used by a Risk Committee to actively monitor BHC risks 
Type of Risk Measure Baseline/Normal Stress Scenario 
Capital Ratios Tier 1 capital   XX bps XX bps 
Capital Ratios Total Capital Ratio XX bps XX bps 
Capital Ratios Leverage Ratio XX bps XX bps 
Profitability  Monthly Net Income  $XX millions $XX millions 
Profitability  Efficiency Ratio XX% XX% 
Profitability  Trailing 12-month Net Income $XX millions $XX millions 
Profitability Return on Assets  XX bps XX bps 
Profitability Net Interest Income and NIM measures XX bps XX bps 
Credit Risk Actual Loan Losses $XX millions $YY millions 
Credit Risk Provisions (forward over two quarters) as a 
percentage of Tier 1 Capital 
XX bps XX bps 
Credit Risk Non-Agency MBS Securities XX bps  XX bps 
Credit Risk International Exposures XX bps YY bps  
Profit Rate Risk Change in one-year earnings for a specified loss 
stress scenario 
XX bps XX bps 
Operational Risk Material exceptions to policies and limits X times Y times 
Reputational 
Risk 
Retention of High Potential Key Managers X% Y% 
Reputational 
Risk 
% of Customer Satisfaction X% Y% 
Market Risk Change in one-year earnings given a 300bps (or 
500bps) parallel shift in the yield curve 
$XX millions $XX millions 
 Key No Breach Close to Breach Breach 
 
Inspired by: McKinsey (2014), Lam (2015)  
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Appendix 7: Sample Risk Committee Charter (Excerpts) 
Wells Fargo and Co. Risk Committee Charter, 15 December 2015 
PURPOSE: 
The purpose of the Risk Committee is to provide oversight of the Company’s 
enterprise-wide risk management framework and corporate risk function, 
including strategies, policies, procedures, processes, and systems, established 
by management to identify, assess, measure, monitor, and manage the major 
risks facing the Company. The Committee shall assist the Board of Directors 
and its other committees that oversee specific risk-related issues and serve as 
a resource to management by overseeing risk across the entire Company and 
across all risk types, and by enhancing management’s and the Board’s 
understanding of the Company’s overall Risk Appetite and enterprise-wide risk 
management activities and effectiveness. 
MEMBERSHIP AND MEETINGS: 
The Committee consists of a minimum of six members and meets at least 
quarterly. The members of the Committee shall each have been determined by 
the Board to be independent under the rules of the New York Stock Exchange. 
The Committee’s membership shall meet all independence, expertise and 
experience requirements imposed by any applicable regulatory authority. 
The Committee shall meet periodically in separate executive sessions with the 
Chief Risk Officer (CRO) and other members of management as it determines 
appropriate.  The CRO is expected to communicate with the Chair on any 
significant risk issues that arise between committee meetings, including any 
issues raised by management’s Enterprise Risk Management Committee. 
 
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILITIES: 
1. Risk management framework. The Committee shall approve and periodically 
review the Company’s risk management framework, which outlines the 
Company’s overarching approach to risk management and the policy, 
practices, and governance structures used by management to execute its 
risk management program and corporate risk strategy, including those 
related to the following: 
• Maintaining a strong risk culture and the independence and structure of 
corporate risk 
• Defining risk roles and responsibilities across the Company’s three lines 
of defence 
• Establishing protocols and processes for issue escalation and reporting 
• Facilitating an appropriate credible challenge of business decisions 
• Providing for the recruitment, development, retention, compensation and 
succession of risk talent, as well as enterprise-wide risk incentive based 
compensation practices that are consistent with the safety and 
soundness of the Company and do not encourage excessive risk-taking 
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2. Oversight of the Corporate Risk Function. The Committee shall oversee and 
receive reports of the Company’s enterprise-wide risk management 
framework and Corporate Risk function. The CRO together with the 
Corporate Risk Function, shall report functionally to the Committee and 
administratively to the CEO. The Committee shall initiate and approve the 
appointment and replacement of the CRO, evaluate the CRO, and approve 
his or her base compensation, adjustments and incentive compensation. 
 
3. Risk Coverage Statement and Risk Profile. The Committee shall approve 
the types of key risks facing the Company including credit risk, financial 
crimes risk, information security risk, interest rate risk, liquidity risks, market 
risk, model risk, operational risk, regulatory compliance risk, reputation risk, 
strategic risk and technology risk. The Committee review the Company’s 
enterprise-wide risk profile as well as alignment of the risk profile within the 
Company’s strategic plan, goals, objectives and risk appetite. 
 
4. Risk appetite. The Committee shall annually review and recommend to the 
Board the articulation and establishment of the Company’s risk appetite, and 
shall approve any amendments of risk appetite. The Committee shall receive 
reports from management and other Board Committees regarding the 
adherence to risk limits and established risk appetite. 
 
5. Risk Frameworks and Policies. The Committee shall approve and 
periodically review the functional framework and oversight policies 
established by management for the key risk types identified in this 
Company’s risk coverage statement. 
 
6. Liquidity and Funding Risks; Capital Adequacy. The Committee shall 
oversee the Company’s liquidity and funding risks, and shall annually review 
and approve the Company’s liquidity management strategies, policies and 
procedures. The Committee shall discuss periodically the Company’s capital 
adequacy and planning activities in relation to the Company’s risk profile. 
 
7. Acquisitions and Strategic Initiatives. The Committee shall receive reports 
prepared by the Company’s Corporate Development Department pursuant 
to the Board’s Acquisition Policy, and shall make such inquiry of 
management regarding risks that may be associated with the Company’s 
acquisition activities or other new business activities as it may deem 
appropriate. 
 
8. Emerging Risks. The Committee shall receive regular reports from the CRO 
and others regarding emerging risks, including model risk. 
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9. Assessment of Risk Program. The Committee shall review and receive 
regular reports from the CRO and others regarding the effectiveness of the 
Company’s enterprise-wide risk management program, including corrective 
actions taken by management to address risk issues. 
 
10. Other Authority, Self-Evaluation, and Charter Review.  
• The Committee may obtain advice and assistance from internal and 
external legal, accounting and other advisors at the Company’s expense 
without prior permission of the Board or management. 
• The Committee shall review and assess the adequacy of this Charter 
annually and recommend amendments to this Charter at any time for 
approval to the Board. 
• The Committee shall annually review its own performance.  
 
Source: https://www08.wellsfargomedia.com/assets/pdf/about/corporate/risk-committee-
charter.pdf (accessed 14 October 2016) 
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Appendix 8: PCA Results for CEO Power 
CEO Power Index 
These results are produced by creating an index called CEO Power employing 
PCA with 541 observations and seven components. The input variables are 
CEO Age, CEO Board of Director Years, CEO Tenure, CEO Busyness, CEO 
Duality, CEO Education and CEO Total Compensation, as defined in Appendix 
2.89 
Panel I  
Component Eigenvalue Difference  Proportion  Cumulative 
PC 1 2.44833 1.13883 0.3498 0.349890 
PC 2 1.3095 0.346178 01871 0.5368 
PC 3 0.963321 0.147596 0.1376 0.6744 
PC 4 0.815726 0.156525 0.1165 0.7910 
PC 5 0.6592 0.0303322 0.0942 0.8852 
PC 6 0.628868 0.453808 0.0898 0.9750 
PC 7 0.17506 . 0.0250 1.0000 
 
Panel II (eigenvectors)91 
 Components  
Variable PC 1 PC 2 PC 3 PC 4 PC 5 PC 6 PC 7 Not 
Explained 
CEO Age 0.4128 -0.0931 
 
-0.0171 -0.4796 0.7043  0.2966 -0.0811  0 
CEO BOD Yrs. 0.5614 -0.1355 0.2709 -0.0028 -0.2473  -0.0263 0.7289  0 
         
CEO Tenure 0.5468 -0.0745 0.1819 0.0005 -0.4622 0.1457 -0.6539  0 
         
CEO Busyness 0.3267 -0.0274 -0.4129 0.7918 0.2755 0.1384 -0.0018  0 
         
CEO Duality 0.3270 0.4801 
 
-0.2352 -0.1375 0.0834 -0.7588 -0.0747  0 
CEO Education -0.0305 0.4810 0.7590 0.3167 0.2921 0.0373 -0.0675  0 
         
CEO Comp. 0.0308 0.7105 -0.3024 -0.1543 -0.2468 0.5420 0.1560  0 
 
Notes: PCA facilitates the construction of the risk governance index (RGI) without using arbitrary weightings of each variable, following 
Tetlock (2007), Ellul and Yerramilli (2013) and others. This method facilitates the formation of a new variable, CEO Power, made up of 
combinations of the seven CEO-related variables (Lingel and Sheedy, 2015). The newly formed variables, called principal components, 
are by construction orthogonally related, and the linear combination that explains the maximum variation in the initial variables is called 
the first principal component. The first eigenvector defines the relevant weightings for each risk governance variable in the first principal 
component (Lingel and Sheedy, 2012). The index resulting from the use of PCA is used to reduce the number of variables used in 
subsequent regression analysis, a key aim in this exercise (Magee, Schilling and Sheedy, 2014).  
                                            
89 For example, Hagendorff, Collins and Keasey (2010) measure and employ CEO Duality, CEO Age, CEO Tenure and 
expertise in their study of monitoring variables, while Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) find a link between CEO pay 
measures and risk-taking incentives embedded in executive compensation plans. 
90 The first principal component explains the variation in the model and justifies its use in subsequent regressions. This 
factor varies in the risk governance literature, with 36% of the variation explained by Lingel & Sheedy (2012), up to 
nearly 90% by Ellul and on Yerramilli (2013). 
91 The weighting assigned to each index component is determined by the eigenvector for each principal component. 
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Appendix 9 
Table 22. Model 13: Mitigating omitted variables – performance measures92  
Variable93 Model 13a 
(ROA) 
Model 13b 
(NIM) 
Model 13c 
(Eff. Ratio) 
Model 13d 
(HPRs) 
     
     
Risk Appetite 0.401** 0.895*** -8.217 -12.20* 
 (2.20) (3.38) (-1.74) (-1.81) 
     
CRO Age 0.00722 -0.0345 0.223 0.196 
 (0.23) (-0.77) (0.28) (0.17) 
     
BHC Assets -.0000017 -.000007** .000058* .000153** 
 (-0.87) (-2.48) (1.13) (2.09) 
     
BOD Meeting 0.00518 0.0185 0.199 -0.353 
Number (0.29) (0.71) (0.42) (-0.53) 
     
BOD Meeting 0.0248** -0.00312 0.106 0.875* 
Attendance (2.11) (-0.18) (0.34) (1.84) 
     
BOD Non-insider -1.634 -3.993 -2.394 47.86 
 (-0.83) (-1.40) (-0.04) (0.66) 
     
Board Size 0.0372 0.0239 -1.131 1.149 
 (0.92) (0.41) (-0.97) (0.77) 
     
TLTA -0.0461*** -0.0508** 1.194** -0.385 
 (-2.66) (-2.02) (2.57) (-0.60) 
     
Deposits / Assets 0.0406 0.0422 -0.689 0.163 
 (1.98) (1.42) (-1.27) (0.21) 
     
CEO Shares -4.50e-09 -1.79e-09 3.15e-08 -.0000001** 
 (-1.41) (-0.39) (0.37) (-2.37) 
     
Institutional Shares 0.00828 0.00805 -0.0951 0.0449 
 (1.39) (0.93) (-0.56) (0.15) 
     
RC Member Busy -0.0807* -0.0225 0.945 -0.118 
 (-1.93) (-0.37) (0.86) (-0.07) 
     
CRO Centrality -0.427 -1.204** 9.495 -3.505 
 (-1.23) (-2.39) (1.02) (-0.27) 
     
CRO Tenure 0.0127 0.00302 -0.0415 0.245 
 (0.69) (0.11) (-0.09) (0.36) 
     
RC Chair Gender 0.216 0.301 -9.557* -2.691 
 (1.13) (1.09) (-1.80) (-0.38) 
     
Observations 183 183 176 181 
     
R2 0.3111 0.3082 0.2508 0.7064 
     
AIC 60 197 1196 1364 
     
BIC 118 255 1253 1422 
     
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
 
Notes: Table 12 Models 13a to 13d reports fixed effects (FE) estimations with Risk Appetite observed in BHC annual reports the 
key explanatory variable, for an extended set of control variables. The dependent performance variable is labeled underneath 
the Model number. Significant findings are denoted with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively with coefficient 
values reported (and t values reported in parentheses).   
 
 
                                            
92 No evidence for multicollinearity was identified after running a VIF test for the independent and control variables. 
93 Risk Committee Exists did not produce reported results due to collinearity, so is not reported.    
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Appendix 10 
Table 23. Model 14: Mitigating omitted variables – risk measures94  
Variable95 Model 14a 
(NPLs) 
Model 14b 
(Loan Loss) 
Model 14c 
(Tier 1) 
Model 14d 
(Tail Risk) 
     
     
Risk Appetite 0.135 -882.0*** -0.288 -0.735 
 (0.81) (-4.60) (-0.36) (-0.29) 
     
CRO Age 0.00855 1.577 0.152 -0.109 
 (0.32) (0.05) (1.13) (-0.26) 
     
BHC Assets -.0000009 -0.0166*** -.0000004 .000030 
 (-0.48) (-7.62) (-0.05) (1.06) 
     
BOD Meeting 0.00456 -14.14 0.0619 -0.155 
Number (0.29) (-0.73) (0.78) (-0.63) 
     
BOD Meeting 0.000886 3.698 0.130** -0.0857 
Attendance (0.08) (0.30) (2.53) (-0.53) 
     
BOD Non-insider -0.611 -1448.2 7.572 18.66 
 (-0.36) (-0.65) (0.88) (0.69) 
     
Board Size 0.0364 -26.06 -0.0142 -0.111 
 (1.01) (-0.55) (-0.08) (-0.20) 
     
TLTA 0.0173 12.25 -0.298*** -0.306 
 (1.06) (0.65) (-3.93) (-1.28) 
     
Deposits / Assets 0.00838 20.30 -0.101 -0.443 
 (0.43) (0.89) (-1.09) (-1.53) 
     
CEO Shares 6.25e-09 -.00000065 -1.35e-08 -.0000003*** 
 (1.58) (-0.19) (-0.97) (-7.00) 
     
International Activities 3.863 24459.3*** 5.677 45.50 
 (0.70) (4.71) (0.26) (0.67) 
     
Institutional Shares -0.00867* -2.351 -.0819*** 0.150 
 (-1.66) (-0.34) (-3.14) (1.84) 
     
RC Member Busy 0.0467 3.546 0.232 -1.432** 
 (1.14) (0.08) (1.27) (-2.50) 
     
CRO Centrality -0.209 525.8 -0.245 -1.190 
 (-0.64) (1.37) (-0.16) (-0.25) 
     
CRO Tenure -0.00186 7.976 0.129 -0.114 
 (-0.12) (0.41) (1.60) (-0.45) 
     
RC Chair Gender 0.0468 -333.4 -0.446 -1.799 
 (0.25) (-1.53) (-0.53) (-0.68) 
     
Observations 173 175 182 182 
     
R2 0.3111 0.7912 0.4618 0.7353 
     
AIC 2 2484 596 1014 
     
BIC 62 2544 656 1075 
     
Year Dummies Yes    Yes    Yes Yes 
     
Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
 
Notes: Table 12 Models 13a to 13d reports fixed effects (FE) estimations with Risk Appetite observed in BHC annual reports the 
key explanatory variable. The dependent performance variable is labeled underneath the Model number. Significant findings are 
denoted with *, ** and *** for 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively with coefficient values reported (and t values reported in 
parentheses). 
 
                                            
94 No evidence for multicollinearity was identified after running a VIF test for the independent and control variables. 
95 Risk Committee Exists did not produce reported results due to collinearity, so is not reported.    
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Appendix 11: Curriculum Vitae 
Walter Gontarek is the Chief Executive Officer of Channel Capital Advisors LLP 
(Channel) a London-based, FCA-authorised and regulated credit investment 
management firm. He co-founded Channel ten years ago and was directly 
involved in establishing its corporate governance structures. Channel launched 
and managed Channel Capital Plc, a credit products platform which carefully 
acquired an investment-grade credit portfolio of $12 billion, before selling this 
business in a corporate disposal to a major US-based fund management firm in 
2013. Since then, Channel has successfully launched a working capital vehicle 
to provide financing opportunities for small to medium-sized European 
corporates using its trade receivables financing platform, Channel Finance S.A. 
Walt was previously Managing Director and Head of Global Credit Products at 
the Royal Bank of Canada, Managing Director of the Toronto-Dominion Bank in 
its Global Credit Products unit, a vice-president and director in capital markets 
at CIBC Wood Gundy in New York and London, a consultant to the Government 
of Poland on its banking privatisation programme, president of the retail-banking 
subsidiary at Loyola Capital, and a loan officer at Maryland National Bank for 
consumer and small business loans. 
He holds a BBA in Finance from Loyola University in Maryland, an MBA in 
Finance from the Stern School of Business at New York University, a certificate 
in International Management from ISA at the HEC Graduate School of 
Management in Jouy-en-Josas in France, and attended The Rock Corporate 
Governance Program at Stanford Law School in Palo Alto in 2013. Walter has 
published conceptual bank corporate governance research entitled “Risk 
governance in financial institutions: The growing importance of Risk Appetite 
and Culture” in The Journal of Risk Management in Financial Institutions in 
2016, which was based largely on his literature review at Cranfield School of 
Management. 
Walt is Chairman of the Advisory Board of Cloud 9 Group, a fintech company 
providing order to cash working capital solutions and an independent director of 
Frontclear Management NV (a provider of guarantees in frontier markets 
backed by leading development banking firms), and was named as a financial 
expert at the 2012 launch of PRIME Finance, a financial tribunal in the Hague 
backed by Dutch authorities to assist judicial systems in resolving financial 
disputes in emerging markets. He presented to this forum at the Peace Palace 
in Den Haag in January 2017 in order to raise the awareness of emerging credit 
market gaps in frontier markets and trade finance.  
Walt’s twitter’s address is @WalterGontarek, his corporate governance 
research website is www.corporategovernanceadvisory.com, and his blogsite 
dedicated to banking corporate governance is www.future-
governance.blogspot.co.uk. He is also an academic member of the European 
Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) and a member of the International 
Corporate Governance Society (ICGS). Walt was awarded the Cranfield School 
of Management’s Alan Harrison Award in October 2015. 
Walt resides in Sevenoaks, Kent, UK with his wife and three daughters.  
